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 In the years after the First World War numerous paramilitary organizations were 
set up in Bavaria with the expressed purpose of preventing a communist revolution in the 
state.  Encouraged by Germany’s and Bavaria’s Social Democratic leaders, military 
officers and men of means formed Freikorps units to overturn the Spartacist revolt in 
Berlin in January 1919 and the Räterepublik in Munich in April 1919.  After the specter 
of revolution receded these groups did not disband but reorganized themselves as 
paramilitary leagues.  In Bavaria the most significant of these early organizations was the 
Civil Defense Guards, or Einwohnerwehr, which was succeeded after 1921 by Bund 
Bayern und Reich.  In the years that followed both groups worked assiduously to impose 
their ideological imprint on Bavaria, but failed in the main.  However, through their 
efforts they set patterns and helped propagate ideas that would later be taken up by Adolf 
Hitler and his Nazi Party. 
 This dissertation looks at the creation, growth, ideology, and activities of these 
two paramilitary associations from 1918 to 1928.  Using archival sources from the 
Bavarian State Archives and the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, it argues 
that both groups subscribed to the culturally despairing völkisch nationalism that had 
been prevalent in Germany prior to World War I.  These tendencies were combined with 
a desire to crush the political left and return to older forms of government, including the 
preservation of the federalist constitution of 1871, ideas that were not shared by every 
organization on the right.  Instrumental in returning Bavaria to conservative rule in 1920, 
both groups failed to bring about their major goals in restoring the old regime to power.  
The closeness of both groups to the established authorities often undercut their efforts at 
critical junctures, making both seem creatures of the state rather than true 
counterrevolutionary forces, something that the Nazis were increasingly able to exploit. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 This is a study of paramilitary politics in Bavaria during the early and middle 
years of the Weimar Republic.  In particular it is an examination of two organizations: the 
Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich.  These two groups played an important role 
in fostering a climate of hatred and opposition to Germany’s first democracy.  Claiming 
to protect ‘law and order’ and the state from internal enemies bent on its destruction, both 
paramilitaries engaged in activities that had the effect of retarding the creation of a 
democratic republic in Bavaria, and overturning it when possible.  In addition, both 
associations were critical to fanning the flames of discontent over the Treaty of 
Versailles, a dissatisfaction that was central to the world view of many ultranationalist 
Germans during the Weimar period and helped to shape their view of the republic.  
Finally, the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich gave respectability to ideas and 
tendencies that would be exploited by organizations, like the Nazi Party, which far more 
revolutionary in their goals. 
 However, for the Nazis to succeed, the Einwohnerwehr and its successor, Bund 
Bayern und Reich, had to fail.  This, then, is a story of the limits of paramilitary politics 
in Bavaria in the 1920s.  Despite the success both groups had as agents of the 
counterrevolution, the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich failed to achieve the 
ideological goals laid out by their respective leaderships. That agenda relied on a 
combination of old notions of federalism and states’ rights carried over from the imperial 
period and a romantic, highly-stylized, and culturally despairing German nationalism that 
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had been amplified during the war years.  As a result both organizations advocated 
solutions to the country’s problems that were both conservative/reactionary (i.e., wanting 
to restore the previous form of government) and more radical (the creation of a völkisch 
utopia) at the same time.  This study will look at the history of these associations, how 
each was founded, the respective ideological programs, and the activities of both groups 
to determine those factors that limited their success. 
Historical Context 
 During the years following Germany’s defeat in the First World War bands of 
young and middle-aged men streamed into paramilitaries, Freikorps, voluntary 
associations, and Einwohnerwehren to save a world that, for them, seemed to be ending.  
That world, the German Empire with its attendant kings and princes, had been supplanted 
at the end of World War I by a new government.  This new regime, Germany’s first true 
democracy, was brought into existence on the strength of revolution and proclaimed from 
the balcony of the Imperial Palace by a politician belonging to the Social Democratic 
Party, which prior to the war was considered illegitimate and illegal by a not insignificant 
number of Germans.1
 That fact made the Weimar Republic a monstrosity in the eyes of many Germans.  
For them the republic stood for everything that had gone wrong in their country: the lost 
war, the breakdown of civil order, the continued material deprivation, and most 
significantly the hated Treaty of Versailles.  That agreement, signed in Paris on June 28, 
1919, blamed Germany for starting the war, took territory from the country in the east, 
 
                                                     
1 Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
19. 
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limited the size of its army, set up an army of occupation in the Rhineland, and forced it 
to pay reparations to the wartime allies.2
 Anger over the loss of the war and the humiliation of a “harsh” peace were not the 
only factors leading men to join paramilitary groups.  Just as important was the continued 
revolutionary fervor in Germany during the months following the end of the war.  The 
republic had been brought to power by revolution and that fact, coupled with the 
continued deprivations of the allied blockade, meant that further revolutionary changes 
might be in store.  For the new republican leaders the memories of the Russian 
Revolution, with its moderate and Bolshevik phases, were ever present.  If order was not 
restored they feared it would lead to the bolshevization of the country, or worse, the 
complete breakdown of civil order.  It was in order to prevent this development that the 
first paramilitary units were called into existence by a government composed of the 
liberal and socialist parties of the Weimar Coalition.
  In none of these instances did the men who 
joined paramilitary units blame the old imperial elites for this state of affairs, only 
Germany’s new democratic leaders. 
3  Led by Philipp Scheidemann, 
under the supervision of President Friedrich Ebert, this regime had claimed for itself the 
mantle of revolution, but was doing everything possible to insure the continuity of the old 
German order.4
                                                     
2 Margaret MacMillan, Paris, 1919: Six Months that Changed the World, (New York: Random House, 
2001), 157-93. 
 
3 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 84-9.  The Weimar Coalition was usually made up of three parties: the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), which represented Germany’s workers, the German Democratic Party (DDP), 
which spoke for the middle class and trended towards progressive politics, and the Center Party (Zentrum), 
that represented German Catholics.  Smaller parties, like the Independent Social Democrats (UPSD), 
sometimes joined this coalition, but played a lesser role compared to the major parties, ibid. 
4 Detlev J.K. Peukert, The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity, trans.  Richard Deveson, 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 28-33.  One of the major themes in the historiography of the Weimar 
Republic was the continuity of elites from the old imperial to the republic itself.  Many institutions that 
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 The first widespread use of paramilitary organizations came with the Spartacist 
Uprising of January 1919.   The revolt was the result of continuing discord between the 
Social Democrats and Independent Socialists over the course of the revolution.  Stymied 
in their efforts for reform the Independent Socialists and their Spartacist allies, led by 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, rioted and seized much of Berlin in the process.  
The Social Democratic leaders, Friedrich Ebert and his defense minister Gustav Noske, 
used the Freikorps to put down the insurrection with great severity, executing 
Luxemburg and Liebknecht in the process.5
 It was in suppressing the Spartacist Revolt in Berlin that government officials 
decided they needed a more dependable force to ensure domestic peace.  The Freikorps 
had simply been too brutal in their suppression of the rebels.  Almost immediately after 
the situation was secured emphasis shifted to the creation of the Civil Guards, or 
Einwohnerwehr.  This organization had a much broader basis than the Freikorps units, 
drawing most of their manpower from the citizenry at large, as opposed to ex-soldiers as 
many Freikorps units had.  Over the course of early 1919 units were set up throughout 
Germany.
 
6
 The most significant of these Einwohnerwehren would be set up in Bavaria.  Not 
only would the organization be the largest in the country, but it would be the most 
important politically.  The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr would not only become the leading 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
served the republic were staffed by people with no real love for democracy and, thus, no loyalty to the new 
government.  These included the army, the civil service, the judiciary, and academia.  The decision for 
continuity, as opposed to using the worker’s councils as an element of the new democratic republic, broke 
up the fragile coalition between the Social Democratic Party and the Independent Social Democratic Party 
(Independent Socialists) in December 1918, ibid. 
5 Ibid.  See also, James M. Diehl, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1977), 23-30 & 38-40. 
6 Ibid, 32-8. 
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agents of law and order, but of the counterrevolution as well.  That transformation would 
have a profound impact on the history of Bavaria and Germany.  The state became in the 
1920s and 30s the epicenter for right-wing political activity in the country.  Most groups 
that hated the Weimar Republic had a strong presence in Munich and other Bavarian 
cities during this period. 
Sources 
 This study is based heavily on archival research in the Bavarian State Archives 
(Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv) located in Munich, and its departments; I – files of the 
Ministry of Interior, including files on the Einwohnerwehr, the Räterepublik, Bund 
Bayern und Reich – including the Beer Hall Putsch, and general political disturbances; II 
– the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellery, including the private 
correspondence of Gustav von Kahr during his presidency in Bavaria from March 1920 
to September 1921, the workers movement and the Räterepublik, forbidden 
organizations, the disarmament debate, and the files of the General State Commissioner 
(Generalstaatskommissar), an office held by Gustav von Kahr in the months leading up 
to the Beer Hall Putsch; IV – the war archive, which contains the complete records of 
both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich; and V – the collections and papers 
of leading political and historical figures of the period including Georg Escherich, the 
head of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, and his second in command Rudolf Kanzler.7
 Additionally this study is based on archival research done at the Institute for 
Contemporary History (Institut für Zeitgeschichte) in Munich.  This archive contains the 
 
                                                     
7 The collection of Rudolf Kanzler’s papers are actually located in department five, but are listed in guides 
and this dissertation, as being part of the Einwohnerwehr archive. 
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main archive of the Nazi Party (Hauptarchiv des NSDAP) – from which files were 
obtained relating to Bund Bayern und Reich, the Working Group (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) 
and Fighting League (Kampfbund) from 1923, the Röhm-Pittinger dispute, and the Beer 
Hall Putsch.  Additionally sources were obtained from the library of the Institute, which 
contained the regulations and program for both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und 
Reich. 
 Finally this study is based on published materials located in the University of 
Nebraska library, and research libraries around the country.  The most significant of these 
published materials is the memoirs of Rudolf Kanzler, Bavaria’s Struggle against 
Bolshevism, which recounts his years as the number two man in the Einwohnerwehr.  All 
secondary source material used in this study is used to either explain the historiographical 
disputes, as background material, or to fill in holes where archival material is missing or 
not available. 
Overview of the Historical Literature 
 There are numerous works on the history of the Weimar Republic that try to 
explain the rise of the Nazis, and their role in the downfall of the republic.  Two of the 
more recent attempts to analyze the failure of Weimar have been by the historians Detlev 
J.K. Peukert and Eric Weitz.  Peukert’s The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical 
Modernity, argued that there was broad continuity from Imperial Germany to the 
Republic epitomized by the survival of old elites – bureaucracy, judiciary, army, to name 
a few.  The decision made by the republican leaders to emphasize stability over chaos led 
them to make choices that helped set the stage for the paramilitaries that would be such a 
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feature of Weimar.8  Moreover, when the crisis years came, the decisions made by the 
early republican leaders led to a perfect storm of enraged elites and a loss of legitimacy 
that made Hitler’s eventual triumph more likely.9
 Meanwhile Eric Weitz, in Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy, divided the 
history of Weimar politics into three phases: left-liberal, moderate conservative, and 
authoritarian conservative.  The republic’s eventual collapse was due primarily to a 
coming together of conservatives and radicals in a grand coalition to destroy the republic 
in the last phase.  This occurred because old elites had lost control of the situation in the 
depression and was willing to countenance an alliance with the radical right.  This had 
not happened during the 1920s due to the broad diversity amongst the radical right, 
epitomized by the paramilitaries.  By the 1930s, however, the situation had changed 
because the Nazi Party had assimilated, or grown much larger, than many of these 
groups.  This allowed more conservative interests to work more closely with the radical 
right in the last years of the republic.
 
10
 A wide diversity of literature also exists about the Nazi Party itself, divided up 
between general works on the party, biographies of Hitler, and on the party’s rise to 
power.  In terms of general histories, Michael Kater’s The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of 
Members and Leaders, 1919-1945, is a comprehensive guide.  Kater used comparative 
statistical analysis to prove that very little difference existed between the Nazi elite and 
common members of the party in their reasons for joining the party, but that significant 
difference existed between the leadership and common members in terms of social 
 
                                                     
8 Peukert, The Weimar Republic, 21-49. 
9 Ibid, 266-7. 
10 Weitz, Weimar Germany, 331-60. 
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class.11  For biographies of Hitler Ian Kershaw’s masterful Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, 
has become an instant classic.  In it he argued that Hitler’s ego was fed in these early 
years by worshipful subordinates, themselves willing to play a role that Hitler had carved 
out for them, who treated him in a messianic fashion, which led him to believe his own 
myth.12  Geoffrey Pridham wrote a classic local study of the Nazi movement in Bavaria 
that argued while many of Hitler’s most fervent followers came from Bavaria, the Nazi 
Party’s ability to pull votes in the state varied by region, with more Catholic areas being 
resistant to Nazi appeals, while northern Bavaria proved more fertile.13
 Narrowing the literature down to paramilitary movements also yields a wide 
diversity of scholarship.  Here the focus on the Nazis’ own paramilitary, the S.A. or the 
Brownshirts, dwarfs the scholarship of other organizations.  Similiarly there are several 
studies of German or Bavarian paramilitaries as a general movement, or a phenomenon of 
the Weimar period.  These tend to include all the organizations that engaged in this type 
of political activity: Freikorps, Einwohnerwehren, and smaller conspiratorial groups.  
Finally, there are works that focus on individual paramilitary organizations. 
 
As mentioned, the S.A. has received a lot of attention from historians.  This is 
understandable considering the organization’s role in helping the Nazis attain power, 
coupled with its sudden loss of prestige in 1934.  Much of the historiography on the S.A. 
                                                     
11 Michael H. Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1983), 234-9. 
12 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998), 591.  Kershaw’s work 
itself builds upon the work of German historian Albrecht Tyrell, who wrote that Hitler’s consciousness as 
the Führer of the movement was the result of a long evolution of the leadership principle that began when 
Hitler gained total control over the party, Albrecht Tyrell, Vom Trommler zum Führer: der Wandel von 
Hitlers Selbstverständnis zwischen 1919 und 1923 und die Entwicklung der NSDAP, (Munich: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 1975), 9-16. 
13 Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler’s Rise to Power: The Nazi Movement in Bavaria, 1923-1933, (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1973), 318-24. 
9 
 
has been dedicated to understanding the social basis for its membership.14  Conan 
Fischer, for instance, using archival resources throughout Germany, presented a detailed 
sociological profile of S.A. members from 1929 to 1935.  He argued that the fantastic 
growth of the stormtroopers during these years was spurred by men “who took for 
granted the social and political advances achieved by Weimar, but experienced its 
economic failings first hand.”15  This had a tendency to blur class line as the Brownshirts 
offered a way to escape the misery of the Depression for many lower class youths, while 
giving the Nazis a way to project power into working class neighborhoods.16
Other works have emphasized the regional factors behind the growth of the 
Brownshirts, the role of violence, and the creation of what Bruce Campbell has called the 
political soldier.  In Die braunen Bataillone, Peter Longerich argued that the S.A. went 
through several stages of growth, from the radical arm of the party in the early years to 
the primacy of the soldier after the seizure of power.  Each phase changed the nature of 
the organization.
 
17  Richard Bessel analyzed the role that violence played in the rise of 
Nazism, noting that the difference between the S.A. and groups like the Freikorps was 
that the Stormtroopers never employed violence to achieve power illegally.18
                                                     
14 Peter Merkl, The Making of a Stormtrooper, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).  Merkl’s 
work builds upon the work of Theodore Abel, who studied 581 early Nazis for his monumental, Political 
Violence under the Swastika, but using social science methodology to reach his conclusions. 
  Meanwhile 
Eric Reiche looked at the growth the S.A. in Nuremberg, noting that the organization’s 
growth benefitted from the presence of a home grown movement that the Nazis co-opted 
15 Conan Fischer, Stormtroopers: A Social, Economic, and Ideological Analysis, 1929-35, (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1983), 223-5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Peter Longerich, Die braunen Bataillone: Geschichte der SA, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1989), 239-45. 
18 Richard Bessel, Political Violence and the Rise of Nazism: The Storm Troopers in Eastern Germany, 
1925-1934, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 1-6.  It must be noted that Prof. Bessel’s starting 
point for analysis was after the Beer Hall Putsch in 1923, when the SA did try to help seize power 
violently. 
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and the placement of the annual party rally in Nuremberg.19  Finally Bruce Campbell 
looked at profiles of the 178 men at the top of the national organization to determine the 
definition of the “political soldier.”  He concluded that what made the organization so 
successful was the unity of purpose amongst its leadership due to the fact that all had 
seen action in the army and thus had a nearly identical world view.20
Less attention has been paid to the Freikorps vis-à-vis the S.A.  These units, 
which had a very short existence, loom large in the historical imagination.  Often they are 
lumped together by scholars with other paramilitary units like the Einwohnerwehr.  This 
stands to reason as a good many Freikorps units reorganized themselves as paramilitaries 
once the danger had passed.  Despite this, there are a couple of major works dealing 
specifically with the Freikorps.  The first, and earliest, was by Robert G.L. Waite, who 
wrote a book called Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar 
Germany, 1918-1923. 
 
Waite’s thesis was that the Freikorps soldiers were not ‘political soldiers’ as 
would be later claimed in the Nazi period, but freebooters who latched on to any ideology 
if it provided them the action they craved.  Indeed Waite believed that to be their guiding 
principle, certainly not a thought out program.  This explained how they could fight 
communism, but still show an affinity for its precepts.  The same went for Nazism.  The 
men who joined these units always looked for a great leader, and until Hitler emerged as 
                                                     
19 Eric G. Reiche, The Development of the SA in Nürnberg, 1922-1934, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986), 222-30. 
20 Bruce Campbell, The SA Generals and the Rise of Nazism, (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1998), 1-7. 
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that man, (not until very late), most shied away.21  Another major work was by Hagen 
Schulze, whose history of the Freikorps portrayed the organization in a more sympathetic 
light.  He argued the tragedy of the Weimar Republic was that it was not able to find a 
way to come to an accommodation with the Freikorps fighters.  The animosity of these 
units came to a head in the Kapp Putsch and irretrievably set these units against Weimar, 
which he argued set the stage for the success of Hitler and the Nazis.22
For the purposes of this study the major historical literature is very diverse, 
dealing with a variety of works that include general studies, specific unit and 
organizational histories, or of individual events in the history of the paramilitary and 
patriotic movements.  The Einwohnerwehr is analyzed in two individualized studies as 
well as some of the general works, while there has yet to be written any detailed study in 
English or German on Bund Bayern und Reich as a standalone group.  The latter 
organization is discussed in the general works on the paramilitary movement, or in 
relation to specific events like the Beer Hall Putsch. 
 
There have been several excellent monographs that deal with the general 
phenomenon of paramilitary politics.  Each work reflects the focus of the author.  The 
first major work produced in this vein was by the German historian Hans Fenske.  
Writing in 1969, his Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918, is a 
local study of the entire paramilitary and patriotic, or vaterländisch, movements in 
Bavaria, though his principal focus was more on the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern 
und Reich than on other organizations like the Nazi Party.  Based on archival research in 
                                                     
21 Robert G.L. Waite, Vanguards of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 264-82. 
22 Hagen Schulze, Freikorps und Republik, 1918-1920, (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1969), 
326-34. 
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the Bavarian State Archives and the Institute for Contemporary History, Fenske’s 
monograph remains one of the better introductions to the subject, and remains the work 
most relevant to the topic of this study. 
 Fenske’s thesis was that “national opposition” to the Weimar Republic ranged 
from groups that offered passive resistance to the republic to organizations that actively 
worked for its destruction.  Both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich fell into 
the latter group.  Within this wing of the “national opposition” Fenske argued that a 
spectrum of opinion existed within the wider patriotic movement, with the Civil Guards 
being the most conservative of the paramilitaries, followed by Bayern und Reich which 
was more radical, and finally the Nazi Party as the most radical of these organizations.23
 It was in 1924, after the failed Putsch, that the extremism on the political right, as 
epitomized by the Nazis and their allies, morphed into outright fascism.  Bund Bayern 
und Reich and the Einwohnerwehr were radical, by Fenske’s estimation, but were not 
fascist.  They were deadly opposed to the socialist government and political left in 
Bavaria, they flouted the Treaty of Versailles, they favored an expansionist foreign policy 
for Germany, and subscribed to a racially völkisch world view that (at least for Bund 
Bayern und Reich) sought to eliminate Jewish influence in society.  However their 
radicalism was held back by the essentially conservative structure of its organization and 
parts of its program like the preservation of the federal structure of government.  Without 
this, Fenske argued, the radical aspects of their program might have prevented them from 
gaining the respect and esteem of the governing elites.  It would not be until the Beer Hall 
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Putsch of 1923, when such respectability was no longer needed, that one saw a true 
fascist movement emerge, as the Nazi Party had reached a critical mass and was able to 
make its case on its own.24
 Fenske viewed the history of the patriotic movement as a gradual evolution from 
conservatism to outright fascism.  There are a couple issues, however, that he did not 
address that are taken up in this study.  One was his analysis of the Einwohnerwehr’s 
formation.  Specifically he omits many details on the formation of militias in the period 
before April 1919.  This is particularly jarring as several proto-Einwohnerwehren were 
formed in months before the call went out to form paramilitary units.
 
25  Another 
weakness was the way the Beer Hall Putsch affected Bund Bayern und Reich internally in 
the years after 1923.26
 Another general work that looks at the paramilitary organizations, but from a 
slightly different perspective is by Horst G.W. Nusser in Konservative Wehrverbände in 
Bayern, Preussen, und Österreich 1918-1933.  Written in many ways as a response to 
Fenske’s work, Nusser expanded his scope beyond Bavaria, necessitating using archival 
material from the Bundesarchiv, then in Koblenz, and from archives then in East 
Germany.  This allowed him to write a more expansive book that gave greater coverage 
  The difficulties between local units and the leadership was a 
major component of the organization’s history in the two years following the putsch, and 
played an important role in setting the group on a different course.  Fenske only glanced 
over these issues, a noticeable omission that this study seeks to correct.   
                                                     
24 Ibid, 313-21. 
25 Ibid, 78-89. 
26 Ibid, 188-223. 
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to events in East Prussia and Austria, which Fenske had touched on but not explored in 
great depth.27
 The main thrust of Nusser’s work was that the paramilitary movement needed to 
be seen more properly as a movement of monarchists.  Their greatest period of influence 
came under the Einwohnerwehr, but the dissolution of the organization led to a loss of 
influence epitomized by strife amongst paramilitary units and the dwindling fortunes of 
Bund Bayern und Reich after 1923.  It is only after 1929 that one saw a revival of 
paramilitary activity that was cut short by the ascension of the Nazi Party to power in 
1933.  In the years that followed, the Nazi Party went to great lengths to discredit many 
of the leaders of this movement.
 
28
 American historian James M. Diehl looked at the paramilitary movement in a 
national context in his major work, Paramilitary Politics in Weimar Germany.  Based 
heavily on archival sources in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Bremen, and the Federal Archives 
at Koblenz, Diehl’s work was comprehensive, covering all paramilitary units in the 
Weimar Republic – those on the left as well as on the right.  As a result Diehl was the 
first scholar to present the story of paramilitary organizations in its entirety to an English-
language readership. 
 
 Diehl’s thesis was that leaders of the Weimar Republic, because of compromises 
made at its beginning, could never adequately enforce its will on the populace.  Fearing 
further revolution, and unable to maintain military discipline, they made use of voluntary 
military groups, the notorious Freikorps.  The use of these, along with the Wehrverbände, 
                                                     
27 Horst G.W. Nusser, Konservative Wehrverbände in Bayern, Preussen, und Österreich, 1918-1933: mit 
einer Biographie von Forstrat Georg Escherich, 1870-1941, (Munich: Nusser Verlag, 1973), 11-15. 
28 Ibid, 354-6. 
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by both sides of the political spectrum, quickly created a situation where it became 
normal to solve political disputes with violence outside the prescribed constitutional 
procedures.  This development had a debilitating effect on political life in Germany, 
acculturating a whole generation of Germans to the militarization of civilian life.  Such 
militarization, Diehl pointed out, was a crucial component of the eventual success of 
Hitler and the Nazi Party.29
 Another major work actually looked at a specific event of these years.  Harold 
Gordon Jr’s Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch analyzes the year 1923 leading up to the 
events of November 8 and 9, 1923.  Based on archival research conducted at the National 
Archives in Washington D.C., plus published material from many of the participants, 
Gordon’s work still stands as the single best history of the Beer Hall Putsch.  Coverage 
was given to all the participant organizations right down to the last detail.  The only 
criticism that could be lodged against the book is that Gordon never ventured into the 
relevant German archives, working instead in the U.S. National Archives and with 
collections of documents that he himself had obtained over the years.
 
30
 Gordon argues that the politics of the pre-putsch years put enormous pressure on 
the Bavarian government and forced it to adopt policies that were simply unwise.  Unable 
to expand the police forces due to the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, Bavarian 
leaders turned a blind eye towards the creation of local self-defense organizations.  As the 
 
                                                     
29 Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 3-22.  As a thesis, Diehl’s work is very persuasive, particularly in 
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concise.  There really is no criticism that one can level at it, unless it is to point out that it does not cover 
local events in the greatest depth, but that was not its intent. 
30 Harold Gordon Jr., Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 633-
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Treaty of Versailles prohibited them from expanding the police, Bavarian leaders were 
forced to create, or tolerate, groups dedicated to private defense.31
 In Gordon’s view Bavarian officials, unable to save the Einwohnerwehr, tried to 
keep as much of its structure intact as possible.  This led to the creation of Bund Bayern 
und Reich, which was seen as a way to stem the tide of Marxism.  Due to the secret 
nature of the group, and the fact that it was smaller and narrower than the old Civil 
Guards, the government also tolerated more radical groups, like the Nazi Party.  
According to Gordon, this opened the floodgates as the leaders of the more revolutionary 
radical groups were determined to overthrow the Weimar system – a goal shared by 
certain members of the Bavarian government – and began to arm themselves in 
preparation for it.  By the time the Knilling Cabinet realized its mistake it was too late, it 
was forced to ride the tiger it had unleashed and found itself increasingly caught between 
the radical demands of Hitler on the one side, and the extortions of Pittinger on the other 
during the course of 1923.  This situation prevailed until the Beer Hall Putsch in 
November, when the government gained the upper hand because of Hitler’s uprising.
 
32
 The Einwohnerwehr, like Bund Bayern und Reich, has been analyzed by 
historians in more general works.  However, unlike the latter, the former has been the 
subject of a couple of full length studies.  The first of these was written by the East 
German historian Erwin Könnemann.  Like many historians from the eastern bloc his 
analysis relies heavily on Marxist theory for the force of its arguments.  His research is 
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based on archival material found in the former East Germany (though he did travel to 
Koblenz), published sources, and secondary source material. 
 His thesis was that the Einwohnerwehr represented the beginnings of a new 
imperialist system.  His work, Einwohnerwehren und Zeitfreiwilligenverbände, stated 
that the Civil Guards were simply part of a complex that consisted of the Reichswehr, the 
police, and the Freikorps.  These reactionary forces overturned the German revolution 
and were the means by which the elites of the republic consolidated their power.  They 
then used their dominance to attempt to crush the power of the working class, beginning a 
struggle that would characterize the Weimar Republic.  Crucial to helping create the 
guards was the SPD, which Könnemann predictably lambasts for betraying German 
workers.  Only the communists and certain elements of the USPD are praised for 
standing up to the paramilitaries.33
 The other major work on the Einwohnerwehr, and the only one in English, is 
David Clay Large’s The Politics of Law and Order: A History of the Einwohnerwehr, 
1918-1921.  Like Diehl, Large argued that the development of private military bands was 
disastrous for Germany.  Based on archival material obtained in the Bavarian State 
Archives, the Federal Archive then in Koblenz, and the Foreign Ministry Archive then in 
Bonn, Large postulates that the Civil Guards in Bavaria initiated the citizens of that state 
“into the politics of violence and intimidation.”
 
34
                                                     
33 Erwin Könnemann, Einwohnerwehren und Zeitfreiwilligenverbände: Ihre Funktioon beim Aufbau eines 
neuen imperialistischen Militärsystems (November 1918 bis 1920), (East Berlin: Deutscher Militärverlag, 
1969), 7-17. 
  Membership had a deleterious effect on 
those who joined because it placed them outside of, and antagonistic to, the state.  More 
34 David Clay Large, The Politics of Law and Order: A History of the Einwohnerwehr, 1918-1921, 
(Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1980), 76-9. 
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importantly, by pursuing activities designed to preserve law and order (Ruhe und 
Ordnung in German), the Einwohnerwehr helped to undermine it in the state, and to 
change the term’s definition.  Law and Order, in this sense, came to mean preservation of 
the state as the leaders of the Civil Guards defined it.35
 The organization’s definition of safety helps to explain, according to Large, the 
connection between the Einwohnerwehr and the more radical groups like Hitler’s Nazi 
Party.  Rejecting the notion that, had it survived, the Civil Guards would have served as a 
safety valve against the more revolutionary ideas of Hitler, Large argued that, during the 
course of its development, the Einwohnerwehr went through a process of internal 
radicalization.  The growing extremism was due to a couple of factors, the taking in of 
whole organizations, like the Freikorps Oberland, into the guards, and the effects of the 
long struggle against its dissolution.  The result was that, in Large’s view, the Civil 
Guards helped to prepare the way for Hitler almost as much as the Freikorps had.
 
36
 This study looks to build upon previous interpretations of both the 
Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich and fill in gaps that exist in our knowledge 
about both organizations.  The major argument of this work is that both paramilitaries 
were limited in their actions due to their relationship to the government.  Each came into 
existence with the help of the Bavarian Reichswehr and lower-level civil servants, like 
Gustav von Kahr, who helped provide them with funds, weapons, and political cover.  
The result was that these units could only operate within parameters defined by their 
political patrons.  When goals were in alignment both units had great latitude of action, 
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even independence.  However, when these were not aligned neither organization could do 
much to influence events, and indeed were often captive to them. 
 In the case of the Einwohnerwehr two examples illustrate this phenomenon.  The 
first occurred during the Kapp Putsch where the Einwohnerwehr, working in conjunction 
with the army, the Munich police, and Gustav von Kahr, forced the resignation of the 
legally and democratically elected Social Democratic government.  Their participation 
not only would bring to power a regime more aligned to their world view, but bring with 
it enhanced powers and responsibilities that were governed in a series of service 
agreements with the Interior Ministry, contracts that made them a power in the state. 
 On the other hand, the conflict over disarmament and dissolution showed the 
limits of government cooperation.  The dispute was brought on by the Einwohnerwehr’s 
involvement in the Organisation Escherich and the Organisation Kanzler, two 
associations created to allow the Einwohnerwehr to play a larger role in Germany and 
German-speaking Europe.  This led inexorably to allied demands for the 
Einwohnerwehr’s disarmament and dissolution.  Despite strong support for the 
organization in the Bavarian cabinet, the dispute proved to a political disaster for the 
Kahr government, who found their room to maneuver increasingly restricted.  Despite the 
willingness of many Einwohnerwehr members to fight the central government and allied 
powers, the Bavarian government was forced to accede to wishes of the Allied Control 
Commission.  Once that happened, the political support for the Einwohnerwehr 
evaporated. 
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 The same phenomenon can be seen in the history of Bund Bayern und Reich, 
though here the examples are even starker.  For the Bavarian army Bayern und Reich was 
their preferred partner amongst the paramilitaries, a relationship that allowed the group 
access to weaponry and army training.  It also made them integral to the army’s plans for 
restoring public order.  Moreover, whenever a dispute arose between Bayern und Reich 
and one of the other patriotic leagues the army and its allies sided with Otto Pittinger, the 
head of Bund Bayern und Reich, in almost every instance.  No other Bavarian 
paramilitary group had this type of access or influence, something that made Bayern und 
Reich the preeminent paramilitary group by 1923. 
 However, as with the Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich found itself bound 
to its political patrons.  The Beer Hall Putsch of November 1923 clearly demonstrated the 
limits of such close cooperation.  Bayern und Reich, like all vaterländisch groups in 
Bavaria, were feverishly preparing for a march on Berlin to overthrow the government; a 
move that was supported by the leadership of the Bavarian army.  When the designs for a 
coup fell through the army backed down, and so did Bund Bayern und Reich, despite the 
desire amongst many of the local units to actually join with Hitler and the putschists. 
 The limits of the paramilitaries’ relationship to the governing authorities have 
been hinted at, but only David Clay Large has explored them in any depth in regards to 
the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, which he rightly attributes to the organization’s 
activities in the Orgesch.37  Most scholars tend to ascribe the dispute to the desire of the 
allies to eventually force the paramilitaries to disband,38
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 or on the reliance of Kahr on the 
38 Fenkse, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 100-8. 
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Einwohnerwehr for his political survival.39  In the case of Bund Bayern und Reich 
historians have tended to view their inaction as a manifestation of their increasingly 
strained relationship with the Nazis and their allies,40 or as involving a power struggle 
between Kahr and Hitler without reference to Bayern und Reich.41
 The other major argument of this work is that the Einwohnerwehr and Bund 
Bayern und Reich were conservative organizations with radical overtones, and that this 
dichotomy was ever present in both organizations.  As Robert Paxton has shown with 
fascist organizations, many of the vaterländisch groups, like the two surveyed here, were 
a mixture of views and sentiments.
 
42  The men who belonged to the Einwohnerwehr and 
Bund Bayern und Reich were conservative, even reactionary, in that they hoped to see a 
return to traditional forms of government or, at the least, preserve the federal structure of 
the German constitution.  However, they also ascribed to the racial völkisch nationalism 
of the more radical right.  They were not exclusively monarchists, nor did they subscribe 
to the centralizing tendencies of the Nazis.43  Moreover, this split was evident in both 
organizations early on.44
 In the case of the Einwohnerwehr, for instance, völkisch sentiment manifested 
itself in outbreaks of antisemitism.  There were numerous incidents recorded at the local 
level, the most significant being in the city of Rosenheim in 1920.  Moreover, many of 
the terms used by völkisch thinkers before the war, like community of the people 
(Volksgemeinschaft), became commonplace in the propaganda and publications of the 
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Einwohnerwehr.  Many of the group’s activities were focused on eliminating the specter 
of socialism, which was one of the ideologies that völkisch thinkers found so abhorrent.  
Even much of the philosophy about the German past, the despair for a culture lost, can be 
seen in propaganda that talked about a society of estates working towards the mutual 
benefit of the other. 
 The völkisch aspects of the Einwohnerwehr remained latent, however, due to the 
need to maintain the fiction that the organization stood above party and religious 
orientation.  No such need was ever present for Bund Bayern und Reich.  From the very 
first propaganda materials trumpeting its establishment, the leadership claimed that it was 
working towards a völkisch-oriented state.  According to the group’s program, all 
members had to be German nationals, i.e. Aryans.  No Jews, nor members from any other 
foreign group, could apply.  Furthermore, it propagated this world view in its propaganda 
and joined with other vaterländisch organizations in German Day celebrations that were 
celebrations of German racial solidarity.  Like the Einwohnerwehr before them they 
worked for the elimination of socialist organizations and parties.  Thus, the presence of 
völkisch ideology in both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich from the 
beginning, and the way this ideology was put into practice by the leadership and 
membership, suggests that these organizations were more than simply ‘conservative-
restorative,’ and that the evolution from conservative to radical in the patriotic movement 
should be placed earlier than it has been by historians.45
 The radical nature of the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich and their 
willingness to work against the nascent Weimar Republic did not occur in a vacuum.  
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Both groups drew upon several decades of völkisch nationalism.  That ideology gained 
currency and adherents amongst a certain strata of the middle class in the years prior to 
World War I, becoming the basis for a critique of the Wilhelmine Reich.  Moreover, its 
viewpoints formed an important part of the program of many patriotic pressure groups in 
the years before 1914.  The advocacy of these organizations helped spread völkisch 
ideology and formed a crucial link between it and the paramilitary groups of the patriotic 
movement in post-1918 Bavaria. 
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Chapter 2 
The Origins of the Patriotic Movement – Völkisch Nationalism and Patriotic Leagues in 
Bavaria to 1914 
 The patriotic (vaterländisch) organizations that sprang up in Bavaria after 1918 
were the manifestations of a long gestation period in which certain individuals and 
groups voiced their discontent with the state of affairs in Imperial Germany.  These 
critics were not to be found on the political left, as one might expect, but on the political 
right.  They were not concerned with the expansion of democracy, civil liberties, or 
greater economic and social justice for Germany’s workers but with the preservation of a 
certain way of life and social organization within the Reich.  Their writings helped to 
create an impression of an impending crisis within both German society and government.  
The organizations they inspired, both large and small, helped to diffuse their views into 
the wider society and provide a template with which to organize after the armistice. 
Völkisch Nationalism in the late Nineteenth Century 
 The key intellectual movement that animated the post-World War I patriotic 
movement was the Germanic ideology of völkisch nationalism.  Völkisch ideas had their 
origins in the years following Germany’s unification under Bismarck, and were put 
forward by writers who considered themselves the prophets of a new era.  Many of these 
thinkers felt alienated from German society, a disaffection that stemmed from frustration 
at not having achieved their desired station in life.  One of the best examples of this was 
the Biblical scholar Paul de Lagarde who had a life-long antipathy towards the academic 
establishment of Wilhelmine Germany, owing in no small part to the fact that it took him 
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much longer to achieve an academic appointment than many of his contemporaries.1  
They rejected the rational discourses of the Enlightenment preferring, instead, to rely on 
intuition and sentiment.  As a result they preferred the artist over the scientist and the 
man of action over the thinker in their political and philosophical works.  Finally, most 
völkisch intellectuals believed that by creating a new ethic or civil religion, they would 
usher in a new era in German history – both in its politics and society.2
 The new spirit that völkisch nationalists wanted to build relied upon a particular 
view of the German past, a past that never really existed in any practical way.  As George 
Mosse noted in the Crisis of German Ideology, the people who held this worldview 
believed that the only worthwhile society was one that was rural, “hierarchical in nature 
and patterned after medieval estates.”
 
3  They saw in Germany’s Middle Ages a 
harmonious social order where everyone knew their proper place and economic function.  
Their ideal of medieval society was rural and based on the German peasant, who was tied 
to the land and thus had a vital connection to his home region.  This concept of 
rootedness, as Mosse noted, was very important to völkisch intellectuals.  It is what gave 
society its meaning and made Germany a true nation and Volk.4
 Because their view of Germany’s medieval past put such importance on the social 
order and the rural landscape, völkisch intellectuals naturally held a more dim view of 
Germany’s present.  They believed that the Germany in which they lived was a society in 
decline.  The empire forged by Bismarck did not conform to the rural idyll they believed 
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to be natural, but instead was a rapidly urbanizing, modern state where the clear lines of 
social class evaporated in the relentless advance of the Industrial Revolution.  The 
peasant, the hero in their worldview, did not form the backbone of the nation, but instead 
migrated to the cities to join the urban proletariat.  The existence of this class itself was 
problematic for the industrial workers did not conform easily to the organic castes they 
believed existed during the Middle Ages.  Most importantly, Germany’s modernization 
was accompanied by increasing calls for greater democracy and civil liberties, ideas that 
had been born of the French Revolution.  As a result völkisch intellectuals held these 
ideas to be un-German and despaired that so many of their countrymen adhered to them.5
 The views that völkisch intellectuals had of contemporary society were not new, 
but instead ran as a critique throughout the nineteenth century and had their origins in the 
philosophy of Idealism that emerged during the Romantic era; indeed völkisch 
nationalists often used the language of Idealism to buttress their arguments.  Idealism 
held that the pursuit of a material existence, as epitomized by the just-emerging Industrial 
Revolution, or the struggle for greater political freedoms, as seen in the French 
Revolution, retarded the spiritual dimension of humanity which these thinkers saw as 
essence of human existence.  Roderick Stackelberg noted that one of the main features of 
völkisch thought was how closely it conformed to Idealist thought as outlined above.  The 
great difference between earlier Idealist philosophers and the advocates of a Germanic 
Ideology was that the idealism of the latter was more conservative in nature and sought to 
prevent political and social change.  The result was that völkisch writers decried the 
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pursuit of wealth and greater freedoms all in order to protect the material prosperity and 
political privileges of those at the top of German society.6
 For völkisch thinkers their primary task was to recreate, or restore, this ideal 
society.  A mythologized past was a large part of it.  Equally important was having a foil, 
and the Jews provided this.  For völkisch nationalists the Jew was a symbol of all that 
they hated.  They were rootless, whereas the peasant was rooted to the land.  They were 
cosmopolitan, lived in cities, and traveled widely.  Because of their traditional role as 
money-lenders and peddlers, Jews came to be seen as synonymous with modern 
capitalism by many of these writers.  It was the Jew who they believed came into the 
countryside and turned the peasant’s world upside down, depriving him of land and cattle 
and forcing him, through circumstance, to migrate to urban areas.  Also, Jews were more 
likely to be liberals and socialists than conservatives.  Many German Jews gravitated 
towards the more progressive and democratic political parties – everything that völkisch 
intellectuals abhorred.  They were the de facto bogeyman.
 
7
 Jews were not the only enemies identified by völkisch thinkers.  Marxian 
socialism increasingly came to be seen as the bête noire of national consciousness and 
was vociferously attacked.  This ideology, trans-national, revolutionary, and dedicated to 
leveling the distinctions völkisch writers so loved, gained ground with an urban 
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proletariat that manned the factories of a rapidly industrializing country.8  Fear of 
Marxism and the Social Democratic Party (the party inspired by revolutionary rhetoric), 
became one of the constants of politics in the imperial period, most famously illustrated 
in Bismarck’s anti-Socialist Laws.  Völkisch writers, like the political elite, also shared 
this anxiety.  Paul de Lagarde, for instance, was obsessed with the unity of the nation in 
his writings partially because he feared that socialism would alienate the worker from 
society.9
 Equally important was the role of religion in the völkisch worldview.  For these 
intellectuals traditional Christianity was insufficient to the problems of the modern age, a 
view they justified because many Germans seemed to abandon the church as the century 
progressed.  Moreover, for many leading individuals in völkisch circles the religion had 
never seemed wholly German to begin with.  Many of them argued for a new approach.  
Paul de Lagarde was critical in this move towards a German Christianity.  In his view, the 
problem with the religion was the influence that Judaism had on its development and 
theology, particularly the writings of Paul.  To save religion for the German people – as 
Germany was still a nominally religious nation – it would be necessary to purge the 
Christian faith of its Jewish elements.  In its place would be a religion that relied on the 
national characteristics of the German people.
 
10
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  In this new faith Jesus would be 
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portrayed as if he were German himself, and his teachings and actions would be more in 
line with the German national, as opposed to the universal, spirit.11
 One of the ways in which this new Germanic faith came to express itself was in 
the belief that Germany needed to be redeemed.  Such redemption would come only in 
political form, in a person who emerged to save the German people and restore the 
mythologized social order völkisch thinkers talked about.  The example par excellence of 
such thinking came from the author Moeller van den Bruck who, in his book Das Dritte 
Reich, spoke of just such a political figure.  This leader would stand above all parties and 
factions, unite all of the German people together, and do away with un-German 
tendencies like capitalism and socialism.  Written in the early 1920s, just immediately 
after the First World War, Das Dritte Reich prefigures in many ways the mythologizing 
of the leader that the Nazi Party took advantage of after they came to power.
 
12
Patriotic Societies and the Political Pressure Groups 
 
 While the ideological musing of völkisch intellectuals helped to provide one 
cornerstone of the patriotic movement, it was nothing without the structure provided by 
social organizations and political pressure groups.  Working both inside and outside 
government groups such as the Wandervögel and the Pan-German League not only 
helped to spread and popularize the radical ideals of völkisch nationalism, but they also 
helped to provide a place where like-minded people could meet and organize.  In this way 
they proved a crucial link between the musings of disparate, and often obscure, 
intellectuals and post-World War I paramilitary organizations. 
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 The role of education was critical in helping to propagate völkisch ideas to a wide 
audience.  Many educators came to see in the ideas of a Paul de Lagarde or Julius 
Langbehn the key to greater cultural unity, which in their minds was the greatest 
challenge of the day.  As Mosse points out, a great many of the teachers of the late 
Wilhelmine period, as well as the early Weimar Republic, came of age in the 1870s and 
1880s when völkisch ideology first came to be articulated.  They imbibed it at the 
university through the fraternities and student social clubs which were known for their 
staunch conservatism.  As a result, when this generation became teachers they assigned 
the writings of völkisch authors in class and authored texts that subscribed to Germanic 
ideology.  Many of the history books of this period contained passages and allusions to 
ideas that would have pleased Lagarde.13  Other educators, inspired by the call for 
spiritual renewal in the nation, set out to create their own schools that would serve as 
models.  Nearly forty such schools were created over a period of twenty-five years from 
1898 to the mid-1920s.14
 Through their efforts, this generation of teachers helped to lay the groundwork for 
the youth movement of the early twentieth century.  Started in 1901 by Karl Fischer, the 
Wandervögel, as they were known, consisted of bourgeois youth who rejected the staid 
society of Imperial Germany in preference for returning to the mountains and forests of 
the Fatherland.  Hikes in forests and up mountains, camping trips to the German 
countryside, and communal existence typified their activities.  It was a revolt by German 
youth against the world of their parents, but this revolt had an ideological ring to it.  
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Many youth joined to reconnect to nature, to escape the drudgery of urban life, and to lay 
bare the hypocrisy of modern industrial society.  In this way their emphasis dovetailed 
very closely to the ideological precepts of völkisch intellectuals.  They saw politics as 
practiced in the Wilhelmine Reich as superficial and alien.  Further, they desired a unified 
existence within their own group typified in a strong leader.  Most Wandervögel groups 
were organized around a particular leader who greatly affected the structure and ideology 
of the local troupe despite the national organization that linked them together.  Finally, all 
local bodies of the youth movement had to deal with the issue of Jewish membership, 
which – despite the variety of opinions – showed the impact of völkisch ideas.15
 Organizations based on völkisch ideology were not confined to the areas of 
education and the youth movement, other groups were founded in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries that tried to put the ideological prescripts of Germanic 
ideologues into practice.  These organizations often were small and cut off from 
mainstream society.  Utopian in nature, groups like the Artamanen of Willibald Hentschel 
sought to create the kind of peasant-centered culture that lay at the heart of völkisch 
theory.  In this regards they were not that far removed from the utopian socialist 
communities that sprang up earlier in the nineteenth century.  Many people who would 
  Many of 
the soldiers who fought in World War I, and who later joined the patriotic movement, had 
participated in the Wandervögel as youths. 
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make a name for themselves in the post-war patriotic movement, and even the Nazi Party, 
like Julius Streicher and Walther Darre, participated in such organizations.16
 While the Artamanen and related groups were small communities, the patriotic 
associations were much larger entities.  The various patriotic associations formed 
beginning in the 1880s; the last of them was founded in the year just prior to the outbreak 
of the First World War.  Their role in the public life of Imperial Germany has been quite 
controversial.  Often these organizations were looked upon as appendages to the ruling 
caste, a way to direct the political life in Germany away from the need for greater 
freedom and democracy.  More recent scholarship has emphasized the rather popular 
nature of these groups.  They provided an outlet for political agitation outside the normal 
political process, which allowed them to be critical of the government while being 
supportive of the state.  They also struggled against those elements of the Reich who 
seemed to oppose both their policies and the socio-political makeup of the state itself.
 
17
 The first of these patriotic associations, the German Colonial Society, was 
founded in 1887.  Like the more famous Pan-German League, which became infamous 
the world over prior to 1914, the Colonial Society went through several incarnations 
before the final organization was founded.  Its purpose was to push for the acquisition of 
overseas colonies for the German Reich, a popular cause in the 1880s.  Despite its 
advocacy, German possession of overseas colonies did not depend upon the efforts of the 
Colonial Society, or its predecessors.  However, as Roger Chickering has noted, the 
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propaganda efforts undertaken in support for the establishment of colonies had a dramatic 
effect on the future course of German politics.  The full-throated support that the Colonial 
Society gave to Bismarck, and his government, when his policies ran parallel to their 
aspirations provided a crucial element for support in the Chancellor’s struggles with the 
Reichstag.  However, when Bismarck decided to halt colonial expansion the Colonial 
Society expressed its frustration towards the imperial government, something that would 
occur frequently within all the patriotic associations from 1890 to 1914.18
 As mentioned previously the patriotic associations served in many ways as an 
outlet for mass politics in the Wilhelmine Reich.  Partly this was due to the political 
structure of Imperial Germany which had many of the trappings of a parliamentary 
democracy, but none of the responsibilities.  Because the Chancellor was appointed by 
the Emperor, and served at his pleasure, there was never any real chance for the political 
parties to positively affect political change.  Laws and budgets originated with the 
government, depriving the parliament of the ability to introduce legislation or to hold the 
government accountable. This did not mean that the parties in the Reichstag were 
completely ineffectual.  They voted on the budget, and this allowed the political parties to 
have some influence on the laws that were passed as well as the fiscal affairs of the 
Reich, but for the most part politics in Wilhelmine Germany represented little more than 
a sideshow, something that was only of interest to people who had some stake in the 
system. 
 
 It was in this bizarre relationship between the Imperial Diet (Reichstag) and the 
Imperial Government that the patriotic societies were able to have an influence on 
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government policy.  Many of these organizations were closely tied to one or more of the 
political parties represented in the parliament, and this allowed them to create dissension 
in the parliament in support of their agenda.19  Equally important, groups such as the 
Colonial Society and the German Navy League often had extensive ties to various 
commercial and industrial interests that benefitted from the fulfillment of the 
organization’s program.  German business had a tremendous stake in the government of 
the Reich, particularly after 1878 when Bismarck erected tariffs in an effort to please both 
industry and agriculture.  Since both were politically represented by political parties in 
the parliament, the government paid particular attention to their needs.  For instance the 
various Navy Bills passed in 1898 and 1907, and supported by the German Navy League, 
served the interests of heavy industry who stood to profit from the building of a large 
fleet.20
The social makeup of the patriotic societies also contributed to their growing 
influence.  While many of the leaders tended to come from elite circles, much of the 
membership represented a wide cross section of the German middle class, from 
university professors to businessmen.  This social class tended to be far more nationalistic 
than either the Junker aristocracy or the growing proletariat.  They feared the rise of the 
industrial working class and saw in their membership a way to fight the rising specter of 
socialism.  Membership also gave them a chance to participate in what seemed important 
national matters beyond the mundane business of everyday politics.   The support of this 
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class was something that German chancellors from Bismarck on sought to obtain, as they 
seemed key to preventing political change within the Reich.21
Ideologically, the patriotic societies promoted an aggressive German nationalism, 
one that was very compatible with the aggressive “world politics” of William II.  They 
also adopted, to varying degrees, aspects of the völkisch worldview.  The most important 
of these was the belief that Germany was rent with internal division and this would need 
to be overcome if a truly national body were to emerge.  Each of the patriotic societies 
defined this differently, but every one of them placed special onus on the need to fight the 
socialist movement mentioned above.  The spread of socialism amongst Germany’s 
industrial working class was one of the key political and social struggles of the late 
nineteenth century, providing the pretext for Bismarck’s repressive Anti-Socialist Laws 
and helping to cause panic for the ruling elites as the SPD’s block in the parliament grew 
ever larger in the years preceding the First World War.  For the leaders and members of 
the patriotic societies the Social Democratic Party represented a dangerous development, 
one that competed with traditional centers of authority for the obedience and devotion of 
Germany’s workers, preventing them from being fully integrated into the nation as they 
conceived it.
 
22
To combat these divisions the patriotic societies argued for a more aggressive 
policy of German expansion; indeed, this was the one thing they all agreed on.  They 
differed to a certain extent as to where this expansion would take place.  Most of the 
societies wanted to see Germany pursue overseas colonies like other European powers.  
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In their view the acquisition of colonies was a sign of importance and prestige for the 
Reich.  This was the raison d’être of the Colonial Society and was equally important for 
the German Naval League, for colonies helped to justify the building of a navy with 
worldwide reach.23  Other groups desired expansion on the European continent.  The 
Association of the Eastern Marches and the Pan-German League both expressed a desire 
to forgo colonies overseas for the conquest of large territories in Eastern Europe, though 
Chickering notes that, for the Pan-Germans, this was but prelude to conquest of overseas 
colonies later.24
German expansion would inevitably involve conflict with other powers, and the 
patriotic societies were more than willing to see this happen.  In fact their ideology was 
predicated upon it.  Many within the societies believed war to be inevitable and that the 
only way the German Reich would survive such a cataclysm would be to aggressively 
build up its armed forces and pursue an imperial policy.  The German Army League 
provided the penultimate expression of this vision.  Founded in 1913, this organization 
was dedicated to helping to enlarge the German army and preserve the special place that 
it held in society.  According to its leaders the German Army League helped to prepare 
the population for the sacrifices necessary in the coming conflict.  To them war was a 
spiritually purifying experience, one that purged the decadence of society.  As such, it 
was part and parcel of humanity’s natural development.  These Social Darwinist views 
led the leadership of the Army League to adopt maximalist terminology to describe the 
conflicts they envisioned.  In their opinion war was not a struggle for resources or for 
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outdated notions such as the balance of power, but for the survival of a people and the 
destruction of the enemy.25
It is in this context that we must look at the ideology of the Pan-German League.  
This organization, though smaller than other patriotic societies, combined almost all of 
the elements mentioned above.  They also were the most völkisch of the patriotic 
societies, as their beliefs and attitudes betrayed a paranoia that was common amongst 
those who subscribed to Germanic Ideology.  For members of the League the world was 
divided into friends and enemies, and the list of the Reich’s friends was small indeed; so 
small that it excluded just about every major power in Europe minus the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.  This highlighted for them the need for expansion, for if Germany 
was to survive it would need to be a state that encompassed all Germans wherever they 
lived.  Like many in the völkisch movement they dreamed of a new Reich, one that 
included Germans who lived in the Habsburg Monarchy, Russia, and northern and 
western Europe, and they strenuously advocated for policies that would make this 
German superstate a reality – often to the embarrassment and consternation of the 
Imperial Government.
 
26
However, for the Pan-Germans it was not enough to simply expand, they also had 
to purge Germany of all those elements that threatened its internal tranquility.  Members 
of the league obsessed over order and saw German society as sliding ever closer to chaos, 
with workers, women, Poles, and other minorities demanding greater political and social 
equality, a rapacious capitalist system destroying the last vestiges of the old feudal order, 
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and the slow growth of parliamentarianism and democracy.  All of this upset what they 
believed was the proper order of both society and the world, a hierarchically organized 
society internally and an external order where the German people stood at the apex of 
humanity.  Internally, they advocated the repression of national minorities, the purging of 
foreign words out of the German language, and the inculcation of a new appreciation of 
the uniqueness, and superiority, of German culture in education.27
The Pan-German League also shared the völkisch obsession with the position of 
the Jews in the Reich.  It was a question that would be taken up frequently in the 
organization’s early years.  In their first official program the Pan-Germans stated their 
opposition to further Jewish immigration to Germany.  Because the league saw ethnicity 
as the crucial division of humanity they believed that the immigration of Jews, most of 
who came from the Russian Empire, would lead to a greater weakening of the German 
nation as they saw it.  Thus Jews, in this context, were seen in much the same way that 
the Pan-Germans looked upon Poles or Hungarians.  It must be noted that, though there 
were many antisemites in the Pan-German League from the beginning, there were 
chapters that had Jewish members, particularly in the larger cities like Berlin or 
Hamburg, and the question of German-born Jews was handled more delicately than those 
of the foreign-born.
 
28
                                                          
27 Ibid., 74-97.  Chickering notes that one of the most used metaphors by Pan-German writers was that of 
the flood and the outpost.  To these people the German communities in Eastern Europe were outposts in a 
sea of enemies and were constantly in danger of being overrun, or flooded, by foreign elements.  This same 
imagery was applied to the Reich as well, where the country was being overrun by Polish migrant workers 
coming to work in factories and on farms – a development they believed to be truly dangerous. 
 
28 Mosse, German Ideology, 218-22, and Chickering, We Men, 230-45.  The Pan-German solution for the 
issue of German-born Jews worked towards a forced assimilation into German culture, an idea that 
mirrored, if in more extreme form, developments taking place within the German-Jewish community at this 
time. 
39 
 
All this changed after Heinrich Class became the leader of the Pan-German 
League in 1908.  A believer in the new racial theories then popular, Class was an ardent 
antisemite who believed that German born Jews were just as dangerous as those who 
immigrated to Germany from the east.  He saw the Jew as the epitome of everything that 
was un-German, a belief shared by völkisch intellectuals.  He purged the Pan-Germans of 
Jewish members and urged that the lives and activities of Jews within Germany be 
monitored by the government.  He pushed for laws that restricted Jewish participation in 
the German economy, took away or prohibited them from taking jobs in cultural and 
education fields, and denied them the right to own land.  Finally, Class influenced the 
league to put forward a statement in 1919 saying that the renewal of Germany would only 
come about through “the removal of Jewish influence.”29
 Völkisch nationalism spread to Bavaria in the early years of the twentieth century, 
but unlike in northern Germany the ideas enunciated by its thinkers found a less than 
receptive audience.  The organizations created in the state to spread völkisch ideas tended 
to be small and had difficulty in recruiting members.  The Pan-German League for 
instance was only able to maintain chapters in Munich and Würzburg, cities that had 
significant Protestant minorities.
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  Other völkisch groups, such as Theodor Fritsch’s 
Germanen Orden, also had small memberships.  The numbers were so small for this 
association that the leadership debated closing one of the two main lodges, located in 
Munich and Nuremberg, in order to save money.  The lack of interest in these years 
prompted remarks that the state was simply not receptive to völkisch ideas.  As a result 
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the full flowering of völkisch nationalism in Bavaria would not occur until the First 
World War.31
The völkisch movement, and the organizations that it inspired or influenced, were 
critical in creating an atmosphere in which the patriotic movement in Bavaria would 
flourish after 1918.  Their writings created a world view that animated the youth of a 
generation to reject the bourgeois world of Wilhelmine Germany as seen in the 
Artamanen and the Wandervögel.  Their discontent over Bismarck’s creation in 1871 led 
them to hope for a more thorough unification, one that brought all Germans together 
under one state.  This desire led the patriotic associations, the Pan-German League above 
all others, to call for a more expansionist policy, one that was not dimmed either by the 
diplomatic isolation of Germany prior to war, or its defeat in that war.  Finally the 
patriotic associations of the Reich provided a template for political participation that was 
both extra-parliamentary and oppositional in nature, all the while being nationalistic in its 
outlook – something that would help to characterize the post-war right in Bavaria. 
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Chapter 3 
War, Revolution, & Repression in Bavaria – 1914-1919 
 The First World War transformed Bavarian, and by extension German, society.  It 
greatly increased the power of the state in people’s lives, brought large scale 
industrialization to the state, and changed the relationship of Bavarians to the old regime 
that had existed prior to 1914 on both the state and federal level.  More important, radical 
nationalism on the model of both the völkisch movement and the patriotic associations 
became critical to the maintenance of popular support for the conflict, for as the military 
stalemate continued, and the country’s material condition worsened, discontent began to 
surface amongst the population that eventually ended in revolution in 1918. 
Bavaria and World War I: 
 Bavarians greeted the outbreak of war on August 1, 1914 in much the same way 
as their fellow countrymen in other parts of Germany, with an outpouring of patriotism 
that seemed to convey acceptance, if not jubilation, at the prospect of conflict with the 
allies.  This mood, which manifested itself in parades, impromptu festivals, and public 
speeches by leading figures, was always more apparent than real.  In late July 1914 
Bavarian workers protested the growing danger of war in many parts of the kingdom, as 
they had during previous war scares.  Many people, fearing financial ruin, began to 
withdraw their money from banks – insisting that their paper notes be converted into gold 
marks.  The unease extended even into intellectual circles; the philosopher Oswald 
Spengler noted that even anarchists seemed to buy into the hyper-nationalistic fervor 
42 
 
being whipped up in this period.1  Nevertheless these expressions of anxiety ran counter 
to the prevailing mood, which saw the coming conflict as a relief from the monotony of 
daily life in Bavaria and Germany.2
 The governing elites in Germany and Bavaria did much to encourage this 
sentiment.  Nationalist and conservative papers ran articles extolling the general 
outpouring of the people in favor of war, seeing in such demonstrations the coming 
together of all Germans, regardless of class or region, as one people united against its 
enemies.  This mood was given official imprimatur on August 4, 1914 when Kaiser 
Wilhelm II declared that he recognized “no parties, only Germans.”
 
3  The civil peace, or 
Burgfrieden, as declared by the Kaiser, became more concrete later when all the political 
parties in the Reichstag, including the Social Democratic Party, voted for the necessary 
war credits.  Thus was created the myth of the “spirit of 1914,” a belief that out of the 
war a new national community had been created.  This powerful sentiment, as Jeffrey 
Verhey has noted, helped to sustain Germany’s war effort throughout the four long years 
that followed.4
 To maintain the German people’s morale, and maintain the ideal of a national 
community, the political leadership resorted to propaganda.  Initially the German 
government’s attempt to control the flow of information was limited to censoring news 
about the conflict.  More effective methods were hampered to certain degree by the 
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disagreement within the cabinet about how to maintain the civil peace.5  As the war 
progressed this ramshackle apparatus was replaced in favor of one increasingly under the 
sway of the German military, headed from 1916 by Generals Paul von Hindenburg and 
Erich Ludendorff.  Their efforts to maintain morale revolved around explaining the war 
to the populace, and the troops, through the use of patriotic instruction.  These gatherings, 
which were first utilized at the front during 1917, featured a variety of speakers who 
explained the goals of the German government in the war, the causes of the conflict, and 
the potential consequences of failure.  While the efforts at improving morale did not turn 
out successfully, the use of patriotic instruction – especially within the armed forces – did 
have an insidious effect; the material used in these lectures were derived in many cases 
from the ideological program of the Pan-German League, other patriotic societies, and 
the writings of völkisch intellectuals.6
 The adoption of such rhetoric to drum up support for the war’s continuation 
marked a break between the type of dynastic nationalism that had characterized Imperial 
Germany prior to 1914 and the kind that would animate post-war patriotic (vaterländisch) 
groups.  The new propaganda emphasized Germany’s war goals, which were defined by 
annexations to the east and the creation of a state freed from political strife.  It subscribed 
to the idea, prevalent in some governmental circles, that the events of July/August 1914 
marked the creation of a true national community (Volksgemeinschaft) – one where all 
Germans regardless of class, religion, or political affiliation could join together in 
supporting the state.  For the people who supported these ideas it was not necessary to 
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promise reforms to the political system in order to rally support for the war effort, as 
those around Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg argued, but only to achieve the final victory 
in which Germany would gain the spoils of victory.7
 Bavaria, in particular, became a home to the radical right groups, and those who 
supported the “national” cause.  While generally supportive at the beginning of the 
conflict, organizations like the Pan-German League became increasingly critical of the 
actions of the German government.  They disapproved of the military strategies 
employed and, more specifically, the domestic policies pursued by Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg.  Many articles in the publications of these groups increasingly came to be 
censored.  To escape these restrictions most groups moved their publications and offices 
to Munich for the remainder of the war, where they continued to criticize the 
government.
 
8
 Despite the efforts of the army, or the virulence of the patriotic associations – and 
publishers like Lehmann, most Bavarians turned decisively against the war by 1917.  
Several factors helped to explain deteriorating attitudes amongst the populace.  The most 
important of these was the material deprivation caused by war.  Munich, like other 
German cities saw the consumption of food drop precipitously from the beginning of 
1915.  To deal with this problem the authorities instituted rationing and tried to get 
people to use substitutes for products like sausages and sauerkraut; turnips becoming a 
  Many of the people who helped to create the radical right in Bavaria after 
World War I, like the ultra-nationalist publisher Julius Lehmann, became active during 
the conflict. 
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universally-consumed, and universally-hated, product.  People in Bavaria did their best to 
evade these restrictions.  They bought food on the black market, bribed public officials 
for extra rations, and raided rural farms for their produce.  In 1916 food riots broke out in 
Munich.  Government authorities dealt harshly with those who violated wartime 
rationing.9
 Deprivation, however, was not just confined to food but covered many facets of 
life in Bavaria.  During the war Munich grew in size as armaments factories and other 
war-related industries were relocated there, leading to an increase of workers drawn from 
the Bavarian countryside and other parts of the country.  Unfortunately there was not 
enough housing for these workers, as most building materials were expropriated for 
military use.  Additionally, small businesses were hit hard by the war because they did 
not have the capital, or workforce, to fill the production quotas required by the 
government.  The countryside was also hit hard, as farmers found that they were required 
to grow more food, but were not paid the price they believed they had earned.  By 1918 
discontent in Munich, and throughout Bavaria, was widespread.
 
10
The Revolution of November 1918 
  
 Revolutionary fervor gripped Bavaria in the fall of 1918 as German forces were 
collapsing, but intimations of the coming uprising percolated throughout the year.  At the 
beginning of 1918 there were massive demonstrations in both Munich and Nuremberg 
                                                          
9 David Clay Large, Where Ghosts Walked: Munich’s Road to the Third Reich, (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1997), 57-65.  Müncheners forays into the countryside were not only strongly frowned upon 
by the government, but by the farmers in the countryside as well who often formed armed bands to patrol 
their fields – beating up, and even killing, those who would steal their crops. 
10 Much of the discontent in Bavaria had an anti-Prussian bias, and was reflective of Germany’s unique 
constitutional arrangement, cultural bias (Bavaria was the second largest state after Prussia), and the 
propaganda of the ultra-nationalist right – something that was important in the post-war period, ibid. 
46 
 
involving thousands of workers, the first such disturbance during the war – in fact the 
first to have occurred in Bavaria since 1848.11  The protesters demanded an immediate 
end to the war without annexations.  Furthermore they demanded that the monarchy be 
abolished in favor of a people’s state, or Volksstaat.  The authorities reacted swiftly to 
these protests by arresting the ringleaders, the most famous of these being Kurt Eisner, a 
transplanted litterateur from Berlin who came to play an important role in Bavaria’s 
revolution.12
 Though suppression worked in these early months, by the fall everything had 
changed so much that the government began putting out peace feelers to the allies and 
promising reform at home.  In Bavaria, like elsewhere, this involved bringing the Social 
Democrats into the government in the hopes of forestalling a Bolshevik-style revolution.  
The Social Democratic Party, despite its revolutionary rhetoric and Marxist heritage, had 
become thoroughly dedicated to reforming society slowly through the democratic 
process.  While whispers of revolution were everywhere, the leaders of the Social 
Democrats – most especially Erhard Auer – were determined to chart a more moderate 
path.  In October the SPD, along with Centre Party, entered into negotiations which 
produced a constitutional monarchy in Bavaria.
 
13
 The arrangement was superseded by events.  Constitutional reform was passed in 
the Bavarian Diet (Landtag) on November 2; by November 5, 1918 revolution had 
already broken out within the High Seas Fleet at Kiel.  News of the uprising had an 
electrifying effect throughout Germany.  In Bavaria the voice of revolution came to be 
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symbolized in the person of Kurt Eisner, who had helped organize the general strikes in 
Munich and Nuremberg in January.  A member of the Independent Social Democratic 
Party, Eisner moved to Munich from Berlin in 1906.  A journalist by trade, he became a 
staff writer for the Munich Post, which was the major Social Democratic daily in 
southern Germany.  During the war, like many German socialists, Eisner parted ways 
with the Majority Social Democrats and joined the Independent Social Democratic Party 
(USPD) which had split with the larger party over the issue of support for the war.  Eisner 
was an unrelenting critic of the both the war and the German imperial system, something 
that would put him at odds with patriotic groups; almost as much as his Jewish heritage 
did.14
 Upon his release from prison on October 14, 1918 Eisner rapidly became the 
voice for those Germans, socialist or otherwise, who were sick of the war and wanted to 
change the German state, and Bavaria, root and branch.  Prior to his release Eisner had 
been entered by the Independent Socialists as a candidate to succeed Georg von Vollmar, 
the long-term Social Democratic parliamentary chief who retired due to illness.  This 
election pitted Eisner against Auer, who was the candidate for the majority SPD.  In the 
campaign Eisner made his most daring statements against the war and the Bavarian 
monarchy, which he believed was just as complicit in causing, and prolonging, the war as 
the Hohenzollern royal family in Prussia.  In an October 23 speech in the 
Schwäbingerbräu Eisner claimed that a people’s state that had a Wittelsbach sitting atop 
it as ruler was no real change at all.  Two days later Eisner made another speech in which 
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he said that, for Germany to move forward, the Kaiser and his sons must abdicate and the 
country become a republic.15
 The campaign between Eisner and Auer was still ongoing when revolution broke 
out in early November, and it was in this context that revolution came to Bavaria.  On 
November 7, 1918 both the SPD and USPD held a joint rally in Munich’s Theresienwiese 
to call for an end to the war and forge a common vision for the future.  While both parties 
agreed to a series of proposals – the abdication of the Kaiser, the placing of the army 
under the constitution, and the democratization of public life, it was Eisner’s address to 
the crowd, lasting over an hour that sparked revolution in Munich.
 
16  Afterwards the 
crowd, numbering near 50,000 marched to a temporary armory, seizing guns and 
ammunition.  Over the remainder of the day revolutionaries seized other parts of the city 
– beer halls, military posts, and the Diet, from which Eisner proclaimed a Bavarian 
republic.  By the end of the day King Ludwig III had left the city for the countryside, and 
later exile, bringing the old order in Bavaria to an end.17
Eisner’s Death and the Radicalization of the Revolution 
 
 The success of the revolution in Munich led to the establishment of a republican 
form of government in Bavaria.  This government was headed by Kurt Eisner, who had 
led the revolutionary bands on November 7.  Eisner had been active during the day, not 
only speaking to the large crowd at the Theresienwiese, but also organizing new political 
forms to take the place of the old guard.  Under his guidance the first Worker’s, Soldier’s, 
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and Farmer’s Councils (Räte) were set up.18
 The first official act of the high council of the soldiers, workers, and farmers was 
to name Kurt Eisner as the new minister-president of Bavaria and, along with him, the 
entire cabinet.  They did this despite the fact that the high council itself had been 
unelected and hastily put together.
  These councils, patterned on the Soviets 
(councils) of the second Russian Revolution, began the task of bringing about reform 
within Bavaria.  Their existence, tied closely to the political prestige of Eisner, and the 
resistance it engendered from the SPD and other elements in society decisively 
influenced the development of the patriotic movement in the years to come. 
19  In fact almost all of the councils throughout Bavaria 
and Germany had been hastily put together.  The councils swept into the power vacuum 
that had been created by the collapse of traditional government.  It was hoped by those 
who composed and supported them that the councils would become in the words of one 
enthusiast, “the fulfillment of their (the Proletariat’s) social hopes and longings, which, 
despite democracy, have been previously unfulfilled.”20  This was certainly the goal of 
Eisner, who argued that the councils be given a prominent place in the new republican 
government.  In his view they would serve as a bulwark to the parliament – a kind of 
secondary parliament to ensure further reforms.21
 For Eisner the role of the councils was vital to the success of the revolution.  
Bavaria had up to 1918 been ruled by monarchical government.  Despite the existence of 
a provincial diet, Bavaria’s politics tended to be conservative – owing to the power of the 
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countryside – and Catholic, reflecting the importance of the Catholic Church in Bavarian 
society and its position among the elites.  Eisner understood that his goals for reform 
could be undermined by the conservative political parties, the Catholic Center party, and 
even by his coalition partners, the SPD, within the parliament.  In this vein it would be 
necessary to use the councils to serve as a counterpoint to the Diet, which Eisner believed 
would tend towards more conservative policies.22
Needless to say the position of the councils was controversial within the Bavarian 
cabinet.  Though supported by Eisner and the Independent Socialists, the Social 
Democrats were conflicted about keeping the councils.  Some members of the cabinet 
believed that they were too similar to the Soviets in Russia that the Bolsheviks had used 
to come to power in 1917.  Furthermore, creating multiple lines of authority had the 
potential to create anarchy within the state as government agencies would not know 
whose edicts to follow.  Auer, the most senior member of the cabinet for the SPD, 
believed that there was no legal basis for the councils, but favored keeping them so long 
as they could evolve into a more traditional parliamentary chamber.  This viewpoint 
gradually became the consensus, and allowed Eisner to preserve the councils but only as 
an advisory body to the diet.
 
23
The dispute over the allocation of political power was not the only point of 
contention within the young revolutionary government.  Eisner would spar with his 
coalition partners over a variety of topics.  Foreign policy in particular was a flashpoint of 
controversy.  Allan Mitchell noted that the revolution in Germany and Bavaria produced 
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nearly opposite results which corresponded to, in many ways, the antagonism that always 
existed between Berlin and Munich.  The revolution in the capital produced a 
revolutionary government that was dominated by the Social Democrats, which hoped to 
maintain continuity and order, with the Independent Socialists in a minority position in 
the cabinet.  In Bavaria, by contrast, the revolutionary government was led by the 
Independent Socialists with the Social Democrats in the background.  Eisner and his 
cohorts, while concerned with maintaining order, were far more interested in a clean 
break with the policies, and even the elites, of the past.24
The most dramatic example of this occurred in the area of foreign policy.  Eisner 
hoped, like most Germans, that the very fact of the revolution and the creation of a 
republican government would persuade the allied powers, most especially U.S. President 
Woodrow Wilson, to negotiate an honorable peace with the new Germany.  While the 
government in Berlin tried to gauge the attitude of the Entente powers through the 
Disarmament Commission and the terms of the armistice then being enforced, Eisner 
believed that only by exposing the corruption of the old imperial elites – thus taking 
responsibility for the conflict – could Germany hope to gain favorable terms.  The 
Bavarian leader had a chance to put his ideas into action during the weeks following the 
November revolution.  On November 10, 1918 he issued a proclamation aimed directly at 
the western powers in which he claimed that those who “bore and shared responsibility” 
for the conflict had been swept away in the revolution, and that this same revolution was 
now under threat from the harsh armistice conditions.  Even more provocative was 
Eisner’s publishing of Bavarian state documents from July and August 1914 that showed 
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the role that the imperial government played in encouraging the Austrians to go to war 
with Serbia.  This controversy, which occurred against the backdrop of a conference of 
provincial leaders in Berlin on November 23, 1918, helped to deepen the differences not 
only between Berlin and Munich, but also within his own ruling coalition.25
The issue of parliamentary elections also led to conflict amongst Eisner’s cabinet.  
After the revolution the cabinet promised parliamentary elections at the earliest possible 
opportunity.  However, much of November passed without movement on the subject.  As 
noted above Eisner viewed the Bavarian parliament with suspicion because many of the 
parties within the body, particularly the conservative and middle class ones, would be 
resistant to the type of reforms he hoped to carry out within the state.  Furthermore he 
believed that not enough time had passed in which the citizens of the province could be 
“liberated” to vote for the Independent Socialists, which he saw as the vehicle for reform.  
However Eisner’s Social Democratic coalition partners saw this as a delaying tactic and 
forced him to call for parliamentary elections to be held on January 12, 1919.
 
26
Eisner’s decision to hold elections in January had been taken at a cabinet meeting 
on December 5, 1918 – just slightly less than one month after the revolution had taken 
place.  While his coalition partners saw elections as a way to regain the initiative in 
creating a new order in Bavaria, some of the more ardent revolutionaries saw in elections 
the beginnings of reaction.
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true revolutionary, but more of a traditional, bourgeois politician who looked to create a 
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the Bolsheviks in Russia.  These radicals on the left coalesced around Erich Mühsam, an 
inveterate critic of Eisner, and on the following day stormed the offices of several 
bourgeois papers in the city, the most prominent being the Bayerische Kurier, and 
“socialized” them.  Additionally, they kidnapped Erhard Auer, the most prominent of the 
Social Democratic members of the cabinet, and forced him to resign his post.  These 
demonstrations were brought under control and dispersed only through Eisner’s personal 
intervention; and this was just the beginning.  A few days later, on December 11, 1918 
members of the Independent Socialists, and more radical members of the councils, 
formed a Spartacus group in Munich, one dedicated to pushing the revolution forward.28
The threat from the left epitomized by Mühsam and the more radical members of 
the councils was mirrored by threats emanating from the radical right.  During the course 
of the war numerous völkisch groups had been established in Munich.  The most 
prominent of these was the Thule Society.  Formed in 1918, the Thule was an outgrowth 
of Theodor Fritsch’s Hammerbund and Germanen Orden, both of which had been 
organized in the years just prior to 1914.  The second of these organizations operated in 
total secrecy, much like the Thule Society would in 1918/19.  Conspiratorial in nature, 
the group only admitted those who could prove pure Aryan ancestry as members.  They 
were heavily antisemitic, dabbled in mystical religious ideas such as Theosophy, and saw 
themselves as an elite organization.
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The Thule Society and other radical right groups in Munich coalesced around the 
publisher Julius Lehmann, who had been an active opponent of the political left during 
the war.  In the aftermath of the revolution Lehmann began to work in a concerted 
fashion to overthrow the revolutionary government.  He made contact with the Thule 
Society and urged them to create an armed militia for this purpose, the Thule Kampfbund.  
As David Clay Large notes, this organization would have an enormous impact on the 
future of right-wing politics in Bavaria during the Weimar Republic.  Several people who 
would become important Nazis, like Hans Frank, Rudolph Hess, and Alfred Rosenberg, 
were members of the fighting society.  The party itself was also an offshoot of this group, 
created by Thule member Anton Drexler after the Munich police infiltrated and broke up 
the militia.  Most important, the Thule Society would be implicated, though not directly 
involved, in the assassination of Kurt Eisner.30
The events leading up to Eisner’s death were bound up in the maneuvers that 
accompanied the Diet elections of January 12, 1919.  Though the number of voters nearly 
trebled from the most recent general election of 1912, the result followed what Allan 
Mitchell called predictable results.  The Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) won a plurality 
of seats in the diet, but the Social Democrats in conjunction with the German Democratic 
Party (DDP), were able to create a working majority in the chamber.
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the parliament where Eisner would be forced to resign.  In the days that immediately 
preceded the first session of the parliament, Eisner tried to revive the councils as a 
counterpoint to the parliament in a vain effort to save his position, leading to charges that 
Eisner intended a second revolution.  Though these were false, it sealed his fate within 
the cabinet, which essentially forced his resignation.32
It was at the opening of the Diet on February 21, 1919 that Eisner’s resignation, 
along with that of the rest of the cabinet, was to take place.  He never got a chance to 
deliver it.  Before entering the parliament building Kurt Eisner was assassinated by Count 
Anton Arco-Valley, an ex-soldier.
 
33  Like many demobilized soldiers, Arco-Valley had 
the misfortune to run into radicals in the streets of Munich, a fact that instilled within him 
a profound hatred of the revolution.  He had tried to join the Thule Society but was 
rejected, partially from rumored Jewish heritage on his mother’s side – the rumor of the 
Thule Society’s involvement seemed to only inflame the councils and the Spartacists.  
The assassin himself was shot by Eisner’s bodyguards, though he survived to stand trial.  
The murder shocked the residents of Munich, turning a controversial politician into a 
martyr overnight and, more importantly, turning the revolution more radical.34
The Räterepublik 
 
 Hans Fenske noted that there were four major phases of the 1918 revolution in 
Bavaria.  The second phase, in his view, began with the murder of Kurt Eisner by Arco-
                                                          
32 Ibid., 242-72. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Large, Where Ghosts Walked, 90-103. 
56 
 
Valley and was marked by a radicalization of the councils.35  This began almost 
immediately.  The day after the assassination a central council (Zentralrat) was set up by 
representatives of the existing councils.  Headed by Ernst Niekisch, a member of the 
Social Democrats who had supported Eisner, this body claimed that the parliament had 
abandoned its legal responsibilities, and as such they claimed the powers of the Diet 
themselves.36  They promptly declared martial law for the capital and armed workers 
with weapons from munitions depots around the city.  These armed workers would patrol 
the streets of Munich for weeks after the shooting, demanding revenge for Eisner’s 
murder.  In this period hostages were taken from prominent families and organizations in 
the city, with the promise that they would be shot if further counter-revolutionary activity 
was not halted.37
 The deliberations of the central council that would take place in late February and 
early March reflected the confusion that had marked much of the Bavarian revolution.  It 
reopened the issue of the councils and reflected the three way struggle that was now 
taking place between the Social Democrats, Independent Socialists, and the Spartacist 
groups in the capital.  In many ways the Social Democrats were in a defensive position.  
Many members of the councils believed that Eisner’s assassin had been paid to do so by 
Erhard Auer, who headed the SPD faction in the Diet.
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more so out of fear that they would lose the allegiance of the masses than out of 
conviction about its efficacy.39
 The goal of the Social Democratic members of the central council was the same 
as before Eisner’s death, to make the transition to parliamentary rule as soon as possible.  
In this they were joined by the Independent Socialists, which had not done well in the 
January 12 elections.  In the deliberations of the central council, both parties agreed that 
the parliament itself would be called back into session as soon as possible, and that the 
most recent election results would serve as the basis for the body.  The question of the 
councils would be decided by this body.
 
40  These decisions were very controversial for 
many members of the Independent Socialists, which hoped to further the development of 
the councils.  Like the Social Democrats, the USPD feared losing the masses to more 
radical elements – in this case to the Spartacist groups within the capital.  These 
organizations were much more radical than the Independent Social Democrats and were 
composed of people who favored a Russian-style revolution in Bavaria.  Many of the 
leaders of these factions were émigrés like Max Levien, who was an ardent admirer of 
Lenin.  Though members of the Spartacist groups had participated in the central council 
and the Congress of Councils, they walked out on the deliberations once the final 
decision to call the parliament back into session had been taken.41
 When the Diet finally was recalled on March 7, 1919 it installed a new cabinet 
headed by Johannes Hoffmann as Minister President.  A member of the Social 
Democratic Party who had served in Eisner’s cabinet, Hoffmann was determined to steer 
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a middle course between the right and the left, a prudent course, but one that infuriated 
both the left and the right.  As it turned out events would overwhelm Hoffmann’s 
government.  Economic dislocation engendered by the war, and the continuing food crisis 
prevented the Bavarian government from instituting policies designed to help its 
citizens.42  Furthermore many Bavarians, particularly supporters of the Bavarian People’s 
Party (BVP), were incensed by the new Weimar constitution which had been sent to 
Bavaria for confirmation.  The document stripped Bavaria of many of the rights and 
privileges that had characterized the state’s relationship to the Reich under the 
Hohenzollerns: a separate army, a separate diplomatic corps, its own Post and Telegraph, 
control over its own railroads, and the right to collect its own taxes on beer.  For many 
Bavarians this was a crippling blow.  They erroneously believed that the federal 
relationship that had tied them to the imperial government would continue under the 
Weimar Republic.  When this did not take place many urged for secession from 
Germany.  Unfortunately for those who urged such a course the Hoffmann government 
was content to maintain Bavaria within Germany, provoking howls of outrage and 
unflattering comparisons to Eisner.43
 These problems only served to further convince the Spartacists and Communists 
that the time was ripe for a second revolution.  They were confirmed in their aspirations 
by events in Hungary, where a revolution had brought a Soviet-style republic to power in 
Budapest under the leadership of Bela Kun.  When they met in Augsburg on April 3, 
1919 they voted to call for a Soviet republic in Bavaria.  This resolution, when delivered 
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to Munich, was met with silence from the government, as Hoffmann had left the city to 
confer with officials in Berlin.  In the absence of Hoffmann the situation quickly spiraled 
out of control.  The Central Council ordered that the Diet, due to meet on April 8, 1919 
not be called back into session.  The next day, on April 5, 1919 representatives of the 
cabinet, the Central Council, and the Communists and Spartacists met at the ministry of 
Military Affairs to find a solution to the impasse, at which Hoffmann’s representative 
called for a councils republic, or Räterepublik – which he did as a way to draw the 
Communists into a coalition with the SPD, something that a congress of the party, 
meeting in Nuremberg rejected outright.  However, the die was cast.  A rump session of 
the Central Council deposed the Hoffmann cabinet and declared Bavaria to be a Soviet 
republic.  The Räterepublik was born.44
The Suppression of the Räterepublik 
 
 In his history of the Bavarian revolution Allan Mitchell noted that it proceeded 
differently than elsewhere in Germany.  The uprising there not only produced results far 
earlier than other parts of the country, but had also lasted longer.  In fact, in northern 
Germany, especially in the capital of Berlin, the revolution’s most radical phase came in 
January 1919.  During that month Spartacist groups, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht, attempted to seize control of the city.  During the uprising the Social 
Democratic government turned to para-military formations, the notorious Freikorps, to 
put down the uprising.  They did so with great severity.  However, because Eisner had 
successfully created a coalition government in Munich, Bavaria did not have a turn 
towards radicalism until after his murder in February 1919.  So, by the time the 
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Räterepublik was suppressed at the beginning of May 1919, the infrastructure, and the 
manner, for doing so existed and was ready to use.45
 Initially, though, the Hoffmann government was determined to deal with this 
problem on its own, hoping to preserve some autonomy from Berlin in the process.  The 
problem for the cabinet, sitting in Bamberg, was that this necessitated a military solution 
– namely the conquest of Munich.  This answer meant that they needed forces and the 
political will to use them.  Both were in short supply in early April.  For much of the 
week following April 8th the cabinet tried to fix the situation by quarantine and 
negotiation.  When these proved fruitless, Hoffmann turned to a military solution, but the 
means in which the government sought to retake Munich – inserting forces into the city 
to create a reverse coup d’etat – proved to be disastrous.  Instead of deposing the 
Räterepublik and restoring the Hoffmann government to its position, the insurgents were 
defeated at the Munich Train Station, where they made a final stand.  It even led to 
further radicalization as the Communists seized control from the Central Council and 
established their rule in Munich.
 
46
In the aftermath of the government’s failed assault on the capital, the cabinet sent 
out a call on April 14, 1919 for the creation a civilian militia, or Volkswehr.  Initially 
these formations were to carry out the fight against the Räterepublik on their own, 
without help from Berlin.  However, these forces proved to be wholly inadequate.  
Organized two days after Hoffmann’s proclamation, and three days after the Palm 
Sunday assault, Bavarian forces were routed by the Munich Soviet’s Red Army in 
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Dachau.  In reports that came back to Bamberg it was said that some of the soldiers 
refused to engage with the enemy.  Reluctantly, the Bavarian Minister-President asked 
Berlin for help.47
 Part of the reason for the poor state of militias formed under the auspices of the 
Bavarian government was the long wait before forming such groups.  This resulted in 
recruits that were not soldiers in any real sense, but citizens with little to no military 
experience.  Even groups that formed prior to the Bavarian government’s involvement 
suffered from this deficiency.  Rudolf Kanzler, who would be important in the formation 
and running of the Einwohnerwehr, began to form a circle around him in Rosenheim in 
December 1918.  The men recruited to staff this militia tended to be men of distinction.  
Shopkeepers, butchers, tailors, and other established men answered the call to take up 
arms in Rosenheim.  Few had any military experience at all.  The result was that these 
initial paramilitary groups were small; the Rosenheim militia itself was roughly ninety 
men when the call for militias went out from Bamberg in mid-April.
 
48
 Despite the low quality, several important Freikorps units were created during the 
period of the Räterepulik.  The most important of these was Schützenbrigade 21 (later 
Freikorps Epp), which was organized by Franz Ritter von Epp.  A soldier and explorer in 
the Bavarian army, Epp began to create a paramilitary formation in early 1919.  In this 
endeavor he received assistance from Gustav Noske, the Minister for Military Affairs, 
who was busy setting up Freikorps all over Germany in response to the Spartacist 
uprising in Berlin.  Epp recruited soldiers for his unit from among the lower ranking 
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officers and non-commissioned officers who had been demobilized after the war.  Epp’s 
unit was given formal status after April 18, 1919 when Minister-President Hoffmann 
called on Berlin for assistance.  This request was granted, but with the proviso that the 
soldiers used for the assault on Munich be led by a Prussian general, who would lead a 
contingent of 20,000 Reich troops, in addition to the paramilitary formations being set up 
by the national government.49
 With the help of the government in Berlin, other units were set up in the same 
manner.  Freikorps Oberland, considered by Hans Fenske to be the prototypical Free 
Corps formation, was created in Bamberg under the command of Rudolf von 
Sebottendorf, a military adventurer who had been active in the Thule Society.  They 
numbered nearly 700 men, 250 of whom would participate in the attack on the capital.  
Another unit, Freikorps Chiemgau, was organized using the farmers and rural laborers of 
the Chiemgau region of Upper Bavaria.  Fenske notes that this particular paramilitary 
formation was different from the others in that there were few soldiers among their 
number.  Together with roughly 15 other formations, small units based on local 
communities around Bavaria, and the small contingent of federal troops sent from Berlin, 
these para-military formations would be involved in retaking Munich.
 
50
 The attack on Munich was supposed to take place on May 2, 1919.  However, it 
ended up taking place a day early because of reports that the leaders of the Räterepublik 
had executed a number of hostages.  These prisoners, who were held in the 
Luitpoldgymnasium, a local school, and had been picked up for a number of reasons – for 
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coming from bourgeois families, belonging to the Thule Society, or having taken down a 
Soviet poster.  The hostages were killed in response to the murder of eight unarmed Red 
Army soldiers, along with 20 medical orderlies, by Freikorps troops when they retook 
Dachau early that morning.  This justification, however, carried little weight with 
government forces, which now used the hostage murder (Geiselmord) as a rallying cry 
and as cause for their actions when they moved into the city the next day.51
 The attack on Munich did not take particularly long.  Resistance was light when 
government and Freikorps troops moved into the city.  Nevertheless government forces 
behaved brutally in putting down the Räterepublik.  Nearly 350 people were murdered 
over the course of the next several days in Munich, many without trials – some after a 
very short trial.  Many of the leaders of the Munich Soviet, like Eugen Levine, were 
subsequently tried and executed, while others, like Ernst Toller, received stiff prison 
sentences.  The brutality was not just confined to killing however.  In the days following 
the assault a female painter, who insulted some Freikorps soldiers, was stripped naked 
and beaten with a riding crop “until there was not a white spot left on her backside.”
 
52  
Citizens, who had been in hiding during the Räterepublik, now hunted down and attacked 
fellow citizens who were known to have leftist sympathies, while other denounced those 
who had helped the leaders of the Munich Soviet.  The severity of the suppression of the 
Council Republic effectively ended the revolution in Bavaria.  In the process, Munich 
and Bavaria generally, were to become home to the political far right, a movement that 
would find expression in the patriotic movement.53
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Chapter 4 
Political Elites and the Creation of the Einwohnerwehr 
 In order to suppress the Räterepublik the government in Bavaria had turned to the 
army and paramilitary formations.  These groups, particularly the local ones, formed the 
nucleus of the patriotic (vaterländisch) movement in the state.  They played a small, 
though significant role in destroying the Räterepublik and insured that further revolution 
would not occur.  However, as the Bolshevik threat dissipated many of these local 
paramilitaries did not simply disappear, but continued to grow.  Their further 
development reflected the fears many people had of a resurgent Bolshevism, as well as a 
desire to return to the status quo ante bellum of the old imperial system.  The 
Einwohnerwehr came about as a result of this expansion. 
Particularly important in this process was the role of the Bavarian political elite.  
Lower level elites, usually located in the hinterlands, helped to found many of the 
original paramilitary groups used by the government.  At the same time they were helped 
in their task by the actions of the Hofmann government that desperately tried to maintain 
control of the situation in Bavaria in the spring of 1919.  Their decision to help foster the 
small paramilitaries in the weeks prior to the ‘liberation’ of Munich provided the first 
taste of real political power to the leaders of the future Einwohnerwehr.  In the months 
that followed a working relationship developed between the men who led these small 
bands and the political leaders of the state, who hoped to use the new organization to 
consolidate their power and prevent future disturbances. 
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Throughout the remainder of 1919 the Einwohnerwehr was organized to become 
an auxiliary dedicated to the preservation of the state, its constitution, and those state 
supporting (staatserhaltend) elements.  It grew to encompass much of Bavaria though 
there would be limits to its reach.  These were tied to the association’s ideology, which 
was itself a reflection of the world view of its leaders.  Their unremitting hatred of 
socialism along with their romanticized view of Germany, and its place in the world, 
ruled out certain segments of the population that did not hold to the nationalist vision of 
the Einwohnerwehr. 
Lower Level Elites and Bavarian Paramilitary Organizations 
 Many of the local Bavarian right-wing groups that had participated in the 
suppression of the Räterepublik began to form in the months following the November 
revolution in Bavaria.  These organizations had several things in common; they were 
small, very local, and almost wholly ineffective in either preventing radical upheaval or 
overturning the new government in Munich.  However, their existence testifies to a 
determination amongst a certain strata of the newly displaced political elites in Bavaria to 
revive their positions of prominence within the Bavarian state. 
 The men most active in forming right-wing paramilitary organizations came from 
the lower reaches of the Bavarian government and civil service.  They were not people 
who, before 1918, had the commanding heights within the state, but held positions that 
gave them some influence and allowed others to look to them for leadership.  As a group 
they were surprised by the speed with which the old order fell in Bavaria and expected to 
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see resistance to the new government form.  When this did not materialize they began to 
organize on their own. 
 One of the best examples of this phenomenon can be seen in the person of Rudolf 
Kanzler.  A middle level civil servant, Kanzler was, at the time of the revolution, a 
member of the Chamber of Deputies in the Bavarian Diet.  His reaction was typical of 
many who held positions in the late Wittelsbach kingdom.  “I waited upon men of name 
and influence to call for armed opposition to the revolutionary rulers.  To my boundless 
disappointment, that never happened.”1  Kanzler returned to Rosenheim shortly after the 
proclamation of the Free State and began to form a paramilitary formation on his own 
initiative.2
 The process by which his group was organized provided a model for the future 
Einwohnerwehr, in which Kanzler played an important part, as well as other paramilitary 
formations.  Much of the membership came from a distinctly middle class background.  
The people that joined Kanzler beginning in December 1918 included: shopkeepers, 
butchers, and tailors; men of distinction but not great wealth.  These were people who 
had enjoyed a prosperous existence in the Kaiser’s Germany, and who felt increasingly 
threatened by the process of modernization.  Few, if any, members of the working class 
joined this early citizen’s militia.  Kanzler was content with this development because he 
believed that society and the state should be controlled by men of merit.  He despised the 
Worker’s, Farmer’s, and Soldier’s Councils (Arbeiter-,Bauern-,und Soldatenräte) that 
were set up in the months after the revolution.  In his memoirs, Bavaria’s Struggle 
  
                                                          
1 Rudolf Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus: Geschichte der bayerischen Einwohnerwehr, 
(München: Verlag Parcus & Co., 1931), 9. 
2 Ibid., Kanzler’s efforts in creating his own Bürgerwehr also ensured that Rosenheim, and the region 
surrounding it, would play a leading role in the revanchist politics of the radical right in Bavaria. 
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against Bolshevism (Bayerns Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus), Kanzler excoriated this 
particular body as the root of problems in the Chiemgau.3
 Organizing the Rosenheim citizen’s militia proceeded slowly at first.  Kanzler had 
hoped to build up a force of 1,000 men, arm them with weapons seized from a cache near 
Rosenheim, and to lead an assault on Munich in much the same way that Bavarian 
peasants had done in 1705.  This proved to be a daunting task as the Eisner government 
and the councils had prohibited the possession of weapons without license of the 
government.  Kanzler wrote that he had to “beg and steal” in order to get the weaponry 
needed.  To disguise his activities, he used his office as a weapons depot, enlisting his co-
workers in his cause.  Making things more difficult was the decision of the council in 
Rosenheim to fire the mayor and local government councilor, people that Kanzler would 
have counted on for support.
 
4
 In spite of these difficulties the Rosenheim militia was strong enough by April 
1919 to take on the local council government.  Taking advantage of the political strife 
occurring in Munich on April 14/15, 1919 (Palm Sunday), Kanzler’s group seized control 
of the local council’s headquarters after an altercation involving the “republican guard,” 
which had fired on people near a local beer hall.  Portrayed as a spontaneous riot in his 
memoirs, Kanzler moved quickly to overturn local councils in the region surrounding 
Rosenheim.  The councils were defeated, according to Kanzler, “with the help of droves 
of people, who raced to the support of only scantily armed farmers in the region, this 
(coup) was successfully overcome in a relatively short time and appreciably without 
 
                                                          
3 Ibid., 10-11. 
4 Ibid. 
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further bloodshed.”5  Despite their success, Kanzler eventually ended his campaign when 
the Räterepublik in Munich sent reinforcements to the region, which forced him to flee to 
Bamberg, where he joined the Hoffmann government.6
 It was during these weeks in the north that Kanzler began to organize, in a more 
systematic fashion, a true paramilitary force.  In this respect he was aided by help from 
the Hoffmann cabinet and the middle class parties, particularly the Bavarian People’s 
Party, who were frantically organizing civil defense organizations and Free Corps in 
every corner of the state.  They provided him with money, officers (though Kanzler also 
relied upon a cadre of officers who escaped from Rosenheim with him), and most of all 
encouragement.
 
7  The result was the creation of the Freikorps Chiemgau, a group that 
was every bit the military outfit, from the officers that led the volunteers to the staff that 
managed the unit’s affairs.8
Despite the assistance Kanzler received he faced two major difficulties in 
organizing this group.  The first revolved around the simple fact that the Räterepublik’s 
forces occupied the Chiemgau region – meaning that the men Kanzler needed to fill out 
the ranks were essentially unavailable at that time.  Second, neither the Hoffmann 
government nor the army provided adequate arms for the Freikorps Chiemgau.  Kanzler 
and his officers solved these problems through subterfuge and smuggling.  Recruiters 
were sent into the Chiemgau region, in what he described as “life threatening” missions, 
 
                                                          
5 Ibid., 12. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Abschrift des Ministerium für Militärische Angelegenheiten, 17. April 1919, BHSA, IV, EWB, NL 
Kanzler, B. 20a. 
8 Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 13-18.  Many of the Freikorps units of the period were organized along military 
lines.  This stemmed from multiple sources: the prevalence of demobilized officers and soldiers in such 
units, the role of the government – particularly Defense Minister Gustav Noske, in creating them, and the 
close working relationship these groups had with the regular army, which coordinated their activities – 
though with great difficulty, Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 29-30. 
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to recruit locals under the noses of republican authorities.  Weapons, many of them in 
caches throughout the region, were smuggled out and brought to several depot centers in 
the north, where they were distributed to the volunteers.9
 The efforts of Kanzler and his staff bore fruit at the end of April, as his forces 
retook the Chiemgau and Rosenheim over the course of several days from April 30 to 
May 2.  This campaign took place at the same time, though independently, of the 
Hoffmann government’s assault on Munich.  In most respects the campaign in the region 
proceeded effortlessly.  Most of the towns and villages in the region were taken with little 
to no resistance.
 
10
 Kanzler’s example was replicated throughout Bavaria.  In Munich local citizens 
organized their own local auxiliaries, but these were not coordinated very well.  Their 
efforts, before the advent of the Räterepublik, foundered on the weakness of the Hofmann 
government in the period immediately following Eisner’s death, and were not rectified 
until the cabinet moved to Bamberg.
  Once the region had been retaken, Kanzler began to reorganize the 
Freikorps Chiemgau. 
11
                                                          
9 Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 16-17. 
  Wasserburg, on the other hand, only took to 
creating their paramilitary force around the time the more radicalized council government 
was set up.  Franz Schneider, who came to control this unit, noted that many people in the 
town saw the November revolution as a comedy.  Only after the local council began to 
10 Ibid., 18-23. 
11 Gründung einer Volkswehr zur Zeit der Räteregierung in München im März und April 1919, BHSA, IV, 
EWB, NL Kanzler, B. 20a. 
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take measures that were deemed injurious to middle class interests, did Schneider and 
others set out to create the Freikorps Wasserburg.12
The most significant figure amongst the lower echelon of the Bavarian elite that 
founded and participated in patriotic organizations, however, was Georg Escherich.  A 
forestry official in the Wittelsbach state, Escherich traveled outside Germany in the years 
before the First World War, which made him unique amongst many of his right-wing 
contemporaries.  His travels, however, only reinforced his authoritarian tendencies.  
David Clay Large describes Escherich as the “Great White Hunter,” a personality type 
frequently seen in Europe during these years.
 
13  Like many Europeans he treated local 
natives with incredible disdain, unless they exhibited traits that Escherich himself prized.  
His travels also fed his incredible ego, as it allowed him to act as a high official, even an 
aristocrat – a role that went well beyond his meager station as a forestry official.14
When World War I broke out, Escherich joined the Bavarian army as a volunteer.  
He served as a captain in the artillery and distinguished himself in the battle of St. Marie 
bei Markirch.
 
15  Wounded in the leg in 1915,16
                                                          
12 Aus Miesbach, Vorgeschichte , BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 14. 
 Escherich would spend the rest of the war 
in Poland.  There he served with the local military administration, gaining invaluable 
experience as an organizer and manager.  He also used the position as an opportunity to 
13 Large, Politics of Law and Order, 18.  Escherich often hunted big game while abroad, in addition to his 
official duties studying foliage. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Gefecht der 2. Ersatz-batterie 1.bayerischen Feld Artillerie Regiments auf dem Col de St. Marie bei 
Markirch am 23. August 1914, BHSA, V, NL Escherich, B. 2. 
16 2. Ersatz – Abteilung 1. Feld Artillerie Regiments an das Königliche Sanitätsamt, 10. April 1915, ibid. 
71 
continue his work as a forestry official, through which he made many contacts in both the 
army and in the government.17
After the war Escherich returned to Bavaria.  Initially he affiliated himself with a 
veteran’s organization, whose purpose was to advocate for officers seeking pension and 
other forms of state support.
 
18  However, over time, he found himself drawn to the 
paramilitary movement.  Escherich disliked the revolutionary upheavals of November 
1918.  Like many low level officials, Escherich had nothing but disdain for the Social 
Democratic Party and the entire political left in Germany.  As a result, the nascent 
patriotic movement seemed a natural fit for him.19  Just as Kanzler had done in 
Rosenheim, Escherich set up his own paramilitary in Isen in April following the creation 
of the Räterepublik.  This group, inexplicably, was able to keep the council’s soldiers out 
of Isen, a fate not shared by many communities in the Chiemgau.20
 In the weeks following the suppression of the Räterepublik Escherich delved into 
the evolving paramilitary scene in Bavaria.  He sent numerous letters to his aristocratic 
friends, military officers, and government officials, in which he maintained the need for a 
more thorough defensive structure.
 
21  His opinions became so well known, that leaders in 
Bavaria sought out his advice regarding their plans for the reinstitution of the Bavarian 
Army, Reichswehrgruppe No. 4.22
                                                          
17 Präsident des Reichstags an Herrn Forstrat, Hauptmann Escherich, 6. Juli 1916, ibid. 
  Government officials sent him recruitment materials 
in which they outlined this new Bavarian force, which differed in some substantial ways 
18 Arbeitsausschuss des WBO an Herrn Forstrat Escherich, 10. Februar 1919, ibid. 
19 Large, Politics of Law and Order, 18. 
20 Horst G.W. Nusser, Konservative Wehrverbände in Bayern, Preussen, und Österreich; 1918-1933; mit 
einer Biographie von Forstrat Georg Escherich, 1870-1941,  (Munich: Nusser Verlag, 1973), 92-3. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Bezirksamt Wasserburg an Herrn Forstrat Dr. Escherich, May 24, 1919, BHSA, IV, EWB, Bund 3. 
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from the old Wittelsbach army.  These included its reliance upon volunteer recruits, the 
ability to move up in the ranks – including the traditionally closed officer corps, and 
closer cooperation between officers and soldiers through trusted officials, or 
Vertrauensleute.23
In the course of this correspondence, Escherich began to outline his thoughts on 
the creation of self-defense organizations that would help support the state.  He 
incorporated some of the ideas being circulated for the new Bavarian army.  One, the new 
force needed to be composed entirely of volunteers.   Two, units should serve as a reserve 
and be used only as a supporting force for both the army and the police.  Three, the 
organization would only be composed of men with the highest moral character.  Four, 
and perhaps most importantly, he insisted that the group needed to be centrally controlled 
by a state leader.  In essence, Escherich called for the creation of a civilian auxiliary that 
was necessary in his view because, despite the destruction of the Räterepublik, the danger 
from the left had not yet dissipated.
 
24
As it turned out such an organization was being created around the same time – 
the Einwohnerwehr, or Civil Defense Guards.  This group had been founded on a national 
level by Gustav Noske, the Social Democratic Defense Minister, who hoped to use it as a 
more reliable instrument of government control.  While the various units of the Freikorps 
had been necessary to squelch the Spartacist Uprising of January 1919, to say nothing of 
the suppression of the Munich Soviet, they often proved difficult to control and tended to 
 
                                                          
23 Die bayerische Reichswehr-Gruppe IV – Herausgegeben vom Stabe des Reichswehrgruppen-
Kommandos Nr. 4 (General v. Möhl), Ibid. 
24 Large, Politics of Law and Order, 19. 
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use excessive violence when employed.25  However, after May 1919 the government no 
longer needed units of ex-soldiers eager for a fight that would undercut the stability of the 
national government.  Nevertheless they still believed a state of emergency existed.  They 
assumed elements of the political left were still plotting revolution which, they argued, 
would overwhelm police and military authorities.  In their view Germany still needed 
paramilitary protection and the men who joined the Einwohnerwehr were to provide it.  
As its regulations stated, “then all men should also be called to arms, in order to protect 
themselves and their possessions.  Everyone, who loves law and order, belongs in the 
Einwohnerwehr.”26
Unlike the Freikorps, which had demobilized veterans as the backbone of the 
individual units, the Einwohnerwehr had a more selective screening process for its 
volunteers.  Members had to be upstanding members of civil society, without any hint of 
impropriety in their background.  Anyone over the age of twenty could join.  Veterans of 
the First World War were preferred, but unlike the Freikorps units, not vital for 
membership.  Those who did sign up had to provide references testifying to their high 
character.  The organization officially took no account of political preferences, or class, 
in regards to membership.  The only stipulation was that all volunteers had to be willing 
to support the state and uphold law and order.
 
27
                                                          
25 Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 29-30 and 39-42. 
  This requirement removed much of the 
political left, to say nothing of the working class, from consideration. 
26 Zentralstelle für Einwohnerwehren beim Reichswehreministerium, Richtlinien für die Aufstellung einer 
Einwohnerwehr: Herausgegeben von der Zentralstelle für Einwohnerwehren beim Reichswehrminister 
unter Berücksichtigung der in Berlin gesammelten Erfahrungen, (Berlin: Zentralstelle für 
Einwohnerwehren beim Reichswehrministerium, 1919), Vorwort, IfZ, SK 37 
27 Ibid., 1-2. 
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With the support of the national government and Defense Minister Noske, the 
Hofmann cabinet ordered the creation of an Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria.  Officially 
promulgated on May 17, 1919, the decree from the Ministries of Interior and Military 
Affairs helped to define the parameters of the new organization.  The Einwohnerwehr in 
Bavaria was organized as a partially civilian and a partially military group, in accordance 
with the regulations set out in Berlin.  It was to support both the police and the army 
whenever necessary and its leaders were to come from local communities.  Perhaps most 
important of all, the regulations called for the creation of military commissioners, or 
Wehrkommissare.  These officers, temporarily appointed by the army and placed in each 
governing district in Bavaria, were given the task of forming and supervising the 
Einwohnerwehr in the state to insure reliability.28
For the leaders of units that already existed, the new instructions meant a chance 
to continue as before.  All over Bavaria, Freikorps organized themselves as Civil Guard 
formations.  Here again Rosenheim and the Chiemgau led the way.  After the suppression 
of the Räterepublik in the region Kanzler moved quickly to consolidate his forces.  He 
broke up the Freikorps Chiemgau and created the Einwohnerwehr Chiemgau.  The 
transition was easy enough, for many of the men who had fought for the previous unit 
signed up for the new one.  Kanzler kept many of the military officers who had aided in 
the retaking of the region as leaders in this new formation.  In fact, in many respects, the 
new organization maintained the militaristic bearing of the former Freikorps Chiemgau.
 
29
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29 Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 24-33. 
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Kanzler’s goal in creating the Einwohnerwehr Chiemgau was to eventually create 
a statewide organization.  However, his ideas differed greatly from those who were 
creating the national organization in Berlin.  He believed that the group needed to grow 
more slowly and thus more assuredly.  He wrote in his history of the Einwohnerwehr, 
“against it I wanted to create, going more slowly and from known, already existing Civil 
Guards cells, built up organically (as I had practically shown how to do it already in 
Upper Bavaria-East) and totally without support from state authorities, a purely private 
and absolutely reliable defense organization.”30  The advantage, as Kanzler saw it, to an 
organic and independent approach came in its independence from political control.  
Without state meddling, a paramilitary formation could develop its own structures and 
create an esprit d’ corps.  The units could be molded to the personalities and 
predilections, political and otherwise, of the leadership.  However, if politicians were 
allowed to supervise, he believed that the Civil Guards would easily find themselves an 
instrument of the state.31
Kanzler’s ideas were not universally shared amongst the men who were creating 
auxiliary units.  In Wasserburg, for instance, Civil Guard units were more loosely based 
than those in Rosenheim, creating what one local member called a “purely civilian 
institution,” in contrast to the military bearing of the Kanzler organization.
 
32
                                                          
30 Ibid., 40. 
  As a result 
local units were allowed greater flexibility in governance and normal activities.  This 
included raising their own funds through a variety of means, like auctioning off 
31 Ibid.  Kanzler, writing from the perspective of 1931, justified his plan for the Einwohnerwehr by pointing 
to the example of the Austrian Heimwehr, an organization that had been set up with help from the Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr and its off-shoot Organisation Kanzler, or Orka.  In Kanzler’s view the success of the 
Heimwehr proved that an independent paramilitary force could indeed become a major political player in 
politics by staying apart from state control.  Ibid., 41 
32 Organisation der Ortswehren in den Gemeinden im Bezirk Wasserburg am Inn, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 14. 
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Christmas trees during the holidays or giving public performances.33  Additionally, 
Schneider and his men asserted their independence from Rosenheim, despite Kanzler’s 
claim of control over all of southeast Bavaria; their defiance stemmed from anger at the 
high handed behavior of Kanzler’s men during the liberation of Wasserburg.34
Escherich also held ideas that varied from Kanzler’s, though there were 
similarities in their approach.  The differences revolved around the creation of a statewide 
organization, the centralization of all local units under its leadership, and how the group 
should relate to the government.  Escherich believed that the Einwohnerwehr should 
closely cooperate with civil authorities.  This approach was outlined in a June 4, 1919 
letter to local communities in the regions around both Wasserburg and Isen.  Escherich 
argued that instead of organizing on the local level as Kanzler had done, all units should 
be tied to the defense district, or Wehrkreis.  All the communities within this region were 
compelled to set up guard units.  The minimum number of men in each unit was to be 
twenty, and all were to be volunteers who conformed to national guidelines.  Local 
authorities also had to financially maintain the group in terms of transportation, 
weaponry, and ammunition.  The use of these would be controlled by the local leader 
working in conjunction with the defense commissioner, who had overall responsibility 
for their activities.  Otherwise, in its inner workings, the Einwohnerwehr was to be 
independent of government control.  The leadership was to be selected democratically by 
  The 
differences in style and tone only added to the personal enmity of both men. 
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34 Organisation der Ortswehren in den Gemeinden im Bezirk Wasserburg am Inn, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 14.  
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the membership, while information on all members, its daily non-emergency activities, 
and other administrative matters were kept beyond the eyes of the state.35
The Bavarian Political Elite and the Creation of the Einwohnerwehr 
 
 The initial organizations of the patriotic movement, the various Freikorps and 
nascent Einwohnerwehr, had been founded by men who held lower level posts in the 
Bavarian state and army.  While their involvement was critical both to rally support to 
their cause and in terms of organization, these units would not have survived for long, let 
alone thrived, without the tacit and active participation of leading politicians and the 
Bavarian Army.  The political figure most identified with the movement, both at the time 
and subsequently by historians, was Gustav von Kahr.  During 1919 and early 1920 Kahr 
served the Hoffmann government as regional president of Upper Bavaria, which included 
Munich and the regions to the south and east where both Escherich and Kanzler had their 
power bases.  Later on he became Minister-President of Bavaria and would remain an 
important player with respect to the patriotic movement throughout the period. 
 Gustav von Kahr came from a middle class family of civil servants who had 
served the rulers of Bavaria throughout the nineteenth century.  Like many in his family 
before him, Kahr received a title of nobility for his service to the Bavarian state.  
Appointed regional president of Upper Bavaria in 1917, Kahr remained at this post 
through the revolutionary upheavals of 1918 and early 1919.36
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  Described by David Clay 
Large as “a short, powerfully built man with rough facial features, close-cropped hair, 
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and a prim goatee,” Kahr was ‘colorless’ to many of his contemporaries.37  Supremely 
devoted to the Wittelsbach rulers he had served, Kahr’s monarchical sympathies were 
well known as was his unremitting hatred for socialism.  These tendencies naturally made 
him an inveterate opponent of the 1918 revolution.38
 Kahr’s interest in creating a paramilitary force that would turn back the gains of 
the revolution was evident from the very first.  In the days that followed the November 
1918 Revolution, Kahr suggested creating a civilian organization to protect businesses 
and private property.  This proposal was turned aside by Interior Minister Erhard Auer as 
unnecessary at the time.
 
39  The subsequent radicalization of the revolution and the defeat 
of the Räterepublik gave Kahr a chance to try again.  During the summer of 1919 he 
organized a series of meetings with Escherich and other leaders of the paramilitary 
movement.  The first of these was held on June 21, 1919 in his office.40  Interestingly 
Rudolf Kanzler had not been invited to the meeting, a fact that reflected the esteem in 
which Escherich’s ideas were held.41
 At this first meeting it was decided to divide Upper Bavaria into a number of 
regional districts, or Gaue, which would correspond to local government offices.  The 
initial localities were organized around major cities or towns like Munich, which was a 
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regional office all on its own, Rosenheim, Garmisch, Freising, Wasserburg, Weilheim, 
and Landsberg to name a few.42  The creation of districts and regional offices were 
designed to correspond with local government offices and to allow for close coordination 
with state authorities.  Escherich followed up the meeting with another in Berlin four 
days later on June 25, where it was decided that further development of the group would 
be handled by local officials.43
 Following this meeting establishment of the Einwohnerwehr was expedited by 
Escherich, working through Kahr’s office and assisted by both the interior and defense 
ministries in Munich.  In fact both offices started creating regulations for the organization 
before requested to do so by Berlin.  The Ministry of Defense established a series of 
guidelines for the distribution and use of weaponry and ammunition that was circulated 
through the government, and given to Escherich, following the June 21 meeting.
 
44  These 
regulations were to be supervised by the local defense commissioners, who, as noted 
previously, were responsible for streamlining the units’ activities and making sure the 
government’s edicts were followed.45
 A second organizational meeting was held on July 2, 1919 in Kahr’s office in 
Munich.  Rudolf Kanzler, who had not been invited to the first conference, was in 
attendance, as were many of the regional governors in Bavaria.   Kahr, however, was not 
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there.  He was in Berlin at the time and left Escherich to chair the conference.46  During 
the discussion Kanzler argued strongly for his ideas of a private military force, but was 
unable to move the government officials and military men who preferred an organization 
that could serve their interests.  Seeing the writing on the wall, Kanzler put his support 
behind Escherich’s plan writing later, “In the interest of unity in the fatherlandish 
movement and controlled by the thought that through my assistance, in view of my 
experience in the area of defense, one would be able to accomplish much good and 
prevent many misdeeds.”47
 The final organizational meeting was held on July 17, 1919.  At this meeting, 
which was chaired by Kahr, the leadership was put into place for the Einwohnerwehr.  
Escherich became the state leader, while Kanzler became his deputy.  Furthermore, it was 
decided that regional offices of the group should correspond to military districts, and that 
the Finance Ministry should take the lead in supporting the group.  Finally, the 
participants discussed numerous housekeeping items like identity papers for the 
leadership and the type of dress for the average member.
 
48
 Despite the unity of purpose that prevailed amongst the nascent paramilitary 
leaders and the Bavarian political elite in the summer of 1919 there existed an 
undercurrent of tension, one that would have a profound impact on the development of 
the Einwohnerwehr and the history of Bavaria.  The May 17, 1919 memo that created the 
organization in Bavaria stipulated that the group was to be used as an auxiliary, an arm of 
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the civil and military authorities.  Strict controls were called for and the army was to 
provide guidance in this area.  They appointed special military commissioners in each 
government district to closely supervise Einwohnerwehr units.  In all cases the guards 
were to answer to local control – either civil or military.  They were not to be classified 
as military, to avoid the expected restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, but as local 
auxiliary to the police that in an emergency could be used by the local military 
commander.49  The guidelines set forth by military officials in Munich corresponded 
closely to the regulations set forth by the main Einwohnerwehr office in Berlin.50
 The type of group described in the May 17 letter did not correspond however to 
the reality in Bavaria.  Even as Escherich and Kanzler were setting up the organization 
they moved to make it practically independent from the state.  The key to getting out 
from under government control was to eliminate the military commissioners as a check 
on them.  Originally the military commissioners had been given a mandate for three 
months, enough time to set up a state-wide body.  After that they could be renewed by the 
cabinet.  As Kanzler pointed out, even before the July 2, 1919 meeting, he and Escherich 
began to urge the removal of these individuals as stewards of the Einwohnerwehr.  They 
argued that keeping them in place would hinder the further development of the group.
 
51
 Needless to say this brought them into conflict with both the Bavarian army and 
the cabinet.  The Hoffmann government had given its assent to the creation of the 
Einwohnerwehr under the assumption that this group would be controlled by the civil and 
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military authorities.  Members of the government, such as Interior Minister Endres, had 
given assurances to that fact.52  The army, along with the Ministry of Military Affairs, 
was particularly troubled by this move from the Einwohnerwehr leadership.  In an 
internal memo of August 9, 1919 they argued that the maintenance of the military 
commissioners was absolutely vital to the smooth functioning of the paramilitary group.  
In their view, the Einwohnerwehr was nothing more than a local body, one that was to be 
controlled by the civil government, and in true emergencies, by the military.  Thus the 
need for more centralized leadership was superfluous, and even dangerous, as it might 
cause further distrust amongst the allied powers and a rather large portion of the German 
population.  They reminded the government that, “It must not be misjudged, that the 
antipathy many workers, and also many majority socialists, have against the civil defense 
forces is still quite great, and that only the avoidance of anything that remotely reminds 
them of so called ‘militarism’ must be avoided.”53
 The reason for the differing interpretations was the decision reached at that July 2 
meeting to make the Einwohnewehr a totally private organization.  Naturally this 
conformed to the wishes of Escherich and Kanzler, who had wanted to be independent of 
state control.  It also corresponded to the reality created by the Treaty of Versailles, 
which placed restrictions on the size of the German military; if the Einwohnerwehr were 
placed under the supervision of the army it might violate the military articles of the peace 
settlement.  Thus the decision that was reached in July, and the underlying reasons for it, 
allowed Escherich and Kanzler to continue to extend the Einwohnerwehr organization to 
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the north, using the functioning and centralized Upper Bavarian group as the nucleus.  As 
new territories were brought in they adhered to the leadership circle around Isen and 
Rosenheim, instead of the official government in Munich.  Thus the ideas of Escherich 
and Kanzler became official doctrine and allowed them to set up an independent entity, 
even with the military and government providing organizational help.54
 The confusion generated by these divergent views was finally cleared up in a 
decree from the Interior Ministry on September 10, 1919.  The Einwohnerwehr, in its 
internal day to day affairs, would be independent of the civil authorities.  “Domestic 
officials do not stand in the lead of the Civil Defense Forces, except in advisory and 
support role.”
 
55  Additionally they were to be supported through funds from the state, 
provided by the military or through local communities depending on whether it was a 
military or police action.  These were regular funds for the staff and leadership, and funds 
for Einwohnerwehr members when called out to action.  Finally, the military 
commissioners who had helped to foster the development of the Einwohnerwehr, and 
expected to supervise it, were dissolved.  In its place a system of service agreements 
(Dienstverträge) would govern the relationship of the group to the Bavarian 
government.56
The Organizational Structure of the Einwohnerwehr 
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 With lines of authority now clearly delineated the leaders of the Einwohnerwehr 
could complete their organizational work.  The state leadership (Landesleitung) of the 
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr made its headquarters at the Ringhotel, Sendlingertorplatz 1 in 
Munich.  From there the leadership and their staff ran an outfit that had units placed in 
every locality throughout the province.  Escherich headed the organization as the state 
leader (Landeshauptmann), with Rudolf Kanzler as his second in command 
(Stellvertreter des Landeshauptmann).  The headquarters staff was divided into nine 
departments and two offices.  The group’s chief of staff and the secretarial staff 
comprised the administrative staff, while the departments consisted of development 
(growth of local offices - I), weapons and munitions (II), procurement (III), information 
and education (IV), administration (financial – V), maintenance (weaponry and vehicles 
– VI), legal (VII), personnel (VIII), and press/propaganda (IX).57  Of the personnel at 
Einwohnerwehr headquarters the most significant, beyond Escherich and Kanzler, was 
Hermann Kriebel, a man who had decisive völkisch leanings and later participated in the 
infamous Beer Hall Putsch.58
 From the leadership in Munich power flowed to the provincial offices.  These 
would be set up throughout the remainder of 1919 and into 1920.  Starting from the 
region of Upper Bavaria, which had been thoroughly organized by Escherich and Kanzler 
by September of that year, the group steadily moved northward.  Using their connections 
with Kahr and the army, the leadership of the Einwohnerwehr was able to prevail upon 
local leaders to create units.  The area of Bavaria where the leadership had the greatest 
difficulty in organizing was in northern Bavaria where there was a fair amount of heavy 
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industry, and thus a large working class.  As a monthly report put it, “Only in industrial 
districts with predominantly left radical populations must action in the first instance be 
taken in the building of Civil Defense forces, because the workers, as in the example of 
the precinct of Wunsiedel, bluntly refuse to join in the building of forces.”59
By the time it was finally organized in early 1920, the Einwohnerwehr would 
have 10 regional (Kreisleitungen), and 141 sub-regional (Gauleitungen) offices 
(including the 29 districts in Munich).  Each regional office had a full staff to handle 
administrative duties and report directly to central headquarters, while the local offices 
contained a leader (Gauleiter), a deputy, and chief of staff.  The most significant of the 
regional and local leaders of the Einwohnerwehr was Dr. Otto Pittinger, the regional 
leader of the upper Palatinate (Oberpfalz), who would later go on to head Bund Bayern 
und Reich after the dissolution of the Civil Guards.
 
60
 One of the first issues facing the state leadership of the Einwohnerwehr was 
funding.  Escherich was very desirous of financial support from the state.  Needless to 
say this created the potential for conflict with the government authorities, and so it was 
initially decided that funding should be as private as possible.  This had the added 
advantage of allowing the organization to continue if a sudden swing in government 
occurred.  Gustav von Kahr characterized the thinking behind this most succinctly: “were 
a communist government to receive in its hands disposition over the state’s financial 
sources for a time they could draw from our resources.”
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was to help set up a private office that would help find people to fund the group.  The 
donors would come from local businesses that would benefit from the Einwohnerwehr’s 
protection.  The more donors who could be found, the less money would be needed per 
contributor.62
Private donations were a tricky problem for some in the Einwoherwehr because of 
the implied obligations it seemed to carry with it.  At a December 1919 meeting several 
Einwohnerwehr leaders objected to some of the private sources used to fund the group, 
particularly the excessive reliance on the banks.  They did not want, in their words, to be 
thought of as a “capitalist and Jewish guard.”
 
63  Instead of relying heavily on large 
financial institutions the Einwohnerwehr leadership decided to raise extra funds at the 
local and regional level.64  In addition, funds were sought from individual members 
themselves.65  However the need for membership dues evaporated beginning in 1920 as 
the Hoffmann government gave three and half million Reichsmarks to the organization.  
One million was to go for insurance, while the remainder went for the maintenance of 
local offices and regular duties.  Funding from the cabinet never obviated the need for 
private funding, however, and private sources would continue to be used to fund the 
organization.66
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
 
63 Niederschrift über die erste Sitzung des Landesauschusses der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns am 16. u. 17. 
Dezember 1919, ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Monatsbericht der Landesleitung, 5. Dezember 1919, ibid.  It appears that Escherich’s appeal for private 
funds from the membership came prior to the leadership meeting (Landesausschuß) where the 
government’s funding was made known, ibid. 
66 Niederschrift über die erste Sitzung des Landesauschusses der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns am 16. u. 17. 
Dezember 1919, ibid. 
87 
The financial support, from wherever it came, helped subsidize a growing 
organization.  Officers, excluding the leadership, and enlisted men were paid regular 
wages for each and every time they were called out to duty.  The members were paid one 
Mark per day of service, with a bonus of five Marks for special duty.67  Particularly 
important was the issue of insurance.  Detailed rules allowed for insurance to be paid out 
for injuries and death to Civil Guard volunteers and their spouses.  Insurance payments 
for death in the line of duty ran five hundred Marks, and were paid out the same for both 
male and female members of the organization.68  Weapons and other property of the 
Einwohnerwehr were also insured as well.69
One benefit of state funding, indeed of the whole semi-official status the group 
enjoyed, was that it led to an increase in membership.  In fact the number of Bavarians 
who became associated with the Einwohnerwehr grew exponentially throughout its short 
history.  By the time of its dissolution in July 1921 the organization had 361,100 
members.  Of these the vast majority, in fact 1/5 of the total membership, resided in the 
region of Upper Bavaria, which never had less than 50,000 members (the first available 
statistics were from January 1920).  Other regions never came close to having the number 
of members of this district.
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organization’s most fervent supporter in the Bavarian government.  This district was also 
the best organized territory of any in the province, with an established history of 
paramilitary activity going back to before the Räterepublik.  Thus it stood to reason that it 
would remain the stronghold of the Einwohnerwehr even after it had extended across the 
state. 
The size of the membership suggests that a strong motivation existed amongst a 
wide swath of the Bavarian population, both young and old, to join the organization.  Pay 
alone was not sufficient to bring men to Escherich in such numbers.  However, a strong 
sense of patriotism, engendered by the war and enraged by the circumstances and 
consequences of defeat, helps to more adequately explain the popularity of the 
Einwohnerwehr, indeed all of the paramilitary units of the post-war period.  Many 
Bavarians experienced the loss of World War I as both a liberating and a deeply 
humiliating experience at the same time.  Hopeful for a fresh start, and a lenient peace, 
most Bavarians and Germans felt betrayed when the terms of the Treaty of Versailles 
became known.  This helped lead to a belief that they had only lost the war through the 
underhanded tactics of the allies and the betrayal of disloyal elements at home.  Thus, by 
joining groups like the Einwohnerwehr these men could continue the struggle against 
both the allies and the republican government, which was the greatest consequence of 
their defeat.71
The Einwohnerwehr placed a great premium on its membership.  If it was to be a 
respected, non-political upholder of “law and order” it needed adherents of the highest 
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caliber.  The regulations that governed the organization set the tone.  All members had to 
be of moral and upright character, literally perfect so that they could project an air of 
confidence and respect amongst citizens – a document filled out by the local leadership 
was to attest to this.  They had to be dedicated to the preservation of the lawful 
government, regardless of party affiliation or feelings about the sitting government.72  
Quality was to be valued much more than quantity.  “It should only take up men, who are 
firmly resolved, to meet in every way its high requirements.”73
The Bavarian leadership set out further guidelines for the members as they set up 
the units.  One regulation involved a probationary period of two weeks for individual 
members, during which time the leadership evaluated the new recruit’s fitness for 
membership.  Another series of regulations involved dismissal from the Einwohnerwehr.  
Associates could be dismissed for injuries that impaired their ability to do their job.  
Additionally they were dismissed for any arrests, or jail time, that reflected poorly upon 
the organization, or as the leadership put it the “the honor of the citizenry.”
 
74  Finally, 
members could leave the Einwohnerwehr, or be released, if they were unable to perform 
their responsibilities.  This governed a wide range of activities, from general 
incompetence to failing to adhere to the “non-political” nature of the organization.  In all 
cases individual members were governed by the local leadership, who dealt with 
membership issues relying upon the guidance of the state leadership.75
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The ideological fixations of a purportedly non-political organization played an 
important role where membership was concerned.  Officially anyone could join the 
Einwohnerwehr regardless of political affiliation or social class.  The only proviso was 
that they be state supporting (staatserhaltend).76  Naturally anyone who did not fall under 
this stipulation was not allowed to join.  The definition of this was made clear in a 
January 1920 Interior Ministry memo to the leadership.  “Personalities, who are 
fundamentally hostile and stand opposed to this government, are to be kept away from 
entrance into the Einwohnerwehr or to be removed from it.”77
What this meant in practice was that members of the Independent Social 
Democratic and the Communist parties could not join the Einwohnerwehr.  This became 
an increasingly contentious issue in the second half of 1919 as members of both groups, 
along with the working class more generally, began to apply for membership.  The 
leadership of the Einwohnerwehr, backed up as it was by the state, refused admittance to 
anyone coming from either party.  In their view, the Independent Social Democrats and 
Communists were organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the government.  
As long as both entities were dedicated to a Bolshevist uprising membership would 
remain unattainable.
 
78
Up until that time the vast majority of the people associated with the 
Einwohnerwehr came from a distinctly middle class background.  This development had 
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been what paramilitary leaders like Rudolf Kanzler had wanted.  They distrusted the 
working class, which had participated in the strikes leading up to the November 1918 
Revolution and who had played a role, albeit a cursory one, in the Workers, Soldiers, and 
Farmers Councils.  The hostile feelings were reciprocated by the Bavarian working class.  
Many workers remembered the role that paramilitary forces had played in the suppression 
of the Räterepublik and they believed the Einwohnerwehr to be an element of the 
counterrevolution.  As a result few workers joined the Einwohnerwehr. 
A particularly good example of the difficult relationship between the 
Einwohnerwehr, indeed most paramilitary groups, and the working class can be seen in 
Wasserburg in late 1919.  During the month of November the working class in the region, 
led by members of the Social Democratic Party, argued that members of the working 
class be allowed to enter the organization.  Once in the association these workers began 
to push for the election of a new local leader and a reorganization of the unit.  The 
Wasserburg leadership attempted to negotiate with a representative of the working class, 
but these negotiations proved fruitless as workers who had joined not only refused to 
follow the established leadership (they insisted on following their own leaders), but they 
also refused to return weapons that had been issued to them.  For the Einwohnerwehr’s 
leadership this incident allowed them to portray the working class of Wasserburg as 
heavily politicized, and thus not acceptable to the group.  As the report of the local 
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military commander put it, “Accession of the united working classes as a political party, 
occupational, or economic class is not possible.”79
The example of Wasserburg is illustrative of the particular problems faced by the 
Bavarian leadership as it related to industrial workers and their political representatives.  
Ideologically committed to the creation of a defense force without reference to party 
persuasion, religious affiliation, or social class, the organization in practice discouraged 
such participation, and expelled those members of the working class that adhered to 
socialism like the workers in Wasserburg, whom they saw as under the influence of the 
Independent Social Democrats or the Communists.  The Social Democratic Party (SPD), 
which also represented the workers, viewed this issue with alarm but did precious little to 
change the situation beyond moral suasion.  The national party leadership issued a 
statement calling on all workers and party members to join the Einwohnerwehr, noting 
that, “Weapons in the hands of a reactionary middle class are a danger.”
 
80  Moreover the 
expulsion of socialists by various district offices brought them into conflict with the 
Hoffmann government in Munich, who warned the Einwohnerwehr’s leaders about the 
potential for “bad blood” between the group and Bavarian workers.81
Nevertheless, the Einwohnerwehr’s leaders continued to prevent members of the 
more radical wings of German socialism from joining the group on the basis that they 
were revolutionary and not “state supporting.”  This policy became even more strictly 
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enforced after the establishment of the more conservative Kahr government in March 
1920.  Members of both parties, and the workers they represented, renewed their efforts 
at joining the organization.82  Despite their rejection of such left-leaning members, the 
leadership accepted associates who had similarly questionable tendencies on the right.  In 
Fürth this became an issue when the local office accepted into the Einwohnerwehr a man 
of known monarchist sentiment, while rejecting the membership application of an 
independent socialist.83  Both local and regional offices justified the move by saying that 
the member in question, a man named Neidhardt, “generally respects the majority elected 
government.  He fights against it at the most with spiritual weapons and aims to 
reintroduce the monarchy through the parliament.”84  The move was reaffirmed by the 
leadership in Munich.85
Some local units of the Einwohnerwehr even tried to exclude Jews from 
membership in the organization.  These attempts were made in violation of the 
association’s own rules, which had made provisions for excluding members on the basis 
of revolutionary (Bolshevik) tendencies.  The regulations stated that anyone could join 
the organization regardless of social class.  The German word for this, Stand, has a rather 
wide definition.  In addition to its common meaning the word also can mean social 
standing, profession, and condition.  In this context it almost necessarily had to refer not 
 
                                                          
82 Landesleitung der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns an die Staatsministerium des Innern, 25. März 1920, ibid. 
83 Einwohnerwehr Fürth – Gauleitung an die Kreisleitung der Einwohnerwehr Nürnberg-Fürth, 9. August 
1920, ibid. 
84 Kreisleitung der Einwohnerwehr Nürnberg-Fürth an die Landesleitung der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns, 
11. August 1920, ibid. 
85 Landesleitung der E.W. Bayerns an die Kreisleitung der E.W. Nürnberg-Fürth, 27. August 1920, ibid. 
94 
just to class, but also to religion as well, even though the rulebook did not specifically 
mention the latter.86
Many Bavarian Jews joined the Einwohnerwehr during the group’s brief 
existence.  According to statistics compiled by the Central Union of German Citizens of 
the Jewish Fath (Zentralverein deutsche Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens) in 1929 over 
two hundred Jews had been members of the Einwohnerwehr.  These men could be found 
all over the state, not just in cities like Nuremberg, but in more rural settings like in the 
countryside around Kempten or Rosenheim.  Of those that served, many had military 
backgrounds, having served in the Bavarian Army during World War I.  For instance, all 
of the Jewish members from Straubing had been frontline soldiers during the conflict.  
Several had leadership positions in the organization; one was even local leader of the 
Golzenhofen office.  The numbers might have even been higher.  Neither Munich nor 
none of its neighborhoods were included in the report.  In addition, there were several 
cities where there had been Jewish members but the respondents were not able to say for 
certain how many there were.
 
87
Outbreaks of open antisemitism in the Einwohnerwehr occurred in two regional 
districts, Regensburg and Rosenheim, and both were severe enough to warrant comment 
from the Bavarian leadership and the Kahr government.  In Regensburg Jewish members 
had been taken into the body “without difficulty” by the district leadership, which itself 
displayed no obvious antisemitic tendencies.  Nevertheless discontent within the 
membership led to the resignation of one member and the expulsion of another.  The 
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situation in Rosenheim was far graver.  There antisemitic feelings amongst the 
membership, and most likely the leadership, led to the promulgation of a petition asking 
that the Jewish members of the local branch be expelled from the organization.88  
Eventually both the state leadership and Bavarian government intervened.  The leadership 
dealt with the issue at a meeting of state and local leaders in August 1920, stating that, 
“an expulsion of a member of the Einwohnerwehr only because he is a Jew, is according 
the regulations entirely illegal,” a sentiment that was backed up by the Interior 
Ministry.89
The internal strife within the Einwohnerwehr over membership shows the extent 
to which a particular ideological stance had come to define the organization, even by the 
end of 1919.  The problems with working class members, and with Jewish members in 
1920, betrayed the group’s obvious conservative slant.  This development was the result 
of the founding period of the Einwohnerwehr.  The men who had founded the initial 
paramilitary units were deeply hostile to the socialist left, the German revolution of 1918, 
and even the government that resulted from it.  After the suppression of the Räterepublik, 
when the Munich cabinet was setting up a paramilitary force, these men were tapped to 
play leading roles in the new organization and were aided by political figures, like Gustav 
von Kahr, who were as suspicious of the majority Social Democratic government as they 
were of the Independent Socialists and the Communists.  Kahr and his allies managed to 
allow Escherich and his men to escape the confines of state control, with all that implied, 
and that would have consequences for Bavaria in the months to come.    
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Chapter 5 
Enforcers of the Counter-Revolution – the Einwohnerwehr, its Ideology, and Activities in 
the Wake of the Kapp Putsch 
 The Einwohnerwehr’s extension throughout the state of Bavaria in the second half 
of 1919 came about due to the efforts of elites who desired to see, at the very minimum, a 
return to a more conservative order, if not a restoration of the pre-1918 government.  
Their worldview played a large role in limiting the social composition of the group.  
Workers, even if they adhered to the Social Democratic Party and not the more radical 
Independent Social Democratic Party, found themselves harassed, ignored, and stymied 
at every turn.  In many instances they found themselves marginalized, or even kicked out 
of local units.  The ideological imprint placed on the units by local leaders and state 
leaders even extended to Jews, despite regulations allowing for Bavarians of other faiths 
to join. 
 The narrow definition in regards to membership reflected the program of the 
Einwohnerwehr, which built upon the regulations of the national organization and added 
a specifically Bavarian flavor to these.  The world view espoused by Escherich’s units 
was a mixture of utopian nationalism, strident anti-socialism (or anti-communism), a 
belief in federalism, and with it a nostalgia for old Bavaria.  Added to this was an 
apocalyptic sense of urgency that only radicalized the men of the Einwohnerwehr and 
insured that when they did act it was in the most strident fashion possible.  In the process 
they helped overturn Bavaria’s first democratically elected government, ushering in a 
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regime that reflected their views more generally and which allowed them even greater 
leeway in the state. 
The Ideology of the Einwohnerwehr 
 The Einwohnerwehr believed, first and foremost, that they were the protectors of 
“law and order.”  The concept itself was rather amorphous, but served as a rallying cry 
for those who felt that political change ushered in more destructive tendencies.  In the 
national regulations that had been published in June 1919, it stated that the main purpose 
of the organization was to serve as a self-defense force against “plunderers and robbers” 
and those who had a “lust for murder.”1  These they associated with the Spartacists and 
“Bolsheviks” who were responsible for the disturbances of January-May 1919.  The use 
of such phrasing was very clever.  By using terms commonly associated with dangerous 
criminals, it allowed those who read it to see the Independent Socialists, though not the 
Social Democrats, and workers as people willing to use horrific tactics to achieve their 
goals.  Thus, any real political argument that such groups had was illegitimate in the eyes 
of many because of the tactics they were reputed to use.2
 The belief that Bavaria and the Reich faced an existential crisis stemming from 
the revolutionary changes of 1918/19 remained a constant theme of the Einwohnerwehr 
throughout its existence, and helped to underscore the need to preserve ‘law and order.’  
In their view Germany was on the very brink of collapse.  Georg Escherich made 
reference to this fear in an All-Saints Day letter to all Einwohnerwehr units.  
 
                                                          
1 Zentralstelle für Einwohnerwehren beim Reichswehrministerium, Richtlinien für die Aufstellung einer 
Einwohnerwehr, (Berlin: Zentralstelle für Einwohnerwehren beim Reichswehrministerium, 1919), Vorwort 
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“Unspeakable misery, destruction, and death threaten hundreds of thousands of racial 
comrades, if the putting together of all state supporting forces in the homeland to care for 
law and order does not succeed.”3  Fear of Bolshevik upheaval, while the primary danger, 
was not the only one faced by the community.  Einwohnerwehr leaders also pointed to 
the evils of the black market and the loss of honor and morality which they believed were 
just as dangerous to the life of the state.  In Escherich’s view these were also within the 
purview of the group, as the recovery of morals and tradition would help in rebuilding the 
community.4
Recruitment materials sent out by the state leadership stoked fears of upheaval, 
often in the most apocalyptic language possible.  Appeals to honor both for the 
community and the safety of an individual’s family were constantly evoked to encourage 
men to join and gain public approval.  Much of this was designed to refute arguments that 
had been made against joining the group.  Some of these assertions, like the ability to 
defend one’s family with or without weapons, were swept aside by pointing out the 
inability of the individual to defend against “masses of organized and fanatically incited 
subversives.”
 
5  Other objections, like leaving law and order to the police and regular 
army, were refuted using the argument that the Einwohnerwehr had the advantage of 
being everywhere at the local level.6  They firmly believed membership in the 
Einwohnerwehr was the best way to prevent “outside agitators” from achieving their goal 
in Germany, which they convinced themselves was civil war.7
                                                          
3 Aufruf an die Einwohnerwehren Bayerns, 1. November (Allerheiligen) 1919, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
 
4 Ibid. 
5 Werbeschrift der Einwohnerwehr, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 14. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Werter Herr!, ibid. 
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Fear was also useful for shaking the local population out of its apathy in regards 
to the dangers of revolutionary forces in the state.  Local officials often engaged in 
campaigns designed to engender enthusiasm in favor of the Einwohnerwehr through fear 
of the consequences of inaction.  For example, the local defense commissioner in 
Deggendorf noted that the people in his region needed to be shaken out of their 
complacency that the army would always be there to protect their property.8  Such fear 
was useful to Escherich and his men.  It prevented people from falling under the sway of 
propaganda from the left, which often attacked the Hofmann government and the 
Einwohnerwehr for the reaction against the revolution.9  It also served to rally the 
population through difficult periods like the winter of 1919, where harsh conditions 
followed a poor harvest.  Without the Einwohnerwehr it was believed that many of these 
people would turn towards Bolshevism.10
In the ideology of the Einwohnerwehr and its leaders communism, and socialism 
more generally, was behind the disruption of “law and order.”  Many of the individuals 
who were involved in the organization, such as Rudolf Kanzler, made their feelings 
perfectly clear about the revolutionary changes that had swept through the state.
 
11
                                                          
8 Hauptmann Bucher Wehrkommissar f. Niederbayern, Gauleitung – Bayernwald an das 
Gruppenkommando Nr. 4, dem Herrn Chef des Stabes Major Preger, 24. October 1919, BHSA, I, M Inn 66 
138 
  As a 
result the struggle against communism became a core tenet of their beliefs.  Escherich 
himself made this abundantly clear when he remarked that, “The Einwohnerwehr is the 
local wall against Bolshevism, and then the Einwoherwehr, just as the Organisation 
9 Regierung von Mittelfranken, Kammer des Innern an das Staatsministerium des Innern, 23 November 
1919, ibid. 
10 Der Winter 1919 im Bezirk Rosenheim, BHSA, I (Staatsministerium des Äußern), MA 102 381 
(Privatkorrespondenz Dr. von Kahr). 
11 Rudolf Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus, (Munich: Paracelsus, 1931), 9-11. 
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Escherich, is the only and lone expression of local power in the struggle against the 
Bolshevist revolution.”12
One danger to such rhetoric naturally was the possibility that, in the mind of the 
average member, the distinction between Social Democrat, Independent Socialist, and 
Communist might be lost.  The organization did try to make sure that conflation of these 
groups did not happen very often.  In many of its memos and letters the leadership made 
clear to distinguish between the “Bolshevik and Spartacist” Independent 
Socialists/Communists, and the ‘state supporting’ Social Democrats, which they often 
referred to as the Majority Socialists.  Members from the latter were perfectly welcome in 
the Einwohnerwehr, and the leadership made sure to point this out at every turn.
 
13  As 
Kanzler stated in a July 1919 speech when it came to support, “The Einwohnerwehr has 
behind it all respectable German men, from majority Socialists to the most conservative 
German Nationalists.”14
Despite such assurances that Majority Socialists were welcome in the 
organization, or that their ideas were seen as respectable, problems existed between the 
Einwohnerwehr and any group on the socialist left.  One issue, mentioned previously, had 
to do with membership by workers in the group.  Often the Einwohnerwehr leadership 
found the majority Social Democrats, and the workers they represented, to be just as 
difficult as the Independent Socialist and Communists who tried to join the association.  
In one memo the state leadership claimed that majority Social Democratic workers were 
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just as enamored of radical ideas as others.15  This led to a campaign on behalf of the 
Social Democratic governments in both Berlin and Munich to open up the membership to 
members of the party beginning in November 1919.16  The state leadership saw such 
efforts as an unwelcome development.  They increasingly excoriated the policy of the 
government in northern Germany, which was run by Social Democrats, seeing in their 
actions agreement with both the Bolsheviks and the Entente Powers.17
Due to the prominence that the struggle against communism and socialism held 
for the Einwohnerwehr, the organization fought its spread tooth and nail.  Armed defense 
was one aspect of resistance, one that remained at the core of the organization’s mission.  
Another way to defeat Bolshevism, however, was by inculcating national feeling amongst 
Bavarians.  The Einwohnerwehr saw themselves as the vanguard for patriotic thinking in 
Bavaria and Germany.  The revival of love of the fatherland would instill in the average 
citizen respect for constituted authority and traditional “German customs, manners, and 
uprightness,”
 
18 that would inoculate the citizen against foreign ideas and tendencies.  
More important, from a military perspective, it would keep alive respect for the martial 
values of the old Bavarian army.  Escherich’s men firmly believed that their group was a 
“life community” of the nation, one that exemplified that values and customs of the 
military and the nation.19
The traditional values that the Einwohnerwehr hoped to restore rested in no small 
part on a highly stylized reading of the recent German past.  For the organization’s 
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leaders and members the events of August 1914 were crucial to their worldview.  For 
them the August days of the Burgfrieden was the moment of greatest national unity when 
all Germans came together in support of the Fatherland in a time of war.  That feeling of 
togetherness, and the need to return to it, was something that obsessed many in the 
leadership.  “To have revived again in the widest circles this belief in us is a moral action 
of the Einwohnerwehren.  It was a spirit like that in August 1914, which let the 
defensemen join together during the May days.”20  According to this view of the national 
community, everyone understood the needs of the other.  Workers did not think their 
bosses to be heartless captains of industry, while the educated strata of society 
appreciated the contribution of the industrial worker.21
Of course those intense feelings of nationalistic unity in August 1914 helped to 
serve a political purpose during the war, namely the preservation of the Imperial system, 
and this was something that the leading figures of the Einwohnerwehr desperately wanted 
to return to.  They saw in the pre-November 1918 government the accumulation of 
several centuries of social and political development in Bavaria and the Reich.  The 
socialist governments that had ruled Bavaria since that time were considered to be 
interlopers determined not only to rob the state of the means of self preservation, but to 
impose foreign ideas upon it.
  That this spirit of unity was 
always more fiction than fact did not occur to, or bother, the members of the 
Einwohnerwehr. 
22
                                                          
20 Addresse bei Ingolstadt, 3. Juli 1919, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 20d (Nachlaß Kanzler). 
  Rudolf Kanzler summed this position up nicely when he 
21 Ibid. 
22 Heimatland, “Ein Jahr Landesverband,” Nr. 39, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
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wrote, “The revolution and its initiators had the attempt to build up a new state without 
respect for the life necessities, natural connections and traditions of the people.”23
They could not say this outwardly of course, because to do so would put them in 
opposition to legally constructed authority, which ran against the organization’s stated 
purpose.  Instead the leadership always claimed to be acting in a way that preserved the 
Weimar and Bavarian constitutions, allowing them to pose as the defenders of the new 
democracy against more radical forces.  This subterfuge worked very well for the group.  
It became the basis for preventing members of the Indepdendent Social Democratic and 
Communist Parties from joining the Einwohnerwehr, or throwing them out.
 
24  It also 
served as a basis for attacking both the Hoffmann and Reich governments.  Rudolf 
Kanzler in Bavaria’s Struggle against Bolshevism argued that much of the discontent 
amongst Einwohnerwehr members and soldiers of the Bavarian Reichswehr in early 1920 
was due to the Hoffmann government neglecting their duties as stipulated by the 
constitution.25  It was a charge that continued to be made against the national government 
in Berlin right up to the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, and allowed the leadership to 
portray that conflict as yet another example of Berlin’s dictatorial stance vis-à-vis 
Bavaria.26
 Propaganda was actively used by the Einwohnerwehr to help revive this spirit of 
national unity, to gain support for the group’s policies, and to recruit new members to the 
cause.  Often these materials painted a bleak picture of the Räterepublik and emphasized 
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the radical nature of those who sought to bring more thorough change to society.  There 
were several ways this was done.  The first involved the collection of the histories of 
local units in the Einwohnerwehr.  These reports, which circulated up through the chain 
of command, told of how various paramilitary formations came into existence.  Each 
local’s story stressed the same themes: the institution of the council government in the 
territory, the resistance to such a government (whether sparked from outside, or not), and 
finally the suppression of the councils and the creation of the local unit. 
One example of these local histories was that of the Garmisch-Partenkirchen 
Einwohnerwehr.  In two reports, one for Garmisch and one for Partenkirchen, the unit’s 
commander claimed that it was only after the Hoffmann government had made its 
proclamation against the council republic on April 10, 1919 that planning for the creation 
of a citizens brigade, which had been called for in December 1918, began in earnest.27  In 
this the community was joined by other towns such as Mittenwald, Oberau, and 
Eschenlohe in planning to create a military force.  This planning continued, even after the 
Mürbock Putsch of April 24, 1919 brought a council government into effect in 
Garmisch.28  The local units of the various communities struck on April 27, 1919 against 
the local councils, deposing them quickly.  In the days that followed, units from this 
region would be sent to Munich where they helped in the suppression of the Räterepublik 
there.29
The histories sent in by local units were also supplemented by additional material 
providing evidence of the Räterepublik’s actions against traditional authority.  The report 
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for Garmisch-Partenkirchen, originally handwritten but retyped in 1937 for the group’s 
archive, highlighted the proclamations and policies of the local councils in the two 
communities.  The guidelines stated that those who went against the councils would be 
brought before the revolutionary tribunal, and possibly put to death, that all local farms 
and businesses were to provide their products to the central committee, and that the 
region was under a state of general strike.30  Naturally such policies created resistance 
amongst groups that would traditionally support such authority, like farmers, teachers, 
and civil servants, all of whom in their own councils proclaimed themselves in support of 
the Hoffmann government and the Einwohnerwehr.31
In their propaganda the leadership of the Einwohnerwehr always stressed the wide 
support their organization had amongst the population.  For example they pointed out that 
much of their membership, from the earliest days in April 1919, derived from Bavarian 
youth with an “activist spirit.”
 
32  The group’s newspaper, Heimatland, noted in its 
September 30, 1920 issue that interest in the first statewide shooting festival had been so 
great that the Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten was printing a special edition dedicated 
to it.33  Where support for the association was not strong, this would be attributed to the 
radical forces of the left, and their supporters, who plotted general strikes against the 
state, and who used the socialist press to attack the organization.34
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31 Ibid.  See also, Entstehungsgeschichte der Einwohnerwehr Partenkirchen, ibid. 
32 Gründung einer Volkswehr zur Zeit der Räteregierung in München im März und April 1919, BHSA, IV, 
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33 Heimatland, “Hinweis,” 30. September 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
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 Perhaps the most effective way to get its message of the state in danger across to 
average Bavarians was through its own media apparatus.  In January 1920 the Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr began publishing its own newspaper.  Called Heimatland, its purpose 
was to publish the pronouncements of the leadership, defend and strengthen the local 
members, inform the public of Einwohnerwehr activities like the shooting festivals, and 
create interest in joining the group.  Members were strongly encouraged to have 
subscriptions to the paper, which cost five Reichsmarks for one year, and the regional 
leadership was expected to circulate it to like-minded associations and to the “order 
supporting parties.”35
 The primary purpose of Heimatland was to spread the patriotic ideology of the 
Einwohnerwehr.  In this it would be most successful.  Rudolf Kanzler, in his observations 
about the organization, wrote of the paper, “In it(s pages) to do actual politics, which 
could somehow take effect on the surface it was hardly noticed.”
 
36  To accomplish this 
objective the paper put a great stress upon articles that had a sentimental view of 
Bavarian history and culture.37  Poetry was a regular feature in the paper, and stressed the 
importance of the member and soldier.38
                                                          
35 Landesleitung der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns an die Kreisleitung der Einwohnerwehren, 27. November 
1919, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
  Heimatland also ran opinion pieces 
commenting on current events, political tendencies, and how the activities of the 
Einwohnerwehr helped to bring about a patriotic (vaterländisch) world view.  As one 
commenter put it, speaking about the group’s ideology, “and whenever unity again arises 
36 Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 192. 
37 Heimatland, “Bayerisch Land und Volk,” Nr. 39, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
38 Heimatland, “Unseren Toten,” ibid. 
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in these people, and when we are all united by Einwohnerwehr supported ideals, then no 
enemy in the world will be able to postpone us on the way to reascendance.”39
 Another function served by the newspaper was to attack the political enemies of 
the organization.  These were identified as “the members of the red and other November 
parties.  Even those people who for decades did everything in order to destroy the 
national and cultural basis of the German people and prepare for the November 
catastrophe.”
 
40  The paper made a specific point of attacking the socialist press, 
particularly the Munich Post, regularly in its articles and editorials.  It accused the 
newspaper of inciting hatred against the Einwohnerwehr and carrying on a media 
campaign designed to lead to the dissolution of the group.  Heimatland also attacked 
members of middle class parties, who were prepared to accede to allied demands for 
disarmament, as well as the allied powers who were determined to put an end to the 
Einwohnerwehr.41  Increasingly from late 1920 on the paper commented frequently on 
foreign affairs, particularly the aforementioned dissolution of the guards, as well as the 
question of Silesia.  This was given particular play in the paper and was mentioned even 
where the subject had no relevance, like in articles about the statewide shooting 
festival.42
 In its ideology the Einwohnerwehr combined a romanticized nationalism with 
hatred of socialism, and the revolution and its works, infusing it with apocalyptic 
language designed to inflame its members.  The effect of their program had a profound 
influence on issues of membership, particularly in the group’s attitudes towards workers 
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and Jews at the local level.  This made the Einwohnerwehr a functionally völkisch group.  
Their antipathy towards the republic, disguised by necessity, became more overt when 
dealing with any political entity to the left of the SPD, and those who tried to join the 
guards from that camp.  Increasingly it would lead them into conflict with the state’s new 
republican leaders. 
The Einwohnerwehr and the Kapp Putsch 
Due to the Einwohnerwehr’s ideological program Escherich and his men always 
had a difficult relationship to the Social Democratic governments that ran Bavaria and 
Germany.  These had come to power through revolution and, as such, were viewed with 
suspicion by the organization’s members, many of whom saw in it the beginnings of 
degradation and decline.  In this they were encouraged by leaders, both within the group 
and amongst their allies in the political establishment, who saw the emerging democratic 
republic as a usurpation of the correct political order and who had always viewed German 
socialists as traitors.  It was only a matter of time before this antagonism would come to a 
head.  When it did in the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 the Einwohnerwehr moved with 
purpose to help put in place a government more in line with their ideological world view. 
The period between November 1918 and March 1920 was marked by increasing 
antagonism between the Hofmann government in Munich and the Einwoherwehr 
leadership.  Much of the dispute had to do with the issue of membership within the 
association.  The willingness of the Einwohnerwehr leadership to prevent workers from 
entering the organization, or throw out those who did not accept the group’s ideology, 
concerned the Hofmann cabinet and forced them and the national party into action.  At 
109 
the end November 1919 both the Social Democratic Party and the Independent Social 
Democrats began to urge their members to enter the Einwohnerwehr en masse.43  This 
was part of a campaign called “Against the Reaction” that was designed to make the 
organization more democratic.44
The attempt to change the composition of the Einwohnerwehr ran into resistance 
however.  Escherich claimed that allowing party members or ‘party-political’ workers to 
enter units would undercut its mission and open up the Einwohnerwehr to political 
disputes, instead of the organization being an un-political haven for all ‘order-loving 
men.’
 
45  Moreover, he argued that it was illegal owing to the group’s regulations, rules 
agreed to by the Bavarian cabinet.46  This would result in chaos for which, in Escherich’s 
view, the responsibility would fall entirely to the Social Democratic leadership.47  
Furthermore Kanzler wrote that the efforts of the majority Socialists in this area only 
convinced Einwohnerwehr members that they too were swayed by “radical ideas.”48  
Their actions against the organization in these months, which included organizing a 
boycott of businesses that dealt with the Einwohnerwehr, only served to further embitter 
the group’s membership.49
Discontent was not just confined to carping about government interference about 
the membership.  The organization increasingly found itself under attack over its 
militaristic bearing, and the potential uses these could be put to.  For instance the 
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Deggendorf newspaper, Bayerisches Volksblatt, noted that the reserve nature of the 
Einwohnerwehr allowed it to train a new generation of soldiers much the same way 
Prussia had done during the Napoleonic Wars, and would allow the country to be ready 
for a new war in a generation.50  According to the München-Augsburger Abendzeitung  
the Independent Socialist press argued that Escherich’s units were nothing more than the 
tools of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who were planning on using the group to evade the 
strictures of the Treaty of Versailles.51  The socialist paper Der Kampf called the 
Einwohnerwehr just the latest manifestation of a militarism that the country needed to 
emancipate itself from.52
The fears that the Einwohnerwehr and other paramilitaries would lead to 
complications with the allied powers was well founded.  When the organization was first 
set up provisions had been made to use the Einwohnerwehr as a dual purpose 
organization.  This brought in many recruits to Escherich’s units, along with other 
paramilitaries.  As James Diehl has noted, many of these volunteers hoped to have a 
career in the German military.
 
53
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  This was recognized by the military establishment in 
Bavaria, as well as Escherich and Kanzler.  One of the enticements given to younger 
members who joined the organization was to allow them to form special units that had a 
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were based.  Older members, meanwhile, had to serve in their home region exclusively.54
As it turned out this military function had a short life.  The Treaty of Versailles 
specifically prohibited Germany from having an army larger than 100,000 men.  Not only 
did this close off a potential avenue for advancement for the average guard member, but 
precluded cooperation between the group and the army, for fear of the Einwohnerwehr 
being seen as a military force.  The group’s planned dual use was scrapped on July 30, 
1919 even as the final makeup of the organization was set.
  
In this way the Einwohnerwehr served as a functional reserve for the army, one that could 
help the nascent Reichswehr in a pinch. 
55  Police powers were not 
mentioned in the treaty and Escherich’s association continued to justify its existence in 
this way.  However, for many of the men in the Einwohnerwehr the loss of the military 
function was simply too much to bear.56
The desire of the allied powers to strictly hold Germany to the one hundred 
thousand men limit became a major aspect of European diplomacy in these early post-
war years.  Once the German government had signed the treaty they were given a 
timetable by which they needed to demobilize their forces, which at the time still 
numbered over three hundred thousand men.  The process took time and was hampered 
by the fact that the army leadership moved slowly in breaking up the paramilitary forces 
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and weeding out undesirable elements from the new army.57  As the leadership began the 
process of demobilization they were thwarted by army commanders, like General von 
Lüttwitz, who preferred to maintain the present military force, and who supported the 
Freikorps.  His position was not shared by many of his fellow generals, who disliked the 
undisciplined nature of these units, their egalitarianism, and their political radicalism.58  
This manifested itself in an abortive coup against the government in August 1919 by 
elements of the Iron Guard division, who demanded from the Reich government positions 
in the army.59
For the allied powers the process simply took too long.  In September 1919 they 
created the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission to oversee and expedite the work of 
disarmament.  This body negotiated directly with the German government, and its 
members could travel anywhere in the country.  Relations between the officers of the 
army and the commission were consistently difficult.  German officers were seen as 
obstructionist and evasive.  The head of the commission complained that many were 
attacked wherever they went.
 
60  Moreover, the commission simply tired of the complaints 
and excuses of Reichswehr leaders, many of whom insisted that paramilitary units like 
the Einwohnerwehr were absolutely vital to the defense of the country.61
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1920 they began to force the German government to break up paramilitary units, 
including the Einwohnerwehr.62
The Bavarian government advised Escherich and his men to give the control 
commission officers no information.
 
63  Despite this the leadership had already committed 
itself to some type of action against the socialist governments in Munich and Berlin.  
Rudolf Kanzler wrote in his memoirs that the government’s signature of the Treaty of 
Versailles was tantamount to not protecting the German people or the constitution and 
justified removing the government.64  Beginning in late 1919 the Bavarian and national 
leaderships began to coordinate with military leaders and other paramilitaries to 
overthrow the republic.  Kanzler was overheard discussing plans to mass gasoline and 
other materials in the event of a putsch, and how the action could be blamed on 
republican leaders.65  Escherich’s second in command also wrote in a February 23, 1920 
memo that it was necessary for “a swing” in the country’s domestic politics.66  He 
promised that action in the north would be paralleled by action in Bavaria, provided that 
they worked together.67
The plotting in Bavaria was paralleled by that in Berlin.  There conspirators 
coalesced around Dr. Wolfgang Kapp, Colonel Waldemar Pabst, and General Erich 
Ludendorff.  These men formed the National Union to bring all paramilitary groups and 
nationalist organizations together in one association dedicated to confronting the 
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country’s democratic leaders.  Kapp was the head of the organization and was aided by 
Pabst, whose task was to bring the paramilitaries together and coordinate the coup.  In 
addition to the Einwohnerwehr Pabst recruited the Erhardt and Löwenfeld Naval 
Brigades, the voluntary associations (Zeitfreiwillige Verbände), the Guard-Cavalry 
Battallion, and the disbanded Freikorps from the Baltic.68  These would strike at the 
government in Berlin, despite the differences that existed between some of the 
putschists.69
The uprising began on March 12, 1920 in Berlin.  Freikorps units in the north, 
principally the Erhardt and Löwenfeld Naval Brigades, supplemented by a few army 
units and the Berlin Einwohnerwehr seized control of the capital.  Confusion marked the 
affair.  While the putschists had hoped to have the support of the army, most units 
remained loyal to the government, though they refused to fire on the paramilitaries 
involved in the coup.  The national government of President Ebert fled Berlin and headed 
to Stuttgart, where they coordinated resistance to the Putsch.  This resistance manifested 
itself in a wave of general strikes that was organized by both socialist parties.  Their 
actions had the effect of bringing the country to a standstill.  This, along with the 
reticence of the military leadership to fully support the Putsch, helped end the coup.
 
70
Upon hearing of the uprising in Berlin, the government in Munich reacted by 
closing the border between Bavaria and the rest of the Reich.  It was feared that 
 
                                                          
68 Johannes Erger, Der Kapp-Lüttwitz-Putsch: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Innenpolitik 1919/20, 
(Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1966), 85-97. 
69 Ibid, 97-107.  The political cleavage mainly concerned what type of government would follow the 
putsch.  Lüttwitz favored overturning the constitution and republic in favor a ‘ministry of strong men.’  
Kapp entered into negotiations with known monarchists for a restoration of the Hohenzollern monarchy to 
the throne.  He encountered resistance to these plans from many of the groups involved and quietly dropped 
them in the weeks leading up to the Putsch, ibid. 
70 Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 47-74.  See also, Erger, Kapp-Lüttitz, 108-54, Mulligan, Creation of 
Modern German Army, 138-69, and Gordon, Reichswehr and German Republic, 113-25. 
115 
paramilitary units, working in conjunction with their counterparts in other parts of 
Germany, would move against the Hoffmann government.  To prevent this they issued a 
proclamation to all government offices and military units instructing them to ignore all 
orders coming from Berlin, a proclamation that was co-signed by General Arnold von 
Möhl, the Bavarian army chief who had been made responsible for the safety of 
Munich.71  Möhl promptly called out the Einwohnerwehr on March 13 to help defend the 
state.72
As the Kapp Putsch developed it became clear that there were differences of 
opinion about where the real danger lay.  The Hoffmann government feared that the 
army, the Einwohnerwehr, and the other paramilitaries would side with the Kappists.  
Others did not share their trepidation.  Gustav von Kahr, for instance, believed that the 
real threat to the state was the extension of general strikes into Bavaria.  “Unfortunately,” 
according to Kahr, “this was not recognized by officialdom in due time.”
 
73  Their lack of 
concern about this, coupled with the fact that the army’s hands were tied in the matter (he 
claimed that General von Möhl could do nothing because President Friedrich Ebert was 
ruling by decree at the time), created a tremendous feeling of unease within both the 
Bavarian Reichswehr and the Einwohnerwehr.  He would later claim that this fact led 
inexorably to the events that followed.74
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The call up of the Einwohnerwehr caught the organization off guard.  Only Chief 
of Staff Hermann Kriebel was in the capital at the time, and he promptly recalled 
Escherich and Kanzler.  Kriebel reported to his superiors upon their return that great 
antipathy to the Hoffmann government existed amongst wide circles within the 
Einwohnerwehr.  He also argued that not all army units could be counted upon to be loyal 
to the state, despite Möhl’s guarantee.  He reported that a group of EW members, 
soldiers, and other auxiliaries had met elsewhere in the capital and pledged their support 
to Kapp and his co-conspirators.  The Einwohnerwehr leadership, after meeting with 
General von Möhl and Kahr, came to the conclusion that the only way to protect “law 
and order” was if the Bavarian general was given dictatorial powers over the government 
for the length of the emergency.75
Escherich, Kahr, and the rest of the Einwohnerwehr leadership argued that this 
measure was necessary to preserve the chain of command and to prevent the Bavarian 
army from coming under the authority of the Kappists, who were issuing orders to army 
units in the state.  As luck would have it, while the circle around Kahr formulated its 
justification for takeover of the government, the Independent Socialist Party was holding 
an emergency meeting to organize a general strike and mass demonstration in Munich.  
According to Kanzler, this was further justification for placing governmental power in 
the hands of the army.  “Therefore the left began the struggle without being riled up 
through some government or military measure.”
 
76
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  With justification now in hand, 
Escherich, Kahr, Chief of Police Ernst Pöhner, and General von Möhl convinced 
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powers in the hands of the Reichswehr.  This move would be confirmed by the entire 
cabinet in an emergency meeting early the next morning with the resignation of the entire 
Hoffmann government.77
The fall of the Hoffmann government was the only significant change to come 
from the Kapp Putsch.  Two days later, middle class parties in the Diet elected Gustav 
von Kahr as minister-president, ushering in a more conservative government, one favored 
by the Einwohnerwehr and its allies.
 
78  News of the resignation and the installation of the 
new government did not lead to tranquility, but only provoked the workers and the parties 
that represented them.  The day after the Social Democratic cabinet resigned the 
Independent Socialists called for a general strike in Munich.79
Immediately after the removal of the Hofmann government an alarm went out to 
all Einwohnerwehr units in the state to crush any and all dissent.  In southern Bavaria this 
was swiftly accomplished.  In Munich units responded quickly to the call – two hours 
after the alarm went out nearly ninety percent of the Einwohnerwehr’s members had 
assembled in the city center.  From there they moved quickly to secure the city, 
disrupting and disbursing the general strike in the capital by the afternoon of March 17.  
The speed and ruthlessness of the Einwohnerwehr established a sullen atmosphere in the 
capital.  The leader of the local Munich unit noted that those workers, and their 
supporters, “voiced their displeasure in a dogged, quietly observant restraint, partly in a 
  This set the stage for 
several days of conflict between Escherich’s men and the Bavarian working class. 
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barely concealed hostility.”80  Similar uprisings were put down throughout the region to 
the south of Munich while other areas, like Rosenheim, had no disturbances to speak of.81
However northern Bavaria became the epicenter of unrest.  The general strikes 
that took place here were not so easily broken up as in southern Bavaria, a result of the 
region having more industry and a larger working class.  They were also much more 
violent.  In Nuremberg 1,200 workers managed to arm themselves and attempted to seize 
the main train station.  Clashes with police and local units of the Einwohnerwehr left 
twenty-three dead with fifty seriously wounded.  There would be similar violence in 
Erlangen and Fürth, where workers attempted to seize the local Rathaus.  In both cases 
altercations ensued with local authorities – both sides were armed – which led to 
casualties.
 
82
It would be the strike in Hof, though, that went beyond the ability of local 
authorities to handle.  Workers there responded to the call to a general strike by arming 
themselves and seizing all the major buildings in the town, some of them violently.  They 
closed all businesses except for grocery stores, erected barricades against the Reichswehr, 
and set up an executive committee to run the town.
 
83
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reports.84  By March 21 unrest and uncertainty continued to reign in the city, even though 
an end to the strike had been successfully negotiated in Nuremberg and elsewhere.85
For the new Kahr government and the Einwohnerwehr leadership this represented 
a clear threat to established authority as they saw it.  On March 19 the Bavarian Ministry 
of the Interior called out the Einwohnerwehr to help in quelling the disturbances in 
northeastern Bavaria.  Since local guard units had been immobilized and disarmed by the 
striking workers it was decided that units from the Chiemgau would be sent north.  The 
decision in many ways reflected the balance of power within the Einwohnerwehr at the 
time.  Northern Bavaria had been difficult to organize, tended to have fewer members, 
and were more likely to have large numbers of workers in them.
 
86  Units from southern 
Bavaria, particularly the Chiemgau, were much larger, reflecting the region’s importance 
as the epicenter of the paramilitary movement in the state.87  Rudolf Kanzler personally 
took command of the Einwoherwehr units as these came from his home region.88
The force they assembled for the operation itself ended up being an exercise in 
excess.  The Einwohnerwehr would fight in conjunction with the local Reichswehr unit 
from Bayreuth, which had left the region and made its way to Rosenheim.  The unit 
chosen to go north to Hof was the 1. Landfahne Chiemgau.  It was comprised of seven 
hundred men, sixty horses, and eighteen vehicles.  They were armed with machine guns, 
rifles, and pistols, and backed up by their own artillery regiment.  In every way it was a 
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fully realized military unit, complete with a staff to run its operations.  The only thing 
missing were uniforms, though these were given to the men once they reached Bayreuth.  
The trip to the north was also excessive for the reactions they received from officials and 
the populace, reactions that were marked by jubilation, according to Kanzler.   During 
their first stop in Munich they were feted by Escherich, members of the Kahr 
government, and a military choir, and when they arrived in Bayreuth were again greeted 
by local officials and a full military band.  At Münchberg the men were greeted 
enthusiastically by a populace who had suffered under the hand of the “Räterepublik.”89
The attack on Hof itself, as the most significant action during the 
Einwohnerwehr’s existence, proved to be somewhat anti-climactic.  They arrived at Hof 
on the evening of March 21 and completely surrounded the city by the early hours of 
March 22.  Their approach, though taken with security measures, was an open secret.  To 
forestall an attack on the city, the workers sent representatives to negotiate with the head 
of the Reichswehr detachment, First Lieutenant Hausl, a move that proved to be 
unsuccessful.  The failure of these talks was the signal to prepare for an assault on the 
town.  The 1. Landfahne took up positions to the south of Hof, their artillery covering the 
train station while the rest of the company moved into the city.  They encountered very 
little resistance from the workers or their leaders – the only resistance being offered to the 
east of town where the Reichswehr placed its forces.  Once in possession of the city, both 
the army and the Einwohnerwehr fanned out with prepared arrest lists to seize prominent 
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members of the working class, their leaders such as Blumtritt, and confiscate their 
property.90
The Einwohnerwehr sought to portray their actions in Hof in the best possible 
light.  In order to prove they were not there just to suppress the workers the 1. Landfahne 
brought with them bakers and butchers to serve meals to the workers of Hof.  Kanzler 
tried to draw a contrast between the state of these workers and their leaders.  When 
Einwohnerwehr members went to arrest Blumtritt at his home they claimed to find the 
parliamentarian’s pantry well stocked with sugar, coffee, and pork amongst other items, 
and trumpeted this as proof of the double standard of the socialists.  In addition several 
large caches of weapons were found at the headquarters of the Independent Socialists in 
the city and the printing press of the local socialist paper, providing evidence that the 
workers of Hof were plotting a violent overthrow of the established order.  The speed and 
quickness of the operation against Hof, along with the steadfastness of the organization 
during the Kapp Putsch, was trumpeted as clear proof that the Einwohnerwehr was 
necessary in helping to preserve the state.
 
91
Preserving “Law and Order”: the Expanding Scope of the Einwoherwehr’s Activities in 
the Aftermath of the Kapp Putsch 
 
 The Einwohnerwehr’s role in the Kapp Putsch in Bavaria helped bring to power 
the government of Gustav von Kahr.  Devoted to many of the ideas that animated 
Escherich’s organization, the new Minister-President set about turning Bavaria into a 
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bulwark of ‘law and order.’92  The Einwohnerwehr became a critical component of that 
program and, in the process, enhanced many of the activities that already carried out for 
the state.93
 The primary function of the Einwohnerwehr of course was to preserve law and 
order in Bavaria and to support the government against those who sought to overthrow it.  
In the regulations for all state and local branches it declared on the first page, “Every 
local community, that wants law and order and places itself behind the government, 
should band together for self defense, for defense of women and children, of homeland 
and future, and to the joint struggle against plunderers, Spartacists, and Bolshevists.”
 
94
The removal of the group’s military function as set out in the Treaty of Versailles 
allowed the Einwohnerwehr to evolve into the role that it would become most known for 
– as enforcers of the conservative order in the state.  This task had always been the one 
favored by many in the Bavarian leadership.
  
Such a declaration gave the group a distinctly domestic task.  It was to serve as both a 
national guard and as an auxiliary police force. 
95
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original intent and gave the Bavarian organization a prominence that made it an 
important element in the state.96
The basic duties of the Einwohnerwehr consisted primarily of guard and patrol 
duties in cities and towns during times of emergency.  These included guarding streets 
and public places, protecting official buildings like train stations and government offices, 
searching homes and vehicles, observing the citizenry, and, as a last resort, serving with 
the military as an auxiliary unit to assist the army in house to house combat.
 
97  
Furthermore detailed instructions were given for how the Einwohnerwehr were to 
respond to call ups, tiered by the size and danger of the disturbance, in the use of 
weapons, which was only allowed if individual units were under attack or if the military 
and police were focused elsewhere, and how to interact with the local population.98
The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr went beyond these in almost every way.  For 
instance, the regulations stated that the Civil Guards could be called out only by local and 
state authorities.
 
99  This was retained in the agreements between the government in 
Bavaria and the organization, but with the proviso that all orders calling up various units, 
or the entire group, be issued by the relevant commander.  Furthermore, in cases of 
extreme emergency, the unit commanders could call out the guard on their own authority, 
without waiting for local officials.100
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in a disturbance, though they could only do so if the extremity of the situation warranted 
it.101
The organization’s zeal also showed itself in the arrest powers they claimed for 
themselves.  While federal guidelines had allowed them to arrest disturbers of the peace, 
the power was quite limited.  People could only be arrested by members if a court or civil 
servant so ordered it, or if the person was caught in the act of rebellion and attempting to 
flee.
 
102  The government in Munich, however, allowed the individual guards more 
discretion in their power to arrest people, though this was always described as provisional 
arrest.  People suspected of plotting domestic disturbances, or who had had a suspicious 
and inscrutable personality, often based on family history, could be taken into custody on 
the organization’s authority.  This was in addition to being caught in the act of disturbing 
the peace while the Einwohnerwehr was on duty, or simply being in flight from the 
scene.103
Additional arrest powers were not the only enhancements given to the 
Einwohnerwehr.  The use of weaponry also was greatly expanded.  In Bavaria members 
could use their weapons if it became necessary to achieve the group’s objectives, if their 
superiors ordered them to do so, or if they were threatened with violence in the line of 
duty, and even outside of the line of duty in self defense, or Notwehr.  In this situation the 
individual member could use his weapon as necessary to defend himself and others.  
“Emergency defense is defense which is necessary to stave off an illegal attack on the 
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body, life, honor, and property of one’s self or another.”104  In other German states the 
use of weapons was strictly monitored by the military or civil authorities, who had 
responsibility for their use.  The use of weapons on an individual or organizational level, 
even for self defense, was not permitted elsewhere in the Reich.105
The Bavarian organization’s obsession with guns and their use became a defining 
characteristic of Escherich’s group, even more so than in the national Einwohnerwehr.  
The greatest expression of this mania was the shooting festivals that which were held 
throughout Bavaria in 1920.  Held on the district, regional, and state level, (Gau-, Kreis-, 
or Landeschießen), these events allowed the members to show off their skill with a 
weapon in competitions designed to determine who was the best marksmen.
 
106  Cash 
rewards were given for the top shooters, and the celebrations were marked by a carnival-
like atmosphere.107  There were parades, speeches, and music; the local festival in 
Rosenheim, for example, held a formal dinner followed by a dance.108  Local politicians 
and dignitaries were often invited and spoke approvingly of the organization and their 
place in Bavarian society, which only added to the Einwohnerwehr’s sense of mission.109
The largest of these shooting festivals was held from September 25-30, 1920 in 
Munich.
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capital to compete against each other, but in reality to show off the organization’s 
strength as a political player in the state.  The festival kicked off with a preliminary 
shooting competition north of the city in Freimann, but the high point was the rally held 
on the Königsplatz on September 26.  There the members were feted by Minister-
President von Kahr, the Lord Mayor of Munich, and the group’s leaders, Escherich, 
Kanzler, and Kriebel.111  The Einwohnerwehr newspaper Heimatland ran a special issue 
touting the events of those days.  The articles not only discussed the group’s vision for 
Bavaria and Germany, but spoke approvingly of their activities – particularly the events 
surrounding the Kapp Putsch of March 1920.112
In addition to those powers granted to, or claimed by, the Einwohnerwehr, they 
also spent a great deal of time reporting on disturbances in the state.  Once alerted to the 
outbreak of unrest local units of the Einwohnerwehr were expected to file detailed reports 
to the state leadership and relevant governmental officials.  These dispatches were 
undertaken by the regional commander and were to be updated daily at 12 p.m.  In them 
the local guard reported on the variety of conflict and where it came from.  Local 
commanders made large cities and industrial areas a high priority in their surveillance of 
domestic turmoil.  Additionally the political orientation of such unrest was another topic 
that needed to be included in the situation reports.  The leadership was always worried 
about the potential ramifications of labor.  They saw the general strike as a political tool 
of the left and different from a more traditional strike; it could truly have greater meaning 
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for local authorities.  This meant that the regional leadership also watched and reported 
on the stance of local papers, as well as the mood of the general population.113
Planning for and filing reports were not the only activities undertaken by the 
regional Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria.  Detailed plans were drawn up for guarding and 
supervising transportation in the event of a general strike.  The members were to erect 
barricades that choked off major nodes of transportation for both vehicles and bicycles.  
The strength of these checkpoints, and the guards that manned them, depended to a great 
degree upon the importance of the area to both the government and revolutionary forces.  
Additionally they were to watch and report on the direction of all traffic that passed 
through their checkpoints, inspecting the most suspicious vehicles.
 
114  Equally important 
was the protection of businesses vital to the maintenance of the community, or 
Lebensmittelgeschäfte.  Here coordination with the police and government officials was 
deemed vitally necessary.  As an Interior Ministry memo explained, “general street 
protection and the security of smaller, more vital firms in the streets, as for example 
grocery stores cannot be guaranteed through street patrols and spread out small guards as 
the most recent experiences have shown.”115
The Bavarian Einwohnerwehr spent much of its time as an auxiliary police force 
guarding private property.  This was a particularly important issue for the state’s leaders 
and for the group’s leadership, because of the continued weakness of the post-war 
economy.  As economic conditions deteriorated it became much easier for people to 
migrate to the underground economy that had developed during the war and in its 
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aftermath.  Escherich had made note of the existence of the Black Market in post-war 
Bavaria as early as Christmas of 1919, noting that the Einwohnerwehr needed to play a 
leading role in combating what he saw as dishonorable economic practice.116
As envisioned by the political leadership in Munich, particularly after March 
1920, these activities required the Einwohnerwehr to take the leading role.  “For these 
purposes are local Einwohnerwehren called up in the first wave and the police and 
Reichswehr, in their garrisons, in the second wave.”
  The result 
was that the organization quickly developed into one of the primary, if not the primary, 
protectors of business. 
117  Einwohnerwehr units were to 
provide protection for utilities, groceries, their suppliers, and public transportation.  This 
meant that local units needed to provide a force both large and strong enough to repel any 
attack.  In the case that defenses failed the army would provide them with further support.  
The plan applied to both city and countryside alike and was geared more towards larger 
concerns.  Smaller business would rely on protection from a normal street watch.118  The 
protection of farms also concerned state authorities.  In the fall of 1920 several cases of 
arson had been reported in the vicinity of Pfaffenhofen, Dachau, and Freising.  To protect 
rural areas local units were employed as a night watch to prevent further incidents.119
In the course of their activities the men of the Einwohnerwehr often showed great 
zeal, often too much, and this often led to abuses of authority, violence, and even death.  
Many of the people hurt in these instances came from the working class, or from regions 
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that the Einwohnerwehr had difficulties in.  The town of Wunsiedel provides an excellent 
example of the difficult relationship between Escherich’s group and a local population.  
Located in the northeastern corner of Bavaria, the town was located in a region of the 
state that had a large working class population.  The Einwohnerwehr found organizing in 
the town to be difficult owing to the fact that the local government was controlled by both 
socialist parties.120  Thus in the aftermath of the Chiemgau Einwohnerwehr’s operations 
in Hof they were ordered to Wunsiedel.  There on March 24, 1920, using prepared lists, 
they arrested fifty men, the majority being factory workers.121
Often individual members let the authority they received go to their heads.  
Sometimes this had tragic results.  In September 1920 in the town of Wachendorf the 
local Einwoherwehr leaders shot and killed a worker who was stealing potatoes.  The 
report on the incident indicated that the victim, a father of six, was unemployed and stole 
the potatoes to feed his family.  The incident caused a demonstration amongst the 
workers in the town.
 
122
                                                          
120 Vom Schulhausmeister Ernst Walther in Arzberg an den Vorsitzenden der Rechtsschutzkommission, 
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saying that the Einwohnerwehr was well aware of the political views of the political leadership in 
Wunsiedel area, noting that the mayor of Arzberg, where Walther was from, was still loyal to the 
Räterepublik, Landesleitung der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns an den Verband bayerischer Militärische 
Anwärter, z.H. Herrn Regierungssekretär Bergmann, 13. February 1920, ibid. 
  In other cases they misidentified their victims.  In October 1920 
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boys in Rosenheim.  They arrested both in the apartment of one of the boys, and behaved 
in such a high handed fashion that they discharged their weapons in front of the family.  
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The four Einwohnerwehr men thought the boys were spies.123  As was usual, both boys 
were the sons of workers and themselves apprentices.124
  The ideological program of the Einwohnerwehr required its members to see the 
world divided between those who subscribed to its patriotic worldview and those who 
supported radical Bolshevism.  Those who subscribed to the former believed in a 
romanticized Germany that existed in its purest form during the First World War.  They 
equally hated socialism and believed that the Revolution of 1918 had been a disaster for 
Germany.  That event brought misery to the country and the hated Treaty of Versailles, 
which inflamed many of the organization’s members.  Those who did not needed to be 
opposed.  Thus the Einwohnerwehr played a prominent role in overthrowing the 
democratically elected government in Munich, placing in its stead a government more to 
its liking.  They expanded the scope of their activities, targeting those who did not 
subscribe to their ideology.  Thus the Einwohnerwehr became a pillar of the Bavaria of 
Gustav von Kahr.  In the year that followed the Kapp Putsch, Escherich and his men 
would attempt to create a power base for themselves beyond Bavaria, but in the process 
encountered resistance that proved too strong for the Einwohnerwehr, and its supporters, 
to defeat. 
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Chapter 6 
Expansion and Dissolution – the Organisation Escherich and the Struggle over the 
Einwohnerwehr 
 The activities undertaken by the members of the Einwohnerwehr were heavily 
influenced by the group’s ideology.  Motivated by the need to preserve law and order, 
members found themselves employed in a variety of actions, some more mundane than 
others.  However, after the Kapp Putsch of March 1920 these took a more decidedly 
political tone, as the Einwohnerwehr became involved in the political affairs of both the 
German Reich and even Austria, something that brought even more scrutiny from the 
government in Berlin as well as the Entente powers and led to the group’s eventual 
dissolution. 
Organisation Escherich and Organisation Kanzler 
 The Einwohnerwehr’s part in the Kapp Putsch in Munich, as well as the role it 
played in stamping out the general strike in places like Hof, removed the apolitical mask 
that Escherich and the other leaders had presented since the group was first formed, 
revealing the true face of the organization.  From March 1920 onwards the group openly 
involved itself in the politics of Bavaria and the Reich as agents of the counterrevolution.  
This change would have an enormous impact on the group, as now their activities were 
increasingly aimed at the Social Democratic Party, an organization that until March 1920, 
had been supportive of the Einwohnerwehr, one of the ‘state supporting’ political parties.  
More important though was the fact that such political engagement allowed Escherich 
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and his lieutenants to develop more fully their ideas for national renewal, something that 
had been part and parcel of the Einwohnerwehr’s ideological program. 
 The vehicle by which these political ideas would be disseminated and propagated 
was the Organisation Escherich, an association dedicated to coordinating all paramilitary 
activities in the country.  It was the result of a series of letters exchanged between 
Escherich and Franz Seldte, who headed the largest veteran’s organization in Germany, 
the Stahlhelm.  Seldte had come to know of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr through 
Waldemar Pabst and Captain Schneider, both of whom had been involved with the Kapp 
Putsch.  Seldte wanted to unite all paramilitary groups, including his own, into a 
nationwide organization.1  Events the following March delayed these plans, but work 
began again in April 1920 in earnest.2  Because the Stahlhelm leader felt the work was so 
important he asked Escherich to take the lead in coordinating both the meetings for the 
new group and to be its first leader.3
Escherich was more than happy to take the lead in creating such an organization.  
The leadership of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr had become increasingly disturbed by 
events on the national level in the wake of the Kapp Putsch.  “The Reich government has 
let itself be tempted, in negotiations with the insurrectionists in the question of workers 
guards, the negotiations with the unions and others, into more decisions which mean the 
tacit surrender of civil rights to a dictatorial Bolshevistic minority.”
  
4
                                                     
1 Franz Seldte an Herrn Forstrat Escherich, 21. Januar 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
  In their mind the 
government in Berlin favored policies that would undermine state authority, by favoring 
workers and their unions.  More critically, they believed that Berlin had sided with the 
2 Franz Seldte an Herrn Forstrat Dr. Escherich, 8. April 1920, ibid. 
3 Franz Seldte an Herrn Forstrat Dr. Escherich, 21. April 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 5. 
4 Addresse, 10. April 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
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allies against the Einwohnerwehr.  These actions, they claimed, put the government in 
opposition to the constitution and the people of Germany, a situation that if continued 
could lead to civil war.5
Escherich organized a meeting of all the major groups in the vaterländisch 
movement to be held at Regensburg on May 8/9, 1920.  In attendance would be the 
Einwohnerwehr of Bavaria, Seldte’s own Stahlhelm, the Jung-Deutschland Orden, and 
various north German voluntary leagues (Zeitfreiwilligen-Verbände).
 
6  Since so many 
groups were involved in the proposed venture, Escherich believed that there were several 
points on which they all needed to agree.  The first of these was that the group was not to 
be involved in any coup activity.  Secondly, each organization that joined was to be given 
a portion of the Reich to control, preferably where they were strongest, like the 
Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria.  Third, unity of purpose was considered more important than 
unity of form.  Thus there would be no attempt to enforce coordination amongst member 
bodies.  Finally, this association was not to cooperate with civil authorities, unless a pre-
existing arrangement already existed.7
As it turned out the outlines of the Organisation Escherich corresponded very 
closely to the points made by the Bavarian leader.  Originally called Der Deutsche Hort 
(the German Shield), the assembled delegates agreed to appoint a committee to draft a 
program for the group.
 
8
                                                     
5 Ibid. 
  The document was completed on May 9, 1920 and changed the 
name of the association to Organisation Escherich, after its leader.  The primary purpose 
of the group was to secure the constitution, protect people, work, and property, preserve 
6 Der Landeshauptmann der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns an Herrn Major von Hepke, 28. April 1920, ibid. 
7 Entwurf an Herr von Dewitz, 3. Mai 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 5. 
8 Memo from Magdeburg Stahlhelm, 11. Mai 1920, ibid. 
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the German Reich, prevent separatist tendencies, and work for law and order by 
struggling against revolutionary tendencies from right and left.  Its headquarters was 
based in Munich and any German could be a member provided that he had an impeccable 
reputation, or was from a group that stood on the side of law and order.  Like the 
Einwohnerwehr, this new body claimed to stand above party and religious confession.9
The organization created at Regensburg united the various vaterländisch groups 
into one entity, but allowed each to preserve its individual identity.  This was 
accomplished by dividing the country into zones that each of the major groups would 
control, corresponding closely to ideas Escherich put forward.  As decided at Regensburg 
the country was divided east to west at the Elbe River and north to south at the Harz 
Mountains, with Escherich and the Einwohnerwehr controlling southern Germany, The 
Jungdeutscher Orden controlling western Germany, and the Stahlhelm controlling eastern 
Germany.
 
10  Individual members who joined the association did so through the primary 
group in each region, not the national body.  This regional paramilitary then decided if 
the person could join the Orgesch.  Whether they were in the new group or not, members 
followed the rules and regulations of the paramilitary organization in control locally.11
In the week following the Regensburg meeting a second committee, led by 
Kanzler, hammered out a working program for the Organisation Escherich (Orgesch).  
The document put forward, known as the working program (Arbeitsprogramm), reflected 
quite clearly the ideological predilections of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr as these had 
evolved, and went much farther than any ideas the group had previously propagated.  
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First and foremost among these was the revival of national thinking not only among all 
elements of German society, but even for those who lived outside the Reich.  Another 
major point was the preservation of an idealistic world view (idealen Lebensauffassung) 
from the encroachments of materialist philosophy.  German mothers, and the need to win 
them over to patriotic (vaterländisch) thinking, were a major focus of the document, as 
was reaching the young.  Finally, the group saw it as a major point of their work to try 
and reconcile workers to employers and to protect the middle class.  These points 
comingled with more traditional aspects of the Civil Guard’s program such as fighting 
Bolshevism, strengthening state authority, and combating economic immorality.12
With regulations and an ideological program in place, the Orgesch began to build 
up its infrastructure and extend it throughout the country.  At the time of its founding the 
group was particularly strong in the south, the west, and the east.  These regions lined up 
with individual military districts in the country.
 
13
The need to revive the patriotic movement in northern Germany led the Bavarian 
leadership to sponsor an organizational trip to that region.  Begun on May 25, 1920, three 
members of the Einwohnerwehr’s top leadership traveled to the Rhineland, Westphalia, 
  However, the group had no presence in 
the northern and northwestern parts of the country.  These lands were particularly 
problematic because they represented the industrial heartland of Germany, and as such 
were strongholds of the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Socialists, and the fast 
growing Communists.  This fact made northern Germany a top priority of the new 
association’s leadership coming out of the Regensburg meeting. 
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Hamburg, and Mecklenburg.  While there they met with the leadership of local social and 
civil groups, prominent bureaucrats and officials, and members from defunct paramilitary 
groups.  The purpose was to revive the patriotic organizations in northern Germany under 
the umbrella of the Orgesch.  This included financial support, as three Civil Guard 
leaders were instructed to discuss financial support for groups that adhered; funds were 
administered by the leadership in Munich.14
The trip itself was a success.  Wherever the Einwohnerwehr representatives went 
they received a hearty welcome along with plenty of assistance from civic associations.  
Particularly noteworthy was the support received from the League of German Farmers 
(Bund der Landwirte), who organized the first meetings in Düsseldorf.  They helped to 
identify many of the problems facing the revival of “self defense leagues” 
(Selbstschützverbände).  The most pertinent of these was the division between rural 
countryside and urban areas, where the mass of Germany’s workers lived.  Because of the 
size of the cities in the region many people who held to patriotic ideas believed 
themselves to be in danger.  As the report about this trip put it, “By the fact that a 
complete prostration of the overnight risen Red Army was made impossible through the 
intervention of the Reich government, the pressure of uncertainty and fright before the 
resurgence of the red terror has not been definitively removed.”
 
15
To facilitate the revival of paramilitary groups under the banner of the Orgesch it 
was decided to use those formations that survived the aftermath of the Kapp Putsch and 
to build upon them.  These included a few Einwohnerwehr units, as well as several 
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farmer defense units (Bauerwehren) that had been previously set up.  These would be 
supplemented by members from the cities, particularly the young, who would be spirited 
out of the city to join units in the case of domestic disturbance.  The other meetings 
throughout Northern Germany, the last at Mecklenburg on June 3, 1920, followed similar 
lines; local units were revived under the guidance of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, who 
provided the bulk of the financial support, joined the Orgesch, and continued to protect 
law and order as they had done previously.16
In several of these meetings one question often raised by northern participants 
concerned the political ramifications, both domestically and internationally, of the 
league’s activities.  The working program had talked about the revival of nationalist 
thinking amongst all classes of Germans.  In the course of their trip through the north, 
members of the Bavarian leadership discussed the Greater German (or Grossdeutsch) 
ideas that animated the new organization.
 
17
The worries about political opposition in northern Germany forced the leaders of 
Orgesch to seek political allies amongst the conservative and nationalist parties, which 
would protect the associations if they came under fire from the government.  Working 
  Considering that they often addressed people 
from nationalist circles, this is not surprising.  However, by framing their ideological 
program in such a political way, and Grossdeutsch nationalism was very much a political 
idea, it completely demolished the fiction that they publicly presented, to themselves if to 
no one else, that they served only to protect the state and its prerogatives regardless of the 
political composition of the government. 
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through contacts in the German Navy, Escherich met with representatives of the German 
National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei) and the head of the Reich 
Civilian Council (Reichsbürgerrat).18  With their support Escherich was able to gain 
more support for his activities, as well as additional funding for them.  To coordinate 
efforts further an office was set up in Berlin that handled the group’s interactions with 
both the political parties and the national government, collected and collated reports on 
national and international affairs, and put forth press release and propaganda materials.19
The necessity of establishing political contacts in the capital became apparent 
during the summer of 1920 when the existence of Escherich’s organization became 
known publicly.  The Bavarian leader helped this along by sending a telegram to the 
Reich government on June 28 requesting that it do everything in its power to prevent the 
dissolution of Germany’s paramilitary formations, including the nascent Orgesch, which 
he saw as vital to the country’s interest.  “I consider, by knowledge of the situation, the 
continued existence of the organization as a precondition for the preservation of the 
Reich constitution and essential for the continuance and rebuilding of the German 
Reich.”
 
20
In spite of his professed belief that that the Orgesch was vital to the preservation 
of Germany, Escherich’s telegram set off red flags in Berlin and raised a thorny issue for 
the German government.  Since the Treaty of Versailles had been signed in June 1919 
representatives from the allied powers and Germany had been meeting at the resort town 
of Spa to oversee the disarmament provisions of the treaty.  Their pressure had already 
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forced the government to start dissolving the numerous paramilitary groups in February 
1920, an event which helped lead to the Kapp Putsch.21  Aware of the distrust the allies 
had for the Freikorps and fearful of the role that such units had played in the events of 
March 1920, the government in Berlin was understandably concerned with the creation of 
a new group.  Escherich’s telegram prompted a reply from the Reich Ministry of the 
Interior, where the state secretary remarked that the government had “umpteen inquiries 
about the organization inspired by you.”22  It was certainly not insignificant that this 
reply came days after the Allied Control Commission in Spa ordered the dissolution of 
the Einwohnerwehr.23
Political resistance to Escherich’s outfit was swift in coming, animated by fear of 
the international and domestic implications of the Orgesch.  A variety of steps were taken 
to limit the organization’s reach.  This included tighter control over those paramilitary 
units still being used by the government in spite of the ban.  Paramilitary units in East 
Prussia and Silesia, whether former Einwohnerwehr or Freikorps, were to be brought 
under the control of the regional president in order to prevent these forces from joining 
the Munich group.
 
24  Furthermore, at the behest of the Prussian Interior Minister Hans 
Severing police in Prussia began monitoring the group and its activities, as well as 
enforcing the ban on paramilitary groups.25
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  Finally, a campaign in the press aimed at the 
Organisation Escherich began in early August.  Papers like Vorwärts and the Munich 
22 Der Staatssekretär des Reichsministerium des Innern an Herrn Escherich, 12. Juli 1920, BHSA, IV, 
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Post ran stories highlighting the danger posed by the creation of Escherich’s new group 
stating that, “Orgesch, as a spearhead for certain economic and political interest groups, 
is becoming entirely an armed organization of the reaction and makes its own faustian 
politics.”26  The stories highlighted the fears of Social Democratic politicians like Gustav 
Noske, who was so instrumental in helping to create the Einwohnerwehr, and believed 
that the Escherich circle would “conjure up serious confusion and domestic conflict.”27
The leadership in Munich believed such efforts were persecution by the political 
left.  This was certainly the view of Rudolf Kanzler, who claimed years later that fears of 
the “Diktat from Spa” were overblown by radical forces to persecute the organization. 
 
28  
To counter the efforts of the Social Democrats and their allies Escherich and his 
underlings waged a propaganda campaign intended to allay any concerns that people had 
about Orgesch and its goals.  This proceeded on two levels, one aimed at government 
officials, the other at the general public.  To ease fears amongst Germany’s leaders the 
Bavarian leader argued in a memo that the group, as constituted, was an organization of 
the middle.  “That my organization would be exposed to many attacks from left and right 
was clear to me from the first,” wrote Escherich, who also noted that “majority socialists” 
occupied leadership positions in the association.29
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  He assured the government that the 
only goal of the group was to fight Bolshevism, particularly “National Bolshevism,” in 
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all its forms, and that they would be prepared to resist a putsch from right or left.30  
Furthermore, Escherich also bitterly complained to the government about attacks coming 
from local politicians, especially those in Prussia who saw the group as unlawful and 
moved to dissolve it.31
To foster public support the Orgesch leadership turned to the press to make their 
case, though this had varying results.  As with government officials, care was taken here 
to present the group as a moderate organization.  The Bavarian leadership held press 
junkets for local papers to expound on this point.
 
32  Furthermore, they argued that attacks 
against the Organisation Escherich stemmed from Social Democratic leaders who 
desired to regain the trust of radicals.33  Finally, they accused the left wing press of siding 
with the radicals.  The Münchener Zeitung, in its August 9 edition, attacked the press war 
against the Orgesch stating, “but it is however a dangerous game, that here institutions 
push to still call themselves civic, while they undermine with enthusiasm the last bulwark 
against Bolshevism.”34  Much of the media campaign was conducted through 
conservative-leaning papers.  Independent papers seemed to view the group much the 
same way as the socialist press.  The Neue Berliner Zeitung, for instance, described the 
group as a herald of violence to come,35
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 while the Berliner Tageblatt wrote that the 
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Orgesch “only wants to build a different government that would be equal in philosophy 
to the parties of the right and, as one says, to duly rule.”36
Despite the efforts of some government officials, like Interior Minister Severing, 
or the socialist press, the Organsation Escherich continued to make inroads in provinces 
like Prussia.  This development was partially the result of the Prussian government’s 
decision on May 27, 1920 to permit paramilitary groups to continue to operate under the 
strict control of regional presidents.
 
37  The decision to maintain local paramilitaries was 
the result of continuing disputes with Poland over the borders in East Prussia and Silesia, 
where it was feared that Polish forces would attempt to seize territory by force.38  The 
belief of officials in Berlin that an emergency situation existed on the eastern border 
created the space whereby Escherich and his group were able to expand the Orgesch.  
Most local organizations joined the group during the summer of 1920.39
The union of these local groups with the Organisation Escherich occurred 
without the knowledge of the regional government, which had authority over their 
activities.  A couple of factors explain why this happened.  One was the promise of 
financial support from the national organization.  In the summer of 1920 the regional 
government in East Prussia and Silesia simply could not support the local paramilitaries.  
An Orgesch report from July 28, 1920 stated that financial support was an imperative for 
the national organization to provide leadership and improve morale.  Failure to do so 
would allow the state government to eventually provide funds, and hence direction, to 
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local units.  A second was the influence of local leaders.  As was the case in northwestern 
and northern Germany, prominent local leaders formed the backbone of support, and 
became the group’s local leaders.  For example, the man elected to lead the Orgesch in 
East Prussia, Brandis, was the leader of the local agrarian league, and as a result helped 
tip the scale in favor of Escherich and away from Berlin.40
The public fracas over the Organisation Escherich continued through the month 
of August.  The Bavarian leader continued to lodge complaints with the national 
government in Berlin over what he believed to be unfair treatment of his group in states 
like Prussia and Saxony.  He argued in a telegram on August 18 that the prohibition 
against the Orgesch violated the rights of local militiamen in those states.
 
41  Escherich 
also began to appeal directly to the members of the Reichstag on behalf of his 
organization.42  Such efforts had been requested by the Orgesch office in Berlin, which 
believed that only a sustained campaign of persuasion by Escherich, Kanzler, and even 
the Bavarian government could turn the tide of public opinion in their favor.43  In the end 
the Orgesch did not achieve its goal of recognition by the Prussian government.  
However, in East Prussia matters were different.  There the Organisation Escherich was 
confirmed in its control of local paramilitary groups.44
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41 Telegramm Escherich an den Herrn Reichspräsidenten, 18. August 1920, ibid. 
42 Escherich an Abgeordnete Frau Käthe Schirmacher, 23. August 1920, ibid. 
43 Brief an Herrn Forstrat Dr. Escherich, 19. August 1920, ibid. 
44 Report, 1. September 1920, ibid.  In October the leadership in Munich mused on the difficulties in 
Prussia, chalking them up to the resistance from reactionaries on the right, who feared the democratic 
nature of the organization, and from Social Democrats, and the workers, on the left, who mistrusted the 
group as reactionary itself.  Interestingly, the leadership believed that part of the reason for this state of 
affairs had to do with Jewish influence in the capital, and that the key to overcoming it would be to 
cultivate contacts with “national thinking” Jewish associations, Rundschreiber der Oberleitung 
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The success that the Orgesch had in organizing paramilitary groups in East 
Prussia and Silesia was duplicated in Austria.  Over the course of 1920 paramilitaries 
were set up on the model of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr.  Like with the Organisation 
Escherich, members of the Civil Guard’s leadership played a key role here as well.  
Rudolf Kanzler became the point man for organizing these auxiliaries, with the result that 
the new association was named after him, Organisation Kanzler (Orka), and placed 
within the larger framework of the Orgesch.45
The initial stages of what would eventually become the Austrian Heimwehr 
actually predate the creation of the Organisation Escherich.  On February 16, 1920 
Rudolf Kanzler received a letter from Dr. Zahnbrecher, a member of the Bavarian 
Landtag who had excellent contacts in Austria.  His report told of political unrest in many 
of the country’s largest cities, particularly Linz, Innsbruck, and the capital of Vienna.
 
46  
Demonstrations had taken place both in support of and against the Social Democratic 
government’s creation of workers councils and were seen by many to be the prelude to a 
Räterepublik.47
                                                     
45 One of the significant aspects of the Organisation Escherich was that its most notable success lay outside 
the Reich, like Austria, or on frontier territories, like East Prussia.  Within Germany, the organization had 
very little scope outside Bavaria, other than through groups affiliated with it (like the Stahlhelm), and 
quickly lost what little influence it had, though it played a role in a number of assassinations during the 
course of 1920 & 21, Large, Politics of Law and Order, 50-54, and Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 78-93. 
  Zahnbrecher reported that many Austrians in the provinces preferred to 
declare the country’s constitution null and void and join with Germany, a move that had 
been forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles.  Knowing that the Entente powers would 
never permit such a solution, the request was made for Bavarian help in “the building of 
46 Dr. Zahnbrecher an Herrn Kanzler, 16. Februar 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, NL Kanzler, B. 20a. 
47 Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 86. 
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farmer guards in those rural communities (parishes) to make political preparation for 
defensive measures against Bolshevism.”48
The Austrians hoped that close coordination between them and Bavaria would 
make the union of Austria with Germany inevitable and force the allies’ hands.  In 
particular Zahnbrecher had talked about close coordination between Bavaria and the 
Austrian provinces more directly as a precursor to union with Germany, or Anschluß.
 
49  
However, a meeting held three days after the receipt of this letter, in the office of Gustav 
von Kahr, highlighted the difficulties both of creating paramilitary forces in Austria and 
of bringing about a union of the two countries.  The major problems were the 
international implications of Bavarian support and funding.  Kahr informed the meeting’s 
participants that, given the international situation, he could not provide government funds 
for the creation of Austrian defense associations.  This meant that any coordination 
between the Bavarians and the Austrians would be a strictly private matter.  Kanzler 
himself was put in charge of creating the Home Guard, or Heimwehr, while local 
Einwohnerwehr offices in the border region with Austria would handle the particulars.50
The creation of local Heimwehr in Austria proceeded along a regional pattern, 
though only certain regions were deemed ready for the creation of a paramilitary force.  
A memorandum, drawn up for the Munich meeting of February 21, highlighted the areas 
where local defense organizations should be built.  These included Styria, Carinthia, 
Upper Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol, and Vorarlberg, territories long considered having 
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derived from Bavarian colonization.51  Kanzler and his representatives chose to organize 
Salzburg first.  The choice made sense as Salzburg was the major Austrian city closest to 
Munich.  In fact, as Kanzler wrote later, many of the major meetings between the 
Bavarian leadership and the Austrians were often held there out of convenience.52  The 
first one was held there on February 28, 1920.  Organized by Schernthaner, the local 
leader of the Christian Socialist Party, it was attended by Kanzler, Schindlbeck of the 
Chiemgau Einwohnerwehr, and Professor Bernhard Stempfle.  The proposal for creation 
of a local Heimwehr in Salzburg closely followed the example of the Civil Guards in 
Bavaria.  The province was divided into districts, five with roughly twelve hundred men 
each.  Kanzler promised to provide weapons to local units until the organization was self-
sustaining.  To ensure this, Stempfle urged the creation of a political block amongst the 
middle class parties against the socialists and communists.53
The other paramilitary groups were set up along a similar pattern.  The date 
calendar of Professor Stempfle, who became a crucial point man for Kanzler in setting up 
the Heimwehren, provides the time line.  From March 20 to April 10 Stempfle was in 
Tyrol, helping to organize auxiliaries there.  Meetings in Graz in May led to the creation 
of units in Styria, while a series of talks in June helped set up local groups in Carinthia.
 
54
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Other local Heimwehren were constituted in the months that followed.  Local units were 
set up in Lower Austria by August 1920, in Voralberg by November 1920, and in Upper 
Austria only by July 1921.  Rudolf Kanzler ascribed the difficulties in creating the Upper 
Austrian Heimwehr to effective resistance by the local Social Democratic government 
52 Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf, 87-9. 
53 Bericht, 28. Februar 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, NL Kanzler, B. 20a. 
54 Terminkalendar, BHSA, V, NL Stempfle, B. 3. 
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and its press, opposition that was only overcome by a successful press campaign by the 
political right in Austria.55
The Austrians who joined the local guards in these provinces did so with a wary 
eye on the international situation, as well as events at home, and this helped smooth the 
process of setting up regional units.  The chaos that accompanied the dissolution of the 
Austro-Hungarian army was one such factor.  During the demobilization, as soldiers 
marched back home to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia, they took the 
opportunity to create havoc in the Alpine provinces.  This complaint was heard often 
from Austrians in their meetings with Stempfle and Kanzler.  Moreover, the continued 
threat of a Bolshevist takeover was continually hyped during these meetings.  In one 
instance, Italian objections to the creation of a local Heimwehr in the Tyrol were 
smoothed over by highlighting the communist threat to northern Italy.  On other 
occasions, participants pointed to examples of communist uprisings as justification for 
their activities.  Two in particular stood out.  The first was an attempted putsch in Graz 
on June 7, 1920, a revolt which was successfully put down.  The second was to remind 
Austrians of the now infamous Bela Kun revolution that occurred in Hungary during 
1919, an uprising that had potential security ramifications for Austria.
 
56
Anschluss was never far from the minds of the Austrians, or their Bavarian 
interlocutors, as they created the Heimwehr.  They still believed that cooperation with 
Munich, rather than Berlin, would strengthen the case for union because in their minds 
Bavaria was not equated with “Prussian militarism.”
 
57
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Rosenheim attempted to give more concrete form to these hopes.  While no one there 
believed that political unification was possible for the foreseeable future, the committee 
did discuss other measures that could be taken to facilitate an eventual Anschluss.  They 
discussed the creation of a Danubian confederacy between Bavaria and Austria that 
would regulate trade, resource sharing, scientific exchanges, and cultural connections 
between the two states.  The assembled delegates deemed such an entity to be a necessary 
first step to help Austria “come back to the Reich again.”58
Another very important way to help bring about the Anschlss was to coordinate 
the activities of the Austrian Heimwehren with those of the Einwohnerwehr.  The best 
way to do this was through the Organisation Escherich.  This development itself was a 
natural outgrowth of the ideological program of the Bavarian leader’s new association.  
The Orgesch’s working program, for instance, was frank in its desire to revive nationalist 
thinking, even among Germans not living in Germany.
 
59  Moreover, Pan-German 
feelings were prevalent amongst many of the Austrians who joined the rapidly forming 
paramilitary units, something strongly encouraged in Munich.  Finally, by combining the 
Heimwehren to the Orgesch it prevented groups in the north from questioning the 
Einwoherwehr’s commitment to Germany.  Escherich, in an address to Austrian self 
defense organizations, put it most bluntly, “I state solemnly, that I and all my colleagues 
hold unshakably to the unity of the German Reich and will combat all attempts, which 
want to disturb this unity.”60
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organization joined Escherich’s group as an individual department under the command of 
Rudolf Kanzler.61
 With its activities in Silesia, East Prussia, and Austria the Organisation 
Escherich clearly demonstrated its willingness to play a role in Germany’s foreign policy.  
They had earlier weighed in on the issue of disarmament and dissolution, problems that 
affected them directly.  Now they began to argue vociferously for a more “national” 
foreign policy from the Reich government.  For many in the Einwohnerwehr and Orgesch 
the current international situation presented both a danger and an opportunity.  If 
Germany was to navigate successfully in the new climate it needed bold ideas and 
leadership. 
 
The leaders of the Organisation Escherich believed they could provide the 
leadership, or at least the answers, for the country’s current diplomatic predicament.  One 
of their proposals involved Germany reaching an accommodation with Russia so that 
both countries could once again divide Poland.  It was believed that only by recovering 
the borders of 1914 could the Reich be made safe against Russian invasion, as well as 
fight effectively against Bolshevism and National Bolshevism in the east.62
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  Another 
called on the government to organize the neighboring states of Eastern Europe into an 
alliance against Russia that would be led by Germany and Great Britain.  This alliance 
depended to a great degree upon a grand bargain between the two countries, one that 
would permit Berlin a free hand in Europe.  “One must bring sacrifice, must make 
concessions to England.  Perhaps concede to them the absolute supremacy at sea, but to 
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take ourselves the prerogative of German hegemony on land as a natural complement to 
England’s sea power.”63
The circulation of such ideas, along with the group’s activities in Austria and 
elsewhere, did bring the Orgesch to the attention of the British and French.  Both states 
watched Escherich’s project very carefully, and were quite alarmed by the organization’s 
program and its rapid growth.  They both feared that the Einwohnerwehr and the 
Organisation Escherich were covert agents of German rearmament.  Their angst was 
fueled in no small measure by media stories that hyped the revanchist nature of the group.  
The French newspaper Excelsior, for example, claimed that the majority of the members, 
if not all, were ex-soldiers who had fought in the German army.  To prove their point 
they noted that the identity cards (Personal Ausweis) for members were modeled on the 
army’s old military pass.
  These ideas naturally were more utopian than realistic as they 
called for a readjustment of the balance of power, something that neither the wartime 
allies nor the German government prepared to do, despite what the Escherich and his men 
thought. 
64  They also informed their readers about the association’s 
growth in Austria, claiming that the ultimate goal of the Orgesch was to control Austria’s 
politics in preparation of Anschluß, something they hoped Allied Control Commission 
would prevent.  “We hope, that they will not let themselves make errors in their 
vigilance.”65
The Dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr 
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The work of the Orgesch and Orka brought a certain prestige to Escherich and the 
Bavarian Einwohnerwehr.  They successfully organized the Austrian paramilitaries into 
the Heimwehr, and the group’s program was being instituted throughout much of the 
country.  They helped organize German forces in East Prussia and Silesia against the 
advances of the new Polish state.  Furthermore, the umbrella association allowed the 
Bavarian leader to attack the policies of the Reich government directly if its measures 
were lacking in “national feeling.”  These attacks, along with their activities in Austria, 
Silesia, and East Prussia forced the hands of the allies and Berlin cabinet, who 
increasingly put pressure on the Bavarian government to disarm and disband the 
Einwohnerwehr.  This political struggle, which occurred at the same time as the Orgesch 
and Orka were being formed, occupied much of the last year of the group’s history, and 
formed the backdrop of Kahr’s regime in Munich. 
The strife that consumed the Einwohnerwehr primarily came from outside 
Bavaria, but it also faced significant resistance during its last year of existence both 
internally and within the state.  Much of the internal dissension within the organization 
concerned the activities of the Organisation Escherich.  By September 1920 the national 
leadership of the Orgesch was staffed almost entirely by the headquarters staff of the 
Einwohnerwehr.66  The dual roles of many of the leading figures (Escherich, Kanzler, 
Stempfle) seemed to suggest to many members of the group that the leadership had 
become more interested in national politics than local Bavarian affairs.  They began to 
worry that the Einwohnerwehr was losing its identity to the new association.67
                                                     
66 Landesleitung der E.W. Bayerns an sämtliche Referate, 18. September 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 1. 
  Escherich 
responded by insisting that the two organizations were separate entities, and that 
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conflation of the two was the result of a media campaign.68  Nevertheless a divide began 
to develop as a result of the Orgesch’s activities, a chasm that as David Clay Large has 
noted isolated Escherich from the rank and file.69
The Einwohnerwehr also faced resistance from the Bavarian government.  
Members of Kahr’s cabinet questioned the wisdom of the Minister-President’s close 
connection to the group.
 
70  One member of the cabinet argued that the activities of the 
Einwohnerwehr (shooting festivals, the provocations of the Orgesch), only weakened 
Bavaria’s position vis-à-vis the allies, and most especially the Reich government.71  
Constitutional issues were a major focus of Kahr’s government during 1920 as they 
sought to prevent further erosion of Bavaria’s rights to the national government, and a 
dispute over the Einwohnerwehr only made this more difficult.72  Finally their role in 
Bavarian politics was seen as disrupting the rebuilding of national economic life.73
 The controversies surrounding the Civil Guard’s activities, whether these were 
overturning the legitimate government in Bavaria during the Kapp Putsch, suppressing 
general strikes in places like Hof while claiming they were communist uprisings, or 
helping to organize the Organisation Escherich and Organisation Kanzler, helped to 
create an atmosphere where it became incumbent upon Germany’s new leaders to break 
the group.  Beginning in 1920 and extending until mid-1921 German and Bavarian 
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politics were increasingly preoccupied with the questions of disarmament and 
dissolution.  This conflict would not only lead to the breakup of Georg Escherich’s 
paramilitary outfit, but also to the downfall of Gustav von Kahr, who had done so much 
to help create the Einwohnerwehr, and who benefited from its existence. 
 The primary impetus for disarmament and dissolution (Entwaffnung and 
Auflösung) came from outside of Germany, from the allied powers that were in process of 
implementing the peace treaty.  In early 1920, as noted earlier, they had forced the 
German government to dissolve all paramilitary units, fearing that these would be the 
nucleus of a new German army.  One consequence of this, of course, was the Kapp 
Putsch of these units in March 1920, an event which helped to solidify the 
Einwohnerwehr’s position in Bavaria while it was fatally weakened throughout the rest of 
the country. 74  Despite the internal tensions created in Germany by the uprising, the allies 
continued to insist that paramilitary units be disbanded.  Their insistence on these 
measures became part and parcel of the negotiations taking place at Spa, where Britain, 
France, and others supervised the implementation of the disarmament provisions of the 
Treaty of Versailles.  Beginning in April 1920 the Entente Powers put increasing pressure 
on the Reich government to move against the Bavarian Civil Guards specifically.75
 The French in particular pushed hard for both disarmament and dissolution.  The 
Munich Post reported that French newspapers, using documents provided by negotiators 
at Spa, wrote stories of the baleful influence that Escherich’s group had on politics in 
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Bavaria, and the danger these posed for European peace and German democracy.76  
Several themes were highlighted in these stories: the control that the German army had 
over the Einwohnerwehr, the retrograde social composition – consisting mostly of 
members from the middle classes and precious few from the working classes, and the 
centralized control that the leadership exercised over local units.77
 They were also shared to a certain extent by the government in Berlin.
  Considering the role 
the Einwohnerwehr played in the Kapp Putsch in Munich, as well as the danger such a 
narrowly based group posed for German democracy, the French fears were justified. 
78  
However, beginning in the second half of 1919 the Reich government, and particularly 
that of Prussia, began to see the Einwohnerwehr as a threat to the stability of the state.  
The charge against the organization stemmed from the Prussian Minister of the Interior, 
Hans Severing, who had broken up the Prussian body by the end of 1920 and greatly 
distrusted the Bavarian organization, and the Kahr government’s support of it.79
Convinced of the sinister nature of the Einwohnerwehr, the Disarmament 
Conference at Spa decreed on July 9, 1920 that the German government take immediate 
steps to disarm it, along with the security police.  The disarming of Escherich’s group 
was only part of a much larger reduction in arms amongst both the military and the 
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civilian population that had been called for.80  On August 7, 1919 the Reichstag passed 
the Law for the Disarmament of the Population.  The decree stipulated that the 
government was to confiscate all military weapons held by people who did not have 
official sanction to possess them.  Those who were allowed to have such weaponry 
consisted of the army and the civil authorities, who needed them in the performance of 
their duties.  Their weapons were registered with a Reich Commissioner for 
Disarmament, who was responsible not only for their collection and numbering, but the 
destruction of all contraband weapons.  This official was also given discretion in 
determining which weapons had military applications.81
 As written the law spelled the end for Escherich’s organization as an armed 
paramilitary force.  The law clearly stated that only people in positions of authority could 
carry arms.  While the Einwohnerwehr did act in a semi-official capacity, when called 
upon by local authorities, it remained a privately controlled group that was free from the 
prying eyes of the state.  This had been the goal from the beginning for certain members 
of the leadership.
 
82  As it turned out this fact only helped the Einwohnerwehr.  The 
independent nature of the Bavarian association prevented it from being covered under 
section 10 of the law, which stated that the Reich Commissioner for Disarmament was to 
carry out his tasks with the help of local authorities, including police auxiliaries.83
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 The law’s passage naturally set off a political firestorm in Bavaria.  The Kahr 
government, after some debate, rejected the law primarily on constitutional grounds.  
Specifically they claimed that the law did not take notice of the traditional constitutional 
arrangement in Germany, one in which the state had traditionally been given wide-
ranging rights vis-à-vis other German states.  As the notice of refusal sent to the Reichsrat 
stated, “the Bavarian state government will not of course shirk its patriotic duty to the 
Reich as opposed to the state.  But it is of the view, that under the circumstances their 
attempts could only be accompanied by success if, with the final passage of the law, full 
understanding and appropriate consideration is given to Bavaria’s interests and special 
relationship.”84
 Kahr’s refusal to disarm the Einwohnerwehr was supported by those elements of 
the state that benefitted most from the organization’s existence and activities.  Some of 
the biggest supporters naturally came from the political coalition then in power in 
Munich.  The largest of these, Kahr’s own Bavarian People’s Party, saw the continued 
existence of the Einwohnerwehr as decisive for the preservation of law and order in the 
Bavarian state.  In September 1920, they directed a resolution towards the Minister-
President urging him to resist any efforts to disarm or dissolve the group because they 
believed the weapons would just go into the hands of communists.
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  The other coalition 
partners also passed resolutions in support of the Einwohnerwehr.  The Bavarian Middle 
Party’s resolution stated that, “the Bavarian protection organization may in neither case 
fall victim to the thirst for revenge of our enemies nor to the weakness of the Reich 
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government.”86  They believed that much of the strife between Munich and Berlin was 
due to the provision in the Treaty of Versailles whereby Germany was guilty for starting 
the First World War, a clause that allowed them to maintain troops on German soil and 
persecute the government in this matter.87
Business also tended to be supportive.  For them the major benefit of the 
Einwohnerwehr, beyond the protection of private property, was their role in stamping out 
graft and corruption throughout Bavaria.  This they saw as vital for the revival of 
economic life in the state.
 
88  The reaction from Bavarian economic elites to the 
disarmament and dissolution drama reflected the esteem in which some of them held 
Escherich’s group.  Not only did they send letters supporting the Civil Guards to the 
Bavarian government, but to the central government in Berlin as well.  One letter sent to 
Escherich from a local leader of a farmer’s union argued that, regardless of the 
Reichstag’s disarmament debate, under no circumstances would the Bavarian 
Einwohnerwehr be dissolved.89
 Of all the interests supporting the Kahr government in their defiance of the allies 
and Berlin it was the Einwohnerwehr themselves who were most crucial.  Throughout 
1920 and 1921 the group’s leadership, at all levels, weighed in on the political dispute 
between Bavaria and the Reich government.  Their efforts consisted of writing letters in 
support of the Bavarian government’s position, explaining the goals and work of the 
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87 Ibid. 
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organization, and most importantly, highlighting the danger to Bavaria if disarmament or 
dissolution were allowed.  Since it touched on their existences as a group, the topics of 
disarmament and dissolution infused nearly all of the thinking and many of the activities 
of the Civil Guards for over a year before their eventual disbandment. 
 The initial reaction amongst the membership was to dismiss the drive for 
disarmament and dissolution as nothing but an attempt on the part of France to drive a 
wedge between Bavaria and the Reich.  Einwohnerwehr leaders argued that the French 
knew perfectly well why the organization was needed, but were using its existence as a 
way to extend its political and economic influence into central Europe, something that 
had been a traditional aspect of French foreign policy.  A divided Germany made this 
much easier.  As one internal memo put it, “our enemies will never abide scruples to use 
this opposition for their goals.  With France this goal is called: disintegration of the 
domestic consensus and unity of Germany.”90
 Additionally many members of the Einwohnerwehr believed that France’s policy 
was not only designed to foment division within Germany, but to promote revolution.  By 
disarming the population, it placed them in a position where they would be at the mercy 
of their enemies.  Many Einwohnerwehr members considered it axiomatic that their 
weapons, rather than be destroyed, would find a way into the hands of their enemies.  
This made the political dispute between Munich and Berlin vitally important for the 
continuance of the Einwohnerwehr’s mission of maintaining law and order.
 
91
                                                     
90 Zur Frage der bayerischen Einwohnerwehr, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 13. 
  They could 
91 14. Stadtbezirk Münchens an die Landesleitung der bayerischen Einwohnerwehr zu Handes des Herrn 
Landeshauptman Dr. Escherich, 12. April 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3.  Interestingly enough, the dispute 
proved to be a useful justification for keeping the working class, and even members of the SPD, out of the 
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not conceive of disbanding the group and would not entertain it.  However, compromise 
was not necessarily ruled out.  A local leader in Munich wrote Escherich encouraging 
him to promise that the Civil Guards would admit no more members in exchange for 
allowing the association to continue.92
 At first the Bavarian leadership had some reason for hope in the province’s 
dealings with Berlin.  The Chancellor at the time, Constantin Fehrenbach, was from 
southern Germany, and many in the Einwohnerwehr believed that fact would give them a 
fair hearing from the Reich government.
 
93  They allowed themselves to believe this 
because Fehrenbach’s coalition government did not include either of the socialist parties 
which in Prussia, under the leadership of Interior Minister Hans Severing, were making 
things very difficult for the organization and its leader.94  Escherich and his staff directed 
letters to the Reich government, in addition to the Kahr government, making the case for 
resisting allied pressure.95  In their appeal to Berlin, the leadership argued that the group 
merely served as private security for those people who had little to no help from the army 
or the police, both of which they claimed was still too weak to face the onslaught of red 
terror.  Moreover, since the Bavarian group had remained loyal to the Reich government 
during the Kapp Putsch, it only proved that neither Berlin, nor the allies, had anything to 
fear from the Einwohnerwehr.96
                                                                                                                                                              
Einwohnerwehr because this would lead to too many political clashes.  In April 1920, the government in 
Berlin was a socialist coalition government of SPD and USPD, ibid. 
 
92 Ibid. 
93 Zur Frage der bayerischen Einwohnerwehr, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 13. 
94 Fehrenbach’s government came to power in the election of June 1920, replacing the SPD coalition 
government of Hermann Müller,  
95 Abschrift der Landesleitung der E.W. Bayerns, 1. Juli 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 1. 
96 Der Landeshauptmann der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns an den Herrn Reichspräsidenten, 7. April 1920, 
BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
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 Their most potent argument, of course, concerned the consequences that would 
fall to Bavaria, and by extension Germany, should disarmament and dissolution carry the 
day.  Many of the letters sent from Einwohnerwehr offices, and the propaganda sent out 
by the leadership, painted a stark picture of a countryside ravaged by the breakdown of 
order.  As was the case with most of their propaganda efforts, apocalyptic language was 
the rule of the day.  Letters, essays, and articles all pointed to the deleterious effects of 
destruction.  In these, naturally, the Räterepublik of April and May 1920 loomed large, 
and were often used as the example to prove the point.97  For many Civil Guard members 
the memories of April and May 1919 were still quite fresh, and they feared a revival of 
those days.98  Moreover, they believed that northern Germany was ripe for a communist 
takeover in the aftermath of Kapp Putsch,99 and that absent the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr, 
“murder and plundering, and chaos and fire like two years ago,” would rule the day.100
Moreover, during the controversy surrounding the issue of disarming and 
disbanding the Einwohnerwehr in 1920 and 1921, many of the arguments used by the 
Kahr Government,
 
101 the state leadership,102 and even ordinary citizens103
                                                     
97 Zur Frage der bayerischen Einwohnerwehren, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 13. 
 in support of 
the organization relied upon the belief that only the Civil Guards stood between the Free 
98 Abschrift Fürstenberg, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
99 Herwarth to Churchill, January 26, 1921, BHSA, II, MA 100 383. 
100 An die Einwohnerwehren, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 13. 
101 Staatsministerium des Inner an das Reichsministerium des Innern, 2. Dezember 1920, BHSA, I, MA 100 
478. 
102 Gedanken über Erhaltung oder Auflösung der bayerischen Einwohnerwehr, Mai 1921, BHSA, IV 
(Kriegsarchiv), EWB, B. 3. 
103 Herwarth to Winston Churchill, BHSA, I (Staatsministerium des Äußern), MA 102 383 
(Privatkorrespondenz Dr. von Kahr). 
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State and a showdown with the left.  In the words of one member, “the final struggle of 
Bolshevism is imminent, to which under no terms will they foreswear.”104
Political chaos was just one of the themes stressed by the organization in their 
communications.  The economic well being of the state was another.  Many members 
feared that, after the destruction of the Einwohnerwehr, the Bavarian economy would slip 
into the grip of the black market; that on top of the economic costs of robbery and arson 
that were sure to follow dissolution.  For the leadership in Munich the case was easy to 
make, as they could point to the situation in northern Germany where the Einwohnerwehr 
had already been disarmed and where, in their minds, the negative effects of such a move 
were easily observable.  One report pointed out that robberies were common amongst the 
banks, factories, and merchants of the Westphalian Rhineland, and that when the local 
citizenry tried to defend itself, the government seemed more interested in the possession 
of weapons than recovery of stolen property and money.
 
105  Moreover, they argued that 
the Einwohnerwehr was needed to protect business because these tended to be the target 
of political protests by leftist groups.106
In spite of their efforts, the political situation for the Einwohnerwehr worsened 
throughout 1920 and into 1921.  The efforts of the Kahr government to protect 
Escherich’s group had a wholly negative effect on Bavaria’s relationship to the central 
government.  The Minister-President directed his government to stymie the 
implementation of the disarmament law over several months in the hopes that he could 
 
                                                     
104 Brief an den Ministerpräsident von Kahr, 13. Juni 1921, BHSA, I, MA 102 384. 
105 Lagebericht: Folgen der Entwaffnung, 22. September 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 1. 
106 Landesleitung der E.W. Bayerns an sämtliche Kreisleitungen bis zu den Gauen und Leitungen der E.W. 
München und Nürnberg, 1. Juli 1920, ibid. 
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persuade the Reich government and the allies to leave the group untouched.107  They 
believed this was necessary because where disarmament had occurred in Bavaria it fell 
disproportionately on the Einwohnerwehr and middle class organizations, while 
communist and other radical groups continued to keep their weapons.108  Kahr’s 
reasoning, however, put the Reich government in a bind.  According to the stipulations of 
the Spa agreement, if Germany did not comply with the deadline for disarmament, which 
according to the treaty was January 1, 1921, then French forces would occupy the 
Ruhr.109
The dispute between Munich and Berlin over the fate of the Einwohnerwehr and 
its weapons raised questions about the Bavarian leader’s motives.  It was believed by 
some in the Reich government that Kahr was using the controversy for his own purposes.  
They feared, most of all, that Escherich and Kahr maintained their defiant position 
because they sought to separate Bavaria from the Reich and rectify the “mistake of 
history” that created a German state under Prussian hegemony.
 
110  They noted that, 
despite the official hard line from Paris, French officials traveled all over Bavaria 
ingratiating themselves to the Bavarian elite, and hinting that the state would be spared 
the worst of any allied sanctions.111
                                                     
107 Bayerische Gesandschaft an das Staatsministerium des Aeußern, 5. November 1920, BHSA, II, MA 100 
478.  The Bavarians hoped to use divisions within the Reichstag between the middle class parties and the 
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  They believed that French actions only encouraged 
Kahr’s obstinate position vis-à-vis the Einwohnerwehr and put Berlin in a most difficult 
108 Staatsministerium des Innern an das Reichsministerium des Innern, 2. Dezember 1920, ibid.  The 
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position.  If they pushed too hard, the Bavarians might conceivably make a deal with the 
French, who would let them keep the group in exchange for independence under 
promises of protection from Paris, especially in the area of economics.112
These fears, along with the stated consequences of non compliance, forced the 
national government to take an increasingly hard line against Munich.
 
113  At a ministerial 
meeting on February 5, 1921, one that was attended by Gustav von Kahr, Chancellor 
Fehrenbach and his cabinet made clear Berlin’s intention to force the Bavarian state 
government to disarm the Einwohnerwehr in order to fulfill the requirements of both the 
Treaty of Versailles and the Spa Agreement.  Members of the cabinet argued forcefully 
that they could not allow Kahr and his government to act in contravention of the Reich 
constitution and the Treaty of Versailles.  Such actions, they asserted, spelled an end to 
the Reich as it was then conceived, something that only served the interests of 
“nationalists in France, England, and America.”114  Despite Kahr’s pleadings, the cabinet 
rejected Munich’s argument that the Einwohnerwehr only served to protect the inner 
peace of the state.  “Bavaria did wrong to cover themselves in the bad experiences from 
March 1919.”115
                                                     
112 Brief von Josef Sonntag, 30. Oktober 1920, BHSA, II, MA 102 382. 
  In the eyes of Fehrenbach and his ministers Bavaria was the culprit in 
any difficulties they had with the allies.  From that moment the fate of the Bavarian 
organization was sealed. 
113 The Reich government, until early 1921, had tried to straddle the demands of the allied powers with the 
intransigence of the Bavarian government by allowing Munich to supervise both disarmament and 
dissolution (neither of which was done), or by disarming leftist groups, which the Kahr government could 
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Politics of Law and Order, 67. 
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115 Ibid. 
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In addition to the Einwohnerwehr the Organisation Escherich was also slated for 
dissolution.  The central government and the allies undertook these measures due to the 
strife that already accompanied the Orgesch in its efforts to set itself up in northern 
Germany, and the prominent role it played in creating the Heimwehr in Austria.116  Thus 
to the Reich government the two organizations were linked.  The Bavarian leadership 
itself attempted to persuade the government of benign nature of the group.  Escherich 
submitted pleas to Berlin arguing that misunderstandings, both intentional and 
unintentional, drove the effort to dissolve the Orgesch and that he could not be held 
responsible for these views.  Alternating between pleading and defiance, the 
Einwohnerwehr leader argued that no people in history were asked to give up the right to 
self defense, a principle that undergirded European politics for centuries.  In his view the 
Orgesch was no paramilitary, but “a purely internal German concern,” one that happened 
to engage in foreign activity due to the oppression of the Treaty of Versailles.117
The intent of the national government to force the dissolution of the 
Einwohnerwehr only increased the determination of the membership and their leaders to 
prevent it.  Many local units flooded the offices of the Bavarian government urging 
continued resistance, or defiantly promising a fight should any attempt be made on the 
part of the government to disarm and disband them.  The Civil Guard of Hiepolstein, for 
instance promised to defend their territory “down to the last cartridge.”
 
118
                                                     
116 See pp. 130-48. 
  The 
Berchtesgaden office expressed dismay at the Reich government for believing that they 
could trust the allies, who they claimed sought to destroy Germany.  Dissolution was, in 
117 Forstrat Dr. Escherich an den Reichsminister des Auswärtigen Herrn Dr. Simons, 18. Januar 1921, 
BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 5. 
118 Gauhauptmann der E.W. Gaues Hiepolstein an den Herrn Ministerpräsident Dr. von Kahr, 16. Mai 
1921, BHSA, II, MA 102 384. 
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their words, “a violation and surrender of the interests of the Bavarian state.”119  The 
vehement response was not just limited to local units, but even came from the leadership 
in Munich as well.  In May 1921 state leaders organized a boycott of all products from 
France, England, and Belgium to protest those countries’ political stance vis-à-vis the 
Einwohnerwehr. In their proclamation to local units the leadership pointed out that not 
only was the embargo a decisive political statement, but that it benefitted German 
industry and would help make the country independent of foreign trade.120
As the dispute continued into May 1921 most observers wondered whether it 
would be possible to dissolve the Einwohnerwehr without bloodshed.  On May 5, 1921 
the Allies issued an ultimatum, directed specifically at the Bavarian government, 
demanding the dissolution of the organization and the surrender of all its weapons.  
Failure to comply would not only bring about an allied occupation of the Ruhr, but of 
Bavaria as well.
 
121  The ultimatum also extended to the Organisation Escherich and any 
paramilitaries still operating in Silesia under their umbrella.122  The stark demands of the 
Allied Control Commission caused consternation in the Bavarian Diet, which debated the 
consequences of doing nothing,123
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 and in the press.  The Süddeutsche Presse wrote, “Mr 
von Kahr has so often explained it is not true that the state leadership of the 
120 Landesleitung der Einwohnerwehren Bayerns an alle Kreis- und Gauleitungen!, 3. May 1921, BHSA, 
IV, EWB, B. 14. 
121 Large, Politics of Law and Order, 73. 
122 Münchener Zeitung, “Bayern und Oberschlesien,” 29. May 1921, Nr. 121, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 4. 
123 Münchener Zeitung, “E.W.-Debate im Landtag,” 28. May 1921, ibid. 
166 
Einwohnerwehr approaches the character of a shadow government.  Today he can prove 
the truth of this statement; he must do it, if he does not want incur the gravest rebuke.”124
With its back against the wall, the Kahr government ordered the dissolution of the 
Einwohnerwehr, disappointing many of its supporters in the organization.  The group’s 
leadership, which had done so much to prevent the disarmament and dissolution, faced 
political reality and crafted a resolution of local and regional leaders that acknowledged 
the inevitable.  “With heavy hearts we have given our consent, to the limits of the 
possible, the exhaustive proposal, which the Bavarian Minister President Excellence von 
Kahr has made as a sign of the good will of Bavaria to the Reich government and the 
league of enemies in the question of the dissolution and disarmament of the 
Einwohnerwehr.  We cannot surpass the limits of the possible.  In this belief we stand 
behind our Minister President Excellence von Kahr and explain in full awareness of the 
scope of this decision that we will keep with him.”
 
125  This resolution was backed up by 
memoranda from the leading figures of the organization.  Rudolf Kanzler, for instance, 
argued, “I know I am one with all upright leaders and men of the Einwohnerwehr, that we  
must not betray our fatherland in this critical juncture and ourselves by threats of any 
kind from Berlin.”126  Similarly Georg Escherich, in an announcement sent to the 
Orgesch, wrote, “We see the dangers of civil war in the interior and with it the foreign 
policy related complications, and we submit ourselves to the violence of the fact.  The 
Organisation Escherich is disbanded.”127
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The decision to accept disarmament and disbandment had come after a period of 
intense discussion within the organization’s leadership.  Through much of Spring 1920 
they debated avenues open to them should the political cover given to them by the Kahr 
government evaporate.  Several possible courses of action were discussed.  The first of 
these involved risking another European war.  The leadership believed that, if they did 
not voluntarily disarm, the French would attempt an invasion of Bavaria and Germany in 
order to carry out the Spa Agreement, an option that many in Munich believed could not 
be carried out.  To undertake an invasion would require the mobilization of the entire 
French army, something Civil Guard leaders thought impossible.  However, in spite of 
these factors, the leadership ruled out war because they believed that it could not be 
prosecuted without a united front with the Social Democratic parties.  Nor could they 
fight in the face of united Social Democratic and Independent Socialists resistance, which 
would split the country and negate the advantages they believed the Germans to have.128
Another option had the Einwohnerwehr give up part of their weapons, while 
reorganizing the group as a reserve of the state police (Landespolizei).  According to this 
view, the organization would give up roughly one third of their weaponry, those which 
clearly had a military purpose and offended the Allied Control Commission.  However, 
this required the leadership to seek the views and opinions of both political allies and the 
government before proceeding.  Given the climate at the time this was a tricky 
proposition at best, and was quickly discarded.
 
129
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The third option, and the one eventually adopted, was to disband under protest 
and to reorganize.  Riedel, who was the group’s deputy chief of staff, argued that instead 
of forming a reserve police force, the Einwohnerwehr be reconstituted as a secret 
organization – a paramilitary force that operated independent of state control.  Such a 
proposal naturally matched up nicely with the original ideas that Rudolf Kanzler had laid 
out in 1919.  In order to have success as an underground group, the new organization had 
to be selective in the number of men it admitted.  Riedel envisioned a tight knit 
community of men, “the truest of the true,” to carry out the fight against communism and 
social democracy.  They would be supplemented by a much larger organization 
composed of the vast majority of former members, who would prepare the way for a 
revival of national thinking along the lines set out by Escherich.130
                                                     
130 Ibid. 
  Thus, the ideas as set 
out by Riedel, paved the way for the survival of the ultra-nationalist ideology of the 
Einwohnerwehr in a new organization, one that was more committed to pursuing the 
worldview espoused by the group – even if it put them in opposition to the state they 
professed to love. 
169 
 
Chapter 7 
Filling the Void – the Creation, Organization, and Ideology of Bund Bayern und Reich 
 The dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr in June 1921 dealt the patriotic 
(vaterländisch) movement in Bavaria a severe blow.  Escherich’s organization had been 
the largest and most powerful right wing group, not just in terms of numbers but in 
weaponry.  With a worldview that was functionally völkisch and ultranationalist, the 
Einwohnerwehr helped to overturn the gains of the 1918 Revolution in the state.  They 
helped topple the Social Democratic government and replaced it with one more to their 
membership’s liking.  They also served as the shock troops for business and government 
interests; crushing any political activity they deemed extremist, especially if it came from 
the working class and their political allies.  Their disbandment at the hands of the allies 
and the Berlin government seemed to signal that the Bavarian right, which had essentially 
stopped the reforming impulse of the new democratic government in Munich, was 
heading for a decline in its influence.  
 However, rather than marking the end or the weakening of the patriotic 
movement, the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr led to a spike in right wing violence at 
both the state and national levels against the republic.  This manifested itself in a wave of 
assassinations that took place during the second half of 1921.  Conspiratorial groups, 
often filled with people who belonged to paramilitary units, waged a secret war against 
leading figures in the republic.1
                                                     
1 The organization most active in these activities was the Organisation Consul (O.C.), which had been 
formed out of the old Erhardt Naval Brigade that participated in the Kapp Putsch, and would later reform 
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  One of their earliest victims was Matthais Erzberger, 
170 
 
who had signed the Treaty of Versailles for Germany.2  In Bavaria assassins took the life 
of Karl Gareis, an Independent Socialist and member of the Bavarian Diet, in June 1921.  
Gareis had been one of most outspoken opponents of the paramilitaries and of the 
Einwohnerwehr in particular.  His murder sparked an intense debate within the 
parliament that only further weakened Gustav von Kahr’s position as Minister-President.3
 The increase in violence was also accompanied in Bavaria by a multiplication of 
organizations on the political right in the aftermath of the Einwohnerwehr’s dissolution.  
The favored status given to Escherich’s units had swelled it membership, often at the 
expense of other groups.  Part of this was due to the fact that the Einwohnerwehr 
absorbed many paramilitary units that had operated on their own during the period of the 
Räterepublik.  The Freikorps Oberland was one such example.  They were taken into the 
Einwohnerwehr as a whole unit, which allowed them to keep their structure.  Once 
Escherich’s group was disbanded, they reconstituted themselves as an independent 
entity.
 
4  Thus the political right in Bavaria tended to be composed of one very large 
organization and many significantly smaller ones.  The Nazi Party was one of these, an 
association so insignificant in the years from 1919 to 1921 that Kahr scarcely paid it any 
attention, even when addressed directly by Rudolf Hess about Hitler and his program.5
                                                     
2 The wave of violence that began with Erzberger reached its peak in 1922 with the assassination of 
Walther Rathenau, who was the German foreign minister at the time.  His murder proved to be a wakeup 
call to the republic’s defenders who passed a law, the Law for the Defense of the Republic, targeting right-
wing paramilitaries in the months that followed, ibid. 
  
3 Bayerischer Landtag – 66. Sitzung vom 21. Juni 1921, BHSA, I, M Inn 71 708. 
4 Rudolf Kanzler, Bayerns Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus, (Munich: Paracelsus, 1931), 164-73.  In 
addition to the Freikorps Oberland the Voluntary Associations (Zeitfreiwilligen Verbände) were also taken 
into the Einwohnerwehr.  Both were absorbed during the course of 1920, and both saw extensive action in 
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Kahr’s response to Hess was written by a state councilor in the Foreign Ministry that simply thanked him 
for his statement on Hitler, giving no indication whether the Bavarian leader regarded him in a positive or 
negative light, Oberregierungsrat im Staatsministerium des Äußern, 24. May 1921, ibid. 
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The end of the Einwohnerwehr not only brought about a revival of previous 
organizations, but marked the migration of many former members into these smaller 
entities, increasing their size and importance after 1921.6
 The expansion of smaller paramilitary organizations in the aftermath of the 
Einwohnerwehr helped propel the creation of a successor organization to carry on the 
work of Georg Escherich and Rudolf Kanzler.  This eventually came to be known as 
Bund Bayern und Reich.  This formation, like the old Einwohnerwehr was a paramilitary 
unit dedicated to the eradication of socialism in Germany, the overturning of the Treaty 
of Versailles, and the propagation of a nationalist world view.  However, unlike 
Escherich’s association, it was overtly political in a way that the Einwohnerwehr only 
implied.  It was also, despite its nominal independence, more reliant upon the army for 
both direction and its place as the preeminent paramilitary organization in the years 1922-
24. 
 
The Organisation Pittinger and the Founding of Bund Bayern und Reich 
 The idea for the Bund Bayern und Reich came about as the result of a debate 
between leading Einwohnerwehr leaders in the weeks following the allied ultimatum of 
May 1921.  Several proposals were put forward within the organization’s leadership for 
how to deal with the demands of the Control Commission.  The most influential of these, 
and the one eventually adopted, came from deputy chief of staff Riedel.  In a 
memorandum he argued, “The immediate formation of a secret organization from the 
truest of the true ought to be simultaneously constituted and is now already being 
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prepared.”7  For Riedel a clandestine paramilitary group remained the only option.  
Bavaria could not resist the allied demands, in his view, because open conflict would be 
opposed by Social Democrats and their allies on the left, whom he believed would act as 
a fifth column in the country, and because there was simply no public support for another 
war even among conservative and middle class Germans.  It would be easy to set up such 
an organization, he claimed, by following the cell structure of communist groups.  They 
could even keep most of their weapons, giving up a certain number to authorities to 
placate the allies but keeping the bulk secretly hidden.  What was required, according to 
Riedel, was a force of thirty to fifty thousand armed men, supported by a larger entity – 
made up of the bulk of the Einwohnerwehr’s former members – who prepared the way 
for national renewal and would serve as a reserve to the more elite force.8
 Riedel’s ideas were adopted by the Bavarian leadership and resulted in the 
Einwohnerwehr being reorganized as the Organsation Pittinger on June 12, 1921.  The 
new organization was secret and significantly smaller than the former Einwohnerwehr, 
only being referred to as OrgPi in official documents to avoid suspicion.
 
9
                                                     
7 Gedanken über Erhaltung oder Auflösung der bayerischen Einwohnerwehr, May 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, 
B. 3. 
  Dr. Otto 
Pittinger, a health inspector (Sanitätsrat) from Regensburg, became the head of the new 
group that bore his name.  A master organizer, Pittinger, like many of the leaders in the 
patriotic movement, had served in the German army during World War I, seeing action in 
the medical corps.  After the war Pittinger returned to Regensburg, where he fell in with 
the extremely antisemitic Bavarian Order Block (Ordnungsblock).  From there he joined 
8 Ibid. 
9 Hans Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918, (Bad Homburg: Verlag 
Gehlen, 1969), 143-47. 
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the Einwohnerwehr, working his way up to regional leader (Kreisleiter).10  It was in this 
capacity that he served as one of the major organizers of the Organisation Escherich.  
Later he was elevated to the state leadership, where he participated in the debates over 
disbandment that raged amongst the Civil Guards in early 1921.  Well connected to the 
political elite of Bavaria and to the major figures of the patriotic movement, Pittinger 
would use these contacts to help build up the Organisation Pittinger and later Bund 
Bayern und Reich.11
Pittinger became the head of the new organization with the blessing of former 
Einwohnerwehr leader Escherich who, according to Otto Nusser, believed that the new 
group would be run along the same lines as the old Einwohnerwehr.
   
12  However Pittinger 
had his own ideas for the new group and these differed greatly from those of Escherich.  
The most significant of these involved politics.  Whereas Escherich had been able to keep 
the Civil Guards from appearing overly political, Pittinger instituted a detailed political 
program for new the organization, one that was more in line with the views of many 
former Einwohnerwehr members.13
 Politics was not the only area where Pittinger’s style differed from Escherich’s.  
The former leader had created in the Einwohnerwehr a group that had both a military and 
 
                                                     
10 Ibid. 
11 Horst G.W. Nußer, Konservative Wehrverbände in Bayern, Preußen und Österreich 1918-1922, mit einer 
Biographie von Forstrat Georg Escherich 1870-1941, (Munich: Nusser Verlag, 1973), 215-17, and Fenske, 
Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 143-47. 
12 Nußer, Konservative Wehrverbände, 215.  Pittinger had been a Kreisleiter in the Einwohnerwehr and 
eventually worked his way into the Landesleitung by 1921.  He was well known to Escherich, Kriebel, and 
the rest of the staff, and had a prominent role in the Regensburg meeting that helped set up the 
Organisation Escherich, ibid. 
13 Ibid.  Pittinger’s political program reflected the preoccupations of many of the local units in the 
Einwohnerwehr, which trended towards völkisch thought, as illustrated in the Rosenheim Einwohnerwehr’s 
attitude towards Jews, see Chapter 4, 92-4. 
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a police function, though the allies would eventually force them to abandon the former.14  
For his organization, however, Pittinger adopted a purely military posture in accordance 
to Riedel’s ideas.  The Organisation Pittinger was devoted first and foremost to 
developing a dependable reserve for the German army in Bavaria.  The group was 
heavily supported by leading military figures like General von Möhl, who was still the 
commander of the Reichswehr in Munich.  This connection was crucial for building the 
OrgPi in the first months of its existence, and for Bayern und Reich later.  It also proved 
decisive in the initial relations between Pittinger and the other paramilitaries of the 
patriotic movement.  To create an effective reserve force more men would be needed, as 
the OrgPi was still a rather small organization.  Coordination amongst the numerous 
successor groups (remnants of the Einwoherwehr, the other voluntary associations, and 
Bund Oberland) would be crucial to creating that reserve, and Pittinger’s favored position 
gave him the incentive to try and bring these groups under his leadership.15
The differences in approach created tensions between Pittinger and Escherich.  
These spilled out into open conflict over the situation with the Orgesch, the group that 
bore the former Einwohnerwehr leader’s name and that now, after the ban of June 1921, 
was operating in secret.  Escherich’s leadership of both groups had created a personal 
union between them and, as the Organisation Pittinger was the successor to the old 
Einwohnerwehr, it was still considered a member of the Organisation Escherich.  This 
meant that Escherich could still control the new group in his role as national leader of the 
Orgesch; this might have been the intent all along.  As Escherich remained very popular 
among many in the patriotic movement in Bavaria, Pittinger spent much of 1921 trying to 
 
                                                     
14 See Chapter 5, 121.  
15 Nußer, Konservative Wehrverbände, 216-17. 
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remove the OrgPi from the national organization.  The feud between the two men 
became so acrimonious that a meeting was held on November 4, 1921 between Pittinger, 
Escherich, and Henning von der Osten (leader of the Orgesch in East Prussia) to resolve 
the dispute.  A compromise was reached at the meeting where Escherich remained as 
head of the national group while giving Pittinger complete control over the Bavarian 
organization.  Despite his popularity though, Escherich’s position in the patriotic 
movement was fatally compromised.  Many leaders within the Orgesch began to reject 
his leadership.  The deteriorating situation allowed Pittinger to gain independence for his 
organization.16
If the struggle between Escherich and the Organisation Pittinger was not enough, 
the Regensburg health inspector had to deal with the other patriotic associations, few of 
whom found Pittinger’s pretensions to leadership inspiring.  They resented having to 
coordinate their activities with the OrgPi, which had the backing of the army and thus 
access to funds and weapons.  The result was that these organizations attacked the group, 
and its leader, frequently.  The paramilitary outfit most responsible for causing trouble in 
late 1921 was the Bund Oberland, which was a successor organization to the Freikorps 
Oberland.
 
17
                                                     
16 Ibid, 216-20.  Escherich’s problems with Pittinger in regards to both the Orgesch and Organisation 
Pittinger resulted in him becoming very disillusioned with the vaterländisch circles around both Kahr and 
Ludendorff, a sentiment he made well known in his correspondence, Brief, July 18, 1922, BHSA, V, NL 
Escherich. 
  Beginning in January 1922 Captain Josef Römer, the group’s leader started 
spreading rumors about Pittinger, his association, and its political goals.  The main story 
17 Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 159-64.  The Bund Oberland formed as the conflict in 
Silesia, where the Freikorps Oberland fought as part of the Bavarian Einwohnerwehr (into which it had 
been absorbed) and the Organisation Escherich, came to an end and the group returned to Bavaria.  
Ideologically heterodox (it flirted with trying to win the workers to the national cause), the group was 
initially run by Captain Josef Römer who was suspicious of figures who appeared to have separatist 
aspirations, like Rudolf Kanzler, ibid. 
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circulated about the OrgPi leader was his desire to see Bavaria secede from the Reich and 
become its own country or unite with Austria.  Both would be done under the auspices of 
a French protectorate.18
Römer’s accusations against Pittinger revolved around a discussion they had in 
December 1921, in which he claimed that the OrgPi leader had announced that his stated 
political goal was to foster Bavarian independence under the protection of France.  This 
accusation made its way into the press on January 30, 1922 when the Hamburg 
newspaper, Welt am Montag, published an article accusing Pittinger of treasonous 
activities against the German Reich.
 
19  These included his involvement in planning a 
royalist putsch to help restore the Wittelsbach monarchy and seeking to unite with 
nationalist circles in Budapest to create a Danubian confederation composed of Bavaria, 
Austria, and Hungary.20
The charges leveled against Pittinger and his group were significant enough to 
warrant a response.  This took the form of a pamphlet distributed by the Organisation 
Pittinger in February 1922 titled, Oberland’s Leaders in the Light of Truth, which 
attacked Römer and his association directly.  In the document a number of 
countercharges were made.  First, they accused the Oberland leadership of dishonesty, 
pointing out that Römer continued to interact with Pittinger and his group up to three 
days before the article attacking the health inspector was published.  They also pointed 
out that Oberland’s leader, in the article in Welt am Montag, claimed the discussion 
between him and Pittinger took place in December 1921, when in fact it had taken place 
 
                                                     
18 Untersuchungsauschuß des E.S.V an den Nationalverband deutscher Offiziere, Ortsgruppe München, 
Abschrift: Oberland-Pittinger, 24. July 1922, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 15. 
19 “Wie Gerüchte entstehen,” Blatt I. Untersuchungsausschuß, ibid. 
20 “Die Anklage,” Blatt II. Untersuchungsausschuß, ibid. 
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in September; this fact would have made Römer as aware of many of the developments, 
like the planned royalist putsch and the trip to Hungary as anyone in the patriotic 
movement.  Finally, the authors of the pamphlet accused the Oberland leadership of 
willfully “misunderstanding” the nature of Pittinger’s address, which they claimed was 
not an endorsement of secession, but a discussion of the impossibility of Bavarian 
separation.21
The feud between Pittinger and Bund Oberland, along with his struggle with 
Escherich over the Organisation Pittinger’s place in Orgesch, created major rifts in the 
patriotic movement.  If left unchecked such a conflict might have fractured the right wing 
in Bavaria, and this was a possibility that the army could not seriously entertain.  
Beginning in May 1922 the Bavarian Reichswehr, in conjunction with three independent 
veterans and officer associations, began an investigation of the rumors swirling around 
the OrgPi leader.  Chaired by General Franz Ritter von Epp, the findings were designed 
to explain “about the quality of the leaders of Oberland and their business.”
 
22
The findings of the commission exonerated Pittinger and his group.  They found 
that charges brought by the leadership of Bund Oberland against the health inspector to 
be completely false, concluding that Römer had indeed lied about the timing of the 
meeting between himself and Pittinger.  Moreover, the September meeting was not the 
only one between the two men as they met in December 1921, during a period when 
Römer and his associates were preparing their lies for public consumption.
 
23
                                                     
21 Oberlandführer im Lichte der Wahrheit, February 1922, ibid. 
  They also 
22 Untersuchungsausschuß des E.S.V. an den Nationalverband deutscher Offiziere, Ortsgruppe München, 
24. July 1922, ibid. 
23 “Schlußfolgerung” und “Tatsachen, die ehrengerichtliche Behandlung fordern,” Blatt IV und V. 
Untersuchungsausschuß, ibid. 
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judged harshly the organization’s decision to make these charges in a “leftist newspaper 
like the Welt am Montag.”24  They also discovered that Römer and his associates were 
motivated primarily by money.  According to Prince zur Lippe, who was present at the 
September meeting, the main motivation of the group’s leaders there was to obtain 
money from Pittinger for their own activities.25  As a result the commission judged 
Oberland’s leaders harshly.  “It is profound to lament, that for such recognizably 
excellent membership material an order organization is located in the hands of an equally 
recognized, incapable leadership.”26
Even before the army’s commission had handed down its verdict in July 1922, the 
Organisation Pittinger had been reorganized as the Bund Bayern und Reich.  The new 
group came into existence in April, just as the dispute between Pittinger and the Bund 
Oberland hit its peak.  No official reason was given for the transformation of OrgPi from 
a small conspiratorial organization into a paramilitary force; however a couple of 
plausible explanations have been proffered by scholars.  Hans Fenske argues that the 
Organisation Pittinger was simply too small to be effective within a patriotic movement 
now dominated by small, self-sustaining units that guarded their autonomy jealously and 
would not surrender it to Pittinger.
 
27
                                                     
24 “Oberlands Führer,” Blatt III. Untersuchungsausschuß, ibid. 
  Meanwhile, Horst Nußer claims that Bayern und 
Reich came into existence as a creation of the health inspector himself, in order to 
underline the differences between the new group and the old Einwohnerwehr.  Such a 
25 Verband bayerische Offiziere Regiments Vereinigungen, Denkschrift: Bund Bayern und Reich und Bund 
Oberland, ibid. 
26 “Schlußfolgerung,” Blatt IV. Untersuchungsausschuß, ibid. 
27 Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 146-47 and 172. 
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distinction allowed Pittinger to gain unfettered independence from both the Orgesch and 
Georg Esherich.28
It is quite possible though that the decision to reorganize the Organisation 
Pittinger as a paramilitary unit was something encouraged by Reichswehr leaders in 
Bavaria.  As noted they hoped to use the OrgPi as an umbrella association to coordinate 
the various paramilitaries to create a dependable reserve militia for the army.  After the 
Einwohnerwehr the most recognizable and prominent of these was the Bund Oberland, 
whose leadership was now disgraced as a result of the feud with Pittinger.  With its future 
now in doubt, the army might have encouraged the health inspector to create a 
paramilitary of his own to ensure that a dependable right-wing force existed for the 
government and military.
 
29
The Organizational Structure of Bund Bayern und Reich 
 
 In terms of structure Bund Bayern und Reich adhered closely to the model of 
paramilitary organization used by the Einwohnerwehr.  The basic organizational unit for 
the group was the region, or Gau.  This local body was, according to the regulations set 
out in Bayern und Reich – Deutscher Freiheitsbund, “the space, in which the civic 
educational work is to be accomplished.”30
                                                     
28 Nußer, Konservative Wehrverbände, 217-20. 
  Below the local districts were the individual 
community units, or Ortsgruppen, and above were the district leaders, Kreisleiter, who 
answered directly to the leadership (Bundesleitung), which sat in Munich.  In most 
29 The Bund Oberland’s leadership descended into a bitter feud following the judgment of the 
Untersuchungsausschuß.  This eventually led to the arrest of its leader Josef Römer in October 1922 on 
charges brought by some of the group’s other leading member, Captain Knaus.  In the aftermath Knaus 
liquidated Bund Oberland and reformed it as Bund Treu Oberland.  Its new leader was Dr. Friedrich 
Weber, Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 163-64. 
30 Hauptmann a.D Hofberger, K., Bayern und Reich – Deutscher Freiheitsbund.  Vom Bund und seiner 
Arbeit, 4, IfZ, Hk 337. 
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administrative matters the local leader (Gauleiter) was free to run his unit as he pleased, 
so long as he adhered to regulations.31
Unlike the Einwohnerwehr, which had portrayed itself as running according to 
democratic norms, Bayern und Reich was much more authoritarian in its selection of 
leaders.  The leadership, which was self selected, named the regional leaders, who then 
chose the district leaders, who then chose the local community leaders.  All district and 
regional leaders served as local auxiliary leaders in conjunction with the organization’s 
role as a reserve military force.  Party politics was forbidden to all members in the local, 
whether they were leaders or not.  The justification for such a prohibition was that the 
intermeshing of politics with the activities of the group created conflicts of interest that 
were not easy to overcome.
 
32
At the top of the paramilitary stood the state leadership, which set policy and 
interacted with political and military leaders.  They also maintained relations with other 
patriotic groups.  Authoritarian though it was the leadership was aided in its work by a 
couple of committees which helped mediate controversies and assisted in crafting policy.  
One committee (Ausschuß) helped advise Pittinger and his subordinates on issues on a 
case by case basis.  The other committee, the state representative (Landesvertretung), 
consisted of the leadership, a council composed of regional leaders and other special 
members, the district leadership, and other patriotic groups who coordinated themselves 
with Bayern und Reich.   The body was designed to allow individual members the ability 
to question the state leadership on matters of goals and actions undertaken by the 
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organization, and to serve as a sounding board for their opinions.  Called into session by 
either the leadership or via written request from local offices, the state representative’s 
decisions were binding with a two-thirds vote.33
Four departments originally handled the league’s work.  These were a military 
and organizational department (Wehr- und Organisationsabteilung – W. u. O.), a political 
department (Politische Abteilung), a propaganda and press department (Propaganda- und 
Presse-Abteilung mit Nachrichtendienst), which had its own news service, and a business 
and legal department (Wirtschafts- und Rechtsabteilung – W. u. R.).  The military and 
organizational department worked closely with the army and concerned itself with 
building up local units and training.  The political department naturally handled ideology 
and worked closely with the propaganda and press department to spread the work of the 
association.  They also ran the communication office, by which orders were passed down 
to local units.  Finally the economic and legal department ran the organization’s affairs.  
Bayern und Reich, unlike the Einwohnerwehr, was entirely independent of the state in 
terms of its finances.  Funds were raised independently on the district level (each regional 
office had an economics official), and these depended greatly on the local relationship of 
group to business interests.
 
34
Significantly for the future of the organization the leadership at the state level was 
reorganized before the end of the first year in such a way that it deprived the group of the 
type of independence that the Einwohnerwehr had enjoyed.  As the founder and head of 
Bayern und Reich, Pittinger controlled both the political program and the paramilitary 
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functions, a combination that prevailed at all levels of leadership.  However, in the fall of 
1922, the health inspector was superseded by an army general, von Stetten, who took 
responsibility for the association’s military wing.  The army’s purpose in this move was 
to ensure supremacy.  “We must endeavor to have the decisive influence in all military 
questions.  We have to firmly fight the idea, which here and there appears, that if 
necessary the secret paramilitary organizations ‘will do things’ and the army may at best 
help.”35  Of course effective control by the Reichswehr naturally had some benefits.  
Bayern und Reich now became the premier paramilitary force in the state.  All other 
patriotic groups, if they wished to have military support and the weapons this provided 
needed to ally themselves with Pittinger’s organization.36
In terms of its membership Bund Bayern und Reich was composed of many men 
who had previously been part of the old Einwohnerwehr, and a few of the regulations that 
prevailed there were continued in Pittinger’s association.  Members had to have an 
unimpeachable reputation.  They were not allowed to be members of leftist organizations, 
especially those that belonged to what the leadership called “the red international.”  This 
included the Social Democratic Party (SPD), whose members had been allowed to join 
the Einwohnerwehr, but were prohibited from signing on to Bayern und Reich.  
Furthermore members must not be “defeatists, naggers, and habitual troublemakers,” for 
these people were considered more dangerous than communists.
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35 Denkschrift of Bavarian Reichswehr over the Military Leadership of Bund Bayern und Reich, IfZ, 
NSDAP Hauptarchiv, MA 144/6. 
 
36 Ibid.  This arrangement allowed the army the ability to remove Bund Bayern und Reich, its paramilitary 
wing, from Pittinger’s control in case of emergency.  The Sanitätsrat clearly understood the arrangement 
with the army as evidenced by an April 1923 explanation of the organization’s relationship to the Bavarian 
government, Verpflichtungserklärung, April 16, 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, Bund 13. 
37 Hofberger, Bayern und Reich, 7-11, IfZ, Sk 337. 
183 
 
The difference between the two organizations, in terms of the membership, was 
that Bund Bayern und Reich required a far more explicitly political and nationalist 
orientation from their members.  For the Einwohnerwehr, while nationalists were 
certainly welcome in the organization, their influence was balanced by the need to 
preserve the state and all ‘state supporting’ elements within it.  This meant that Social 
Democrats, workers, and Jews could join, though not Independent Socialists or 
Communists.  While this led to strife in individual Einwohnerwehr units it also provided 
a check against excessive radicalism.  Pittinger’s units defined their nationalism far more 
clearly than the Einwohnerwehr had ever done.  Members had to have a “Christian and 
racial attitude,” which meant that only those Germans who had a Christian and a racial 
worldview were admitted as members.  Moreover they had to be Aryans; no Jews, nor 
anyone else from a non-German race, were allowed admittance into the Bund Bayern und 
Reich.38
The exclusion of Jews from Bund Bayern und Reich stood in sharp contrast to the 
practice of the Einwohnerwehr, which took in members regardless of their religious 
affiliation.  It is tempting to read into this the influence of the Nazi Party and its growing 
success, and certainly a case can be made for that.  1922 was a significant year for both 
Hitler and his party.  However, a more important contributing factor to this development 
was the latent antisemitism of the Einwohnerwehr.  Many Jews who had joined 
Escherich’s group were often the target of whisper campaigns.  The most significant of 
these of course occurred in Rosenheim, where a list was circulated of Jews in the 
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organization and a petition started to throw them out.39  Even more critical was the world 
view of members of the leadership.  Escherich and Kanzler seemed to take an agnostic 
stance on this issue, but their Chief of Staff Hermann Kriebel was a man firmly in the 
völkisch camp as was Pittinger,40 who was a member of the antisemtic Bavarian Order 
Block before joining the Einwohnerwehr.41
Due to the importance that the group gave to völkisch ideas in its ideology, the 
propagation of such sentiments was critical to the organization’s success.  All members 
were expected to convey these ideas in every aspect of their lives.  To ensure that their 
men did this compliance a rigorous screening process was set up.  Individuals could not 
simply join, they were vetted by the local unit to which they applied, something 
mandated in the regulations.  “It is the duty of the leadership of each local group 
moreover to watch, that no bad elements worm themselves into our league.”
  Bund Bayern und Reich simply adopted the 
world view of its leader. 
42  For the 
state leadership it was more important to gain quality recruits for the group, as opposed to 
massive numbers.  Local offices were required to make the applicant agree to every point 
of the organization’s ideological program.  This was done before the local leadership 
(Vorstandschaft), so they could judge the applicant.  Initiates had to swear their fealty to 
the ideas of the league in the home and in their official lives.  Once completed the 
applicant was voted in or out by local leaders.43
                                                     
39 Gauleitung Rosenheim, Protest!, 6. May 1920, BHSA, I, M Inn 66 138. 
 
40 Large, The Politics of Law and Order, 24-5. 
41 Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 143-7. 
42 Hofberger, Bayern und Reich, 7-11, IfZ, Sk 337. 
43 Ibid. 
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Members, once in Bund Bayern und Reich, were obliged to cover a couple of 
costs in order to help the group run effectively.  All members had to subscribe to the 
weekly newspaper, Bayern und Reich, which reinforced the ideological program of the 
organization, and to which individual associates were encouraged to submit articles on a 
periodic basis.  These subscriptions were ordered through the post office, or the printer, 
though the state leadership preferred the latter as it allowed them to use their own 
financial officials in the transaction.  In addition, members had to contribute dues to the 
organization, as Bayern und Reich was independent of government assistance.  
Considering the economic distress of the period in which the group was founded (just 
before the Hyperinflation of 1923), the leadership took great pains to keep dues to the 
bare minimum.  Each local unit was required to charge all of its associates twenty 
Pfennig per month.  For units that contained more than fifty men the contribution was to 
be ten Marks for the unit as a corporate body.  It was expected that the leadership in each 
town and city would make the case for such contributions.44
The Ideology of Bund Bayern und Reich 
 
The ideological program of Pittinger’s organization built upon the foundations 
begun by the Einwohnerwehr.  These foundations placed a premium on support for a 
highly stylized nationalism, hatred of all radical (read: socialist) tendencies, and a desire 
to return to the sense of solidarity that prevailed at the beginning of the First World 
War.45
                                                     
44 Ibid. 
  In the new group these tendencies were given more concrete expression.  Thus, 
the völksch tendencies that had been hinted at in the Einwohnerwehr became the overt 
45 Heimatland, “Gedanken am Königsplatz,” 30. September 1920, BHSA, IV, EWB, B. 3. 
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world view of Bund Bayern und Reich.  The differences that existed between Pittinger’s 
group and organizations like Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party were not based in 
völkisch ideology, which the Nazis accepted, but in certain aspects of the program that 
Hitler and his interlocutors believed were backwards-thinking. 
The main purpose of the Bund Bayern und Reich was to help free Germany from 
without and within.  In their regulations and many of their correspondences they referred 
to themselves as a “freedom league,” or Freiheitsbund.  In this capacity they sought to 
transform the nation.  “Our league wants to be a school for the people, wants to unite the 
best forces in the land, and wants to rear our young boys into men.”46  To achieve their 
lofty goals, Bayern und Reich spent a great deal of time on outreach to the young, 
establishing local youth chapters in most Bavarian cities and requiring their members to 
enroll their children in such organizations.  They also sought to reach German mothers, 
whom they saw as critical for propagating the Bund’s ideas and values within the family, 
which was the “cornerstone of the state.”  Given a firm foundation in the family and with 
the young, the radical nationalist ideology of Bayern und Reich would help revive 
Germany.47
Völkisch ideas ran throughout the political mission statement of Pittinger’s 
organization.  Key among these was the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft, or community 
of the people.  This notion, as noted earlier, had been held by völkisch thinkers and 
groups since the late nineteenth century.  As George Mosse, who chronicled the 
development of this ideology, noted, the tendency of these groups was to emphasize the 
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interlocking nature of German society.  Theirs was not an egalitarian ethos, but a 
stratified culture where all parts worked for the betterment of the whole.48
The members were pledged to work for this Volksgemeinschaft.  “Each member 
does his part in his region to this end; that class differences are overcome, that finally the 
true community of the people is effective.”
  It was a 
utopian vision, one that most patriotic groups held in the early 1920s and it was a key 
element in the program of Bayern und Reich. 
49  This was to be accomplished by bridging 
the divide between the classes, a divide that had been exacerbated by war and revolution.  
One way of doing that was to permit wide membership.  The regulations stipulated that 
Bayern und Reich had an open membership policy.  Anyone could join the group, 
provided they had a völkisch worldview, were German, and did not subscribe to any 
ideologies or belong to any groups outside of the Volksgemeinschaft.  As Captain 
Hofberger, the ostensible author of Bayern und Reich: Deutscher Freiheitsbund, put it, 
“only when the German citizen, the German farmer, and the German worker go hand in 
hand and work together, will it succeed in overcoming the emergency and saving our 
Germany.”50
Propaganda materials spent a great deal of time extolling the virtues of the 
Volksgemeinschaft.  Pittinger’s group distributed a fair amount of nationalist literature, 
teaching materials, songbooks, and other materials designed to increase nationalist 
feeling and spread the message of the group.
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48 Mosse, Crisis of Germanic Ideology, 20-30. 
  Patriotic songs, for instance, emphasized 
49 Hofberger, Bayern und Reich, 21, IfZ, Sk 337. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Deutscher Kalendar: 1925, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 1-1.  The German calendar in 1925 was filled with 
invective over the Treaty of Versailles and against the allied powers, ibid. 
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military marches, traditional folk tunes, and songs written exclusively for Bayern und 
Reich.52  Additionally, the leadership ran a number of instructional courses that 
highlighted the organization’s program.  The members who took part in these courses 
were those who seemed especially capable of rhetorical argument.  Classes were 
conducted in small groups and held at the group’s headquarters at Möhlstrasse 10.  Costs 
were borne by the local offices.  Once completed the individual member would be able to 
continue instructional work in the organization’s regions and districts.53
Due to the overt völkisch bent of Bund Bayern und Reich, Jews were not allowed 
to become members, and reducing their influence became one of the overarching goals of 
the organization.  This differed greatly from the former Einwohnerwehr where the 
leadership maintained an ecumenical stance despite the fact that antisemitism was 
widespread amongst the local units.  In Pittinger’s association though anti-Jewish 
sentiments were an integral part of the program and were expressed outright by both the 
leadership and the organization’s members.  The regulations stated it thusly, “There is no 
place in our league for members a different race than the Germans.  We are racial 
Germans; therefore Jews also cannot be taken in.”
 
54
Like many other völkisch groups of the period, and in previous decades, Bund 
Bayern und Reich accused Germany’s Jews of every conceivable ill that befell the 
country.  Their charges consisted of all the usual antisemitic tropes.  They were accused 
of being behind the spirit of materialism, which they saw as corrupting society.  “The 
Jewish materialistic spirit of the revolution has brought about an egotistical hedonism, 
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which not only damages our image domestically and internationally, but our national 
economy and the national health as well.”55  Jews were responsible for the scourge of 
Marxism, whose political representatives they saw as responsible for the revolution and 
the Weimar Republic.  Hofberger’s ideological pamphlet made this explicit with the 
extraordinary claim that nearly ninety percent of socialist and labor union leaders were 
Jews.  They were behind economic woes, whether as high finance capitalists, or as 
swindlers and black marketers – a scourge that Bayern und Reich, like the 
Einwohnerwehr before them, saw everywhere.  Finally, Jews were accused, along with 
others, of being the traitors who had helped to defeat the country in the First World 
War.56
Diminishing the position of German Jews, and those from Eastern Europe who 
were seen as dangerous immigrants, was thus central to the program of Bund Bayern und 
Reich.  This stance was clearly in line with the thinking of other patriotic groups, but 
owing to the prominent position of Pittinger’s organization in the calculations of the army 
and government their antisemitic stance was challenged by Jewish leaders in the state.  
The most prominent of these Jewish critics was Fritz Buchmann, a lawyer from 
Regensburg, who sought to persuade the Bayern und Reich leader of the error of his 
organization’s völkisch stance.  In a couple of letters in October 1923, Buchmann 
attacked the racial conceptions on which the group’s worldview was based.
 
57
In Buchmann’s view the patriotic associations, and Bayern und Reich as the most 
significant of them, made several categorical errors in their antisemitic program.  The 
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first of these was that all German Jews were treated as one, undifferentiated, mass.  No 
complexity was allowed to enter their narrative about Jews.  Moreover, no exception was 
made in the program of Pittinger’s organization, or others, for differentiating between 
Eastern European Jews (Ostjuden) and native born German Jews.  Buchmann complained 
that only in Germany could one find the kind of bewailing about Jewish influence in 
society and politics, even though in most European countries one could find Jewish 
ministers and officials with nary a complaint, even though some countries, like France, 
had a more pronounced history of official antisemitism.  Most important of all, 
Buchmann’s letter attacked the notion that Jews were responsible for the radical politics 
of the Marxists, noting that it was a German Jew who was one of the founders of the 
German National People’s Party.58
The central message of Buchmann’s letters to Pittinger was that, for a healthy 
patriotic movement to flourish, it needed to be free of the racial ideas that placed German 
Jews outside the community of the people.  “The healthy patriotic movement ought to 
find means and ways, to attract those patriotically hostile Germans and so also the core 
German parts of the Jewish community in any form to spiritual and material service.”
 
59
                                                     
58 Rechtsanwalt Justizrat Dr. Fritz Buchmann an Herrn Sanitätsrat Dr. Pittinger, 10 October 1923, ibid. 
  
He rejected the notion that one could separate Jewish influence or culture out of German 
society as many patriotic groups wanted to do.  Jews were crucial to the history of 
Germany, he noted, and had always been in the German fatherland since the time of the 
Romans.  What he proposed was that Bund Bayern und Reich, which he called the most 
important organization in the patriotic movement, enter into collaboration with the 
59 Rechtsrat, Justizrat Dr. Fritz Buchmann an Herrn Sanitätsrat Dr. Pittinger, 16 October 1923, ibid. 
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organization he represented, the National Association of German Jews, to help rebuild 
Bavaria and Germany.60
The desire of some Bavarian Jews to help out in the patriotic movement was not 
without precedent.  The membership of Jews in the Einwohnerwehr has already been 
documented.  Many Jewish politicians also oriented themselves to the political right, as 
Buchmann noted in his letter.  Even outside of Germany some Jews gravitated towards 
right wing political movements.  Many Italian Jews joined Benito Mussolini’s Fascist 
Party in the early 1920s, some even advancing to positions of leadership within it.  They 
did so because Mussolini rejected, at least in this period, the kind of racial antisemitism 
practiced by many on the German right – though Mussolini had been known to make 
anti-Jewish statements.  Individual Fascists might attack Jews over the issue of Zionism, 
but the wholesale rejection of Jewish membership as seen in Pittinger’s organization was 
not practiced.
 
61
Closely related to antisemitism was the organization’s unrelenting hatred of 
Communism and Socialism.  One of the eight principles that all volunteers had to agree 
to in order to become a member was “the Struggle against Marxism as the enemy of any 
racial political system.”
  These examples notwithstanding, the efforts of people like Buchmann to 
change the ideological direction of Bayern und Reich failed to move the leaders of the 
group and it would continue to maintain a völkisch stance vis-à-vis Bavarian Jews. 
62
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  For the leadership of the organization Communism went hand 
in hand with their antipathy towards Jews.  Like all völkisch ideologues, the members of 
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Bayern und Reich saw German Jews as essentially rootless cosmopolitans, who foisted 
materialism and Bolshevism on the nation.  Thus the struggle against this ideology 
represented the high water mark of nationalist thought and sentiment.63
In a very practical way this meant struggle against the Marxist parties of the 
German left: the Social Democrats, the Independent Social Democrats, and the 
Communists.  Unlike the Einwohnerwehr, Bund Bayern und Reich did not make any 
distinction among these parties.  To them, the socialist parties were all guilty of un-
patriotic activity and thought; their sins against the fatherland were numerous.  They were 
responsible for the country’s loss in the First World War and the advent of the Weimar 
Republic.  “On November 9, 1918 ‘all power to the people’ belonged to the leaders of 
social democracy.  The republic was here.  No one could stand again them; no one did 
stand against them.  All roads were open to socialism.”
 
64  As the originators and first 
leaders of the republic, the political left was accused of collusion with the wartime allies, 
particularly in the fulfillment of the country’s treaty obligations and their failure to 
oppose allied measures, something which they claimed made another European war more 
likely, not less.65  In later years they accused Social Democrats of fomenting civil war by 
creating their own paramilitary organization, the Reichsbanner, to protect the republic 
from patriotic organizations like Bayern und Reich.66
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  Finally, the Social Democrats and 
its allies were accused of making the economic conditions in Germany and Bavaria worse 
through their economic program, which included measures designed to help the workers 
and increase the social safety net.  “A social democratically influenced government 
64 Hast du die letzten 5 Jahre vergessen?, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 1-2. 
65 Wer stürtzt uns in einen neuen Krieg?, ibid. 
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benefits international financial powers, from whom the Social Democracy and their 
unions are admittedly being strongly subsidized financially and bring us certainly new 
inflation and grisly wretchedness.”67
The First World War loomed large in the ideological world view of Pittinger’s 
men.  Bund Bayern und Reich, like the Einwohnerwehr before it, believed that the unity 
provided by World War I had been the high water mark of German national feeling, and 
the loss of that during the course of the war and following went a long way towards 
explaining the country’s predicament in the early 1920s.  To overcome it Germans and 
Bavarians would need to get back to the unity of 1914, especially for the sake of the 
young.  “Awaken again in our young love of the homeland.  Honor the old traditions and 
the old habits and customs of our homeland, the traditional dress of our people.  Who has 
knowledge of our local history and geography, should tell it to the others, for whom the 
history of a people is a master teacher.”
 
68
One way to help revive this feeling of unity was to dramatize German heroics in 
the war.  The leadership’s propaganda department published a series of essays about the 
war designed to instill pride in German military exploits amongst the young.  Authored 
by Rudolf von Xylander, these essays covered all the important campaigns in the conflict.  
They also justified the actions taken by the German armed forces and government.  For 
instance, in the eighth essay, which concerned the war at sea, Xylander highlighted the 
success of surface units of the German navy, which had effectively been bottled up by 
British forces, while downplaying the actions of U-boats.  When these were mentioned 
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the authors justified their use as being consistent with the rights of nations at war and by 
pointing British hypocrisy in the matter.69
Perhaps the easiest way to revive the “spirit of 1914” was of course to agitate 
against the Treaty of Versailles.  German opinion about the dictated peace ran high across 
the political spectrum.  For Bayern und Reich the fight against the peace treaty was the 
group’s highest goal.  “In order to become a free people again, we must struggle against 
the disgraceful peace of Versaillses, which is nothing more than the instrument of our 
enemies to rob, subvert, and finally to fully destroy us.”
 
70  For Pittinger’s organization 
the Treaty of Versailles represented the high point of national disgrace.  The German 
government, in their view, had trusted the word of the allies which, according to one 
propaganda leaflet, was undermined by the machinations of French policy and the perfidy 
of the British and Americans.71  Moreover, the republic’s Social Democratic leaders had 
not only gone along with the travesty, but further encouraged the fulfillment of the 
treaty’s provisions.  The members of Bayern und Reich, and other patriotic groups, 
believed this was shameful and that it would be necessary to hold out for an “honorable 
peace.”72
The patriotic movement and Bund Bayern und Reich in particular were to be the 
vanguard for helping the German government overcome Versailles.  This would be done 
through maintenance of the weaponry of the paramilitary group, its actions against leftist 
interests in Bavaria, and most of all working to replace the republican form of 
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government in Germany.73  Once again, the country’s internal political dynamic was tied 
to the international situation.  The advent of the Weimar Republic had been a 
consequence of World War I, and the new political constitution that resulted from it was 
seen as the ultimate marker of the country’s defeat.  The liberties that came with it were 
in their view false.  “With this freedom, through this equality, under this sovereignty we 
the people come under the hands of robbers, windbags, and charlatans.  So the most 
undetachable of all rights, the sovereignty of the people ends up a continuous struggle 
between swindlers and dupes.”74
The question of course was what form of government to pursue, and it was in this 
question, among others, that the real differences between Bund Bayern und Reich and 
even more radical groups like the Nazi Party emerged.  The ideological program in these 
areas is what has traditionally marked Pittinger’s organization as a conservative group in 
the eyes of historians rather than a true völkisch entity like Bund Oberland.
  Replacing the republican government, thus, was a 
necessary step in nullifying the treaty. 
75
The most decisive difference the group had with more radical völkisch groups was 
in the type of government that they hoped to see implemented in Germany.  In its 
  Bayern und 
Reich’s different stance on these issues that helped contribute to many of the internal 
squabbles amongst patriotic groups beginning in late 1922.  It also helped to partially 
explain the reticence that the leadership had in helping out with the Beer Hall Putsch. 
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regulations Bund Bayern und Reich made the restoration of the monarchy an important 
part of their program.  In the eyes of the leadership this was crucial for the revival of both 
Bavaria and the Reich.  “We hold the monarchy as the most appropriate form of 
government for the German race.”76  They believed that a royal government in Bavaria 
and Germany had several important benefits, not the least of which was its perceived 
ability to stand above party interests.  In addition, a monarchical form of government 
would help to revive federalism, an issue of particular importance in Munich.  Finally, 
they believed a king would be more capable of taking the reins of government in their 
hand more forcefully than a parliamentary democracy, something they believed was 
necessary at the time.77
The leadership of Bund Bayern und Reich was well aware of the difficulties in 
achieving this goal.  As the regulations put it, “The people should then decide the 
monarchical question when the time for it is ripe.”
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  The means, by which monarchy 
would return to Bavaria and Germany, were spelled out in an essay, Ways to the 
Monarchy, put out by the organization.  In it they stated that the return of dynastic 
government could only be accomplished in the individual states, not in the Reich as a 
whole, where the “fanaticism” of republicanism was too well entrenched.  This left 
Bayern und Reich, and its allies, with one of two options, either reestablish a monarchical 
form of government claiming that Bavaria was a special case in Germany, or work with 
77 Wege zum Königtum, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 30.  See also, Hofberger, Bayern und Reich, p. 23, IfZ, Sk 
337. 
78 Ibid. 
197 
 
royalists in other states to overturn the Weimar Republic and its constitution.  The 
leadership was convinced that the second of these options was more likely.79
Once established the second difficulty was in finding a king, or kaiser, to rule.  As 
noted none of the dynasties of the old German Reich were popular, and Bayern und Reich 
did not overtly suggest that a member of one of these houses be given the throne.  Instead 
they sought one man who had the right ideological characteristics who could take charge 
of the situation, and then be proclaimed, or elected, as sovereign.  This solution bore 
striking resemblance to the way in which the Catholic Church selects Popes, picking the 
man who had the esteem of the College of Cardinals.
 
80  Whoever fit these characteristics 
would then begin to transform German society from, “a leaderless mass into monarchical 
organism.”81
The inclusion of monarchism in the ideological program of Bund Bayern und 
Reich created a significant split between it and more radical völkisch groups.  
Organizations like Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party were not prepared to accept the 
return of monarchy to Bavaria, or Germany.  Their position was that the ruling house had 
“run away” from their responsibilities in 1918.  As a result it was useless to bring such 
elements back into power in Germany, even by popular acclaim.  One officer even said 
that the great struggle on the right was between those who wanted a greater German 
republic and those who desired a “south German Catholic monarchy.”
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Another important difference between Pittinger’s organization and the other 
elements of the patriotic movement was in its view of federalism.  The regulations of 
Bund Bayern und Reich stated that, “What we want is a strong Bavaria in a strong 
Reich.”83  For the group’s leaders the Bismarckian Reich had been the high point in 
German political organization, a state that respected the rights of the individual provinces 
(Bavaria above all) while maintaining a powerful national government.  “Only if the 
individual members of the Reich can be given complete, full, and invigorated expression 
in themselves, if the individual federal states are animalistic and developable, if we also 
again have a Bavaria as it was before the revolution, standing strongly on its own feet, 
worthy of its many centuries of history, than we will again attain past German glory and 
power.”84
The federalist issue was one that complicated Bayern und Reich’s relationship to 
the other groups in the patriotic movement, as well as the government in Munich.  The 
desire to create a unitary Reich is partially what drove the Nazi Party, Bund Oberland, 
and Ernst Röhm’s Reichskriegsflagge to leave the League of Patriotic Associations 
(Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände) and form the Fighting League, or Kampfbund, in 
January 1923.  As the leadership noted in a circular memo, differences between Bayern 
und Reich and Hitler, on this issue, were unbridgeable.
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  Additionally, Pittinger’s 
organization constantly encouraged the Bavarian government, controlled by the Bavarian 
People’s Party, to stand firm against the encroachments of Berlin.  In 1924, a dispute over 
the raising of fees on the German Rail service prompted Pittinger to write a detailed letter 
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complaining of the government’s failure to stop the centralizing tendencies of the 
national government, a matter made worse by the fact that rate hikes were done partially 
in order to appease the allies.86
The final difference in the ideological program of Bund Bayern und Reich, when 
compared to the Nazi Party, concerned the issue of religion.  New members were pledged 
to uphold traditional Christianity.  “Without religion and the fear of god there is no 
ordered house, there is no ordered political system.”
 
87  They felt that the decline of 
religion would lead necessarily to the decline of the state, and this was something that 
could not be countenanced.  Additionally, religious conflict was also considered 
anathema to Bayern und Reich.  “Today whoever wants to begin confessional disputes is 
a criminal to the people.”88  This of course, placed Pittinger’s organization somewhat at 
odds with the Nazi Party, which had its origins in the radical Thule Society – a group that 
believed in a German Christianity more in line with concepts of race.89  Many leading 
Nazis firmly believed in the Aryanized form of the religion espoused by the Society, 
however, as numerous scholars have noted, the Party’s relationship to the Church was 
always more opportunistic, using the Church when necessary, and ignoring, or even 
attacking, it when the situation called for it.90
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The ideological worldview of Bund Bayern und Reich clearly was radical and in 
line with almost all of the organizations of the German right.  They desired to overthrow 
the current government, continue the struggle against Marxism, and reduce, if not 
eradicate, the influence of Jews in German society.  This made them a threat to the 
democratic leaders in Bavaria and throughout the Reich.  However, the differences 
between Bayern und Reich and groups like Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party were 
significant enough to create problems for Pittinger and his men as they conducted their 
activities.  These became increasingly difficult to carry out as the years went on. 
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Chapter 8 
Rising Discord – Bund Bayern und Reich, The Nazi Party, and the Rift in the Patriotic 
Movement 
 Due to the nature of its organization and ideological program, Bund Bayern und 
Reich was involved in more activities than the old Einwohnerwehr.  Conceived as a force 
to defend the state against all radical threats, the Einwohnerwehr was circumscribed in 
the types of activities it could undertake.  For instance, it could not plot to overthrow the 
government, advocate for the dissolution of the Weimar Constitution, or overtly 
coordinate with the army.  Pittinger’s paramilitary group, on the other hand, did not have 
these shackles, and fairly quickly became involved in the revolutionary challenge to 
Germany’s republican leaders, even as it continued to engage in many of the practices 
carried over from the Einwohnerwehr. 
 Despite its more activist agenda, Pittinger’s association was hamstrung in its 
actions by its close relationship to the army and certain political leaders.  Their proximity 
to government power constantly undercut their ability to lead the organizations of the 
patriotic (vaterländisch) movement, which was beginning to split into two factions, one 
surrounding the United Patriotic Leagues of Bavaria (Vereinigte Vaterländische 
Verbände Bayerns), to which Bayern und Reich belonged and a more radical wing that 
began to coalesce around Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Party.  Their rapid rise to prominence 
in 1923 posed a challenge to Pittinger and his associates.  Not only did the revolutionary 
rhetoric of Hitler begin to weaken the loyalty of many local units to Bayern und Reich, 
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but it also attracted allies who firmly believed that the Regensburg health inspector had 
no stomach for the struggle against the Weimar Republic. 
The Activities of Bund Bayern und Reich 
 As a standalone organization, Bund Bayern und Reich undertook the activities 
typical of many paramilitary groups of the period.  They trained constantly with illegal 
weapons, which were stored in caches all over Bavaria.1  They protected businesses from 
the depredations of radical workers and their communist organizers.2  They held patriotic 
festivals and evenings,3 where singing and speeches were always on order.4  Many of 
these actions had been staples of the former Einwohnerwehr and were continued by 
Bayern und Reich.  The most prominent of these, naturally, were the shooting festivals.  
A frequent occurrence amongst the local groups of the Einwohnerwehr, these 
celebrations served the same purpose for Bayern und Reich: to celebrate the group’s 
mission, which was self-defense, and to help hone their shooting skills.  They also 
allowed the organization to send an intimidating message to its enemies about its 
willingness to resort to arms in defense of the Bavarian homeland.5
 The group, however, expanded its activities into areas that the Einwohnerwehr 
had been unable, or unwilling, to go.  One of these involved ideological campaigns 
against the Weimar Republic, and its democratic leaders.  The Einwohnerwehr put out 
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propaganda that attacked Social Democrats, Communists, and their affiliated 
organizations.6  In addition to this they argued for the revival of a patriotic Germany and 
the “Spirit of 1914.”7  The posters, essays, and placards of Pittinger’s organization, 
however, not only took aim at radical groups, but the mainline Social Democratic Party 
and the Weimar constitution itself.  To be sure, the materials never endorsed a particular 
political party on the right.  They did, however, support a position, a worldview that left 
the reader in no doubt as to the organization’s preferences.8
Bund Bayern und Reich’s propaganda activities were always designed with 
Bavarian youth in mind.  It was necessary to win the young for the patriotic movement.  
This had been a major point in the organization’s ideological program,
 
9 and would 
manifest itself in the group’s activities.  Local units helped maintain, or start, youth clubs 
which their children joined.  There the young would be trained in the pedagogical and, 
more importantly, the ideological worldview of the movement.  Physical fitness, personal 
sobriety, a sense of service, and love of the fatherland were all major aspects of the work 
of the youth groups run by Pittinger’s group.  Additionally these clubs were designed to 
create a pool of future recruits for Bayern und Reich.  Youths were to be trained in the 
use of small caliber weaponry and given lessons in how to be a soldier, and why it was 
honorable to serve as one.10
In spite of their efforts, however, many of the youth of Bavaria gravitated away 
from Bund Bayern und Reich as they matured.  One of the characteristics of Bavarian 
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youth, noted by the Pittinger and his men, was their tendency to join multiple 
paramilitaries or other patriotic organizations.  As James Diehl noted, many of the young 
adult and teenagers of the 1920s had been weaned on the Wandervögel movement of the 
early twentieth century, where they were exposed to many of the völkisch ideas espoused 
by Bayern und Reich.  However, influenced by the experiences of the previous decade 
they found some of the political ideas of Pittinger’s group to be quaint and outdated, and 
were attracted to the more revolutionary rhetoric of the Nazi Party and its allies.  Despite 
this fact, Pittinger and the leadership remained confident that, given the opportunity, 
youth would come back to Bayern und Reich because of its völkisch world view and 
plans for the revival of the fatherland.11
The activities of Bund Bayern und Reich, like its propaganda, were also aimed at 
the country’s internal enemies on the left, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist 
Party, and their affiliated organizations.  For the leadership it was imperative to strike 
against the left because they represented utopian thinking at its most dangerous.  German 
socialists, in their view, sought to separate the workers from the community in which 
they had been raised.  The imposition of an un-German political and economic form on 
the country by the Social Democrats – unsurprisingly they blamed this on Jewish 
influence – was exacerbated by the example of the Soviet Union, where civil war and 
famine had followed the Bolshevik seizure of power.  Thus, in their view, the history of 
socialism and communism was a cautionary tale for the Reich.  When coupled with the 
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difficulties of the early post-war period, fear of the political left and the need to fight it 
became an imperative for groups like Bund Bayern und Reich.12
In practical terms this meant a continuation of the kinds of activities against the 
German left that had characterized the Einwohnerwehr.  These included defending 
business interests, monitoring and breaking up communist agitation amongst the working 
class, and protecting the state from revolutionary activity.  The paranoia that had defined 
the Bavarian government, under both Hofmann and Kahr, from 1919 to 1921 continued 
in 1922 and 1923 and, coupled with the deteriorating international and economic 
situation, gave Bund Bayern und Reich a situation they and other patriotic groups 
exploited. 
 
Reports from government officials reported on any hints of discontent amongst 
the population and they found plenty to cause worry.  For instance, in 1922 in the region 
around Dachau small farmers expressed discontent with rising prices and taxes.  While 
normally this would be a group that would have been solid supporters of the existing 
order, in this case the government worried about the efforts of the Communists in Bavaria 
to reach out to smaller farmers.13
                                                     
12 Bund Bayern und Reich believed that socialists overlooked a natural break on the development of 
capitalism – the self-interest of employers who would have to hire from within the community.  This, rather 
than state control of the means of production, was the key to a successful rebuilding of German society, 
Vom Sozialismus und Kommunismus, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 26. 
  Communist leaders in Bavaria were often monitored, 
and then arrested for their activities.  These included trying to set up workers councils in 
Bavaria, especially in the Bavarian Palatinate, a region directly under allied control at the 
13 Präsidium der Regierung von Oberbayern an den Herren Vorstände der Bezirksämter, zum Bericht des 
Bezirksamtsvorstandes Dachau vom 28. April 1922, 6. May 1922, BHSA, I, M Inn 71 708.  What made the 
discontent of small farmers so dangerous is that the larger landowners did not suffer proportionately, and 
seemed to profit from their misfortune, ibid. 
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time.14
Pittinger’s group often found itself in violent altercations with workers and their 
representatives, the people often most discontented with the political and economic 
situation as it then stood.  These incidents usually tended to see a fair amount of 
cooperation amongst patriotic units, usually one of the few times they did cooperate 
amicably, according to Harold Gordon.
  By the beginning of 1923 fears of communist insurrection had become so acute 
amongst official circles that the government felt that the only way they could deal with 
the situation was by increasing cooperation with organizations like Bayern und Reich. 
15  One such incident occurred at the German Day 
celebration held in Coburg in October 1922.  There altercations broke out between rally 
participants and the roughly 200-300 workers who sought to break it up by confronting 
the demonstrators at the train station.  Despite their efforts, police were able to keep order 
long enough for participants, including Hitler, to make their way from the train station to 
the local beer hall.16  Similarly during an anti-Fascist Day held in the city of Rosenheim 
in July 1923 the local unit of Bayern und Reich became involved in violent exchanges 
with the protesters.17  Claiming that they were “radical communists,” local leaders 
asserted that they had been attacked due to the atmosphere of such demonstrations, and 
thus were forced to defend themselves.18
The increasing vehemence of these clashes, particularly during the difficult year 
1923, found Bund Bayern und Reich increasingly at the center of the government’s 
 
                                                     
14 Staatsministerium des Innern an das Staatsministerium der Justiz, 6. December 1922, ibid. 
15 Harold J. Gordon Jr., Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 
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16 Staatsministerium des Innern an das Staatsministerium des Äußern, Betreff: Deutscher Tag in Coburg, 
26. January 1923, BHSA, II, MA 100 411. 
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preparations for potential emergencies.  Authorities were convinced that civil strife could 
break out into open conflict at any time and felt it was necessary to be prepared for this 
eventuality.  The army in particular, was concerned for the need to maintain control in 
Bavaria.  They already had a working relationship with health inspector Pittinger and his 
paramilitary unit, one that was exclusive.  However, as the situation deteriorated over the 
course of 1923, army leaders found it imperative to make the relationship even closer. 
One way of doing this was to exercise direct control over the military half of 
Bund Bayern und Reich.  The army had already done so in the fall of 1922, with Pittinger 
still allowed to be in charge of the political department, and overall, head of the 
organization, but with a reliable military man in charge of the W.O. office.19  The 
reorganization was just the beginning, however, as the army chose to use Bayern und 
Reich to help create a military reserve, or Volkswehr, in Bavaria.  Pittinger’s organization 
was chosen because “the state cannot even do it after the current political situation, the 
setting up and organizing of one (military reserve) in determined strength.”20  The reserve 
was designed primarily to help preserve state authority.  Units were to be organized by 
Bayern und Reich on the local level, just like their own group.  The men who were to be 
recruited into these units, however, were much older, between thirty-five and forty-five 
years of age, and free from any party political influence.  Unlike Pittinger’s association, 
which financed itself via membership dues and donations, the military reserve would be 
supported by the state itself.21
                                                     
19 Denkschrift of Bavarian Reichswehr over the Military Leadership of Bund Bayern und Reich, IfZ, 
NSDAP Hauptarchiv, MA 144/6. 
 
20 Denkschrift über Aufstellung einer bayerischen Volkswehr, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 13. 
21 Ibid. 
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The leadership had a difficult line to walk with the military reserve.  On the one 
hand, they saw its usefulness, particularly in times of war when the army would need to 
mobilize men very quickly.  In this instance, they could count on the support of a military 
reserve.  However, they doubted whether the organization was useful in the case of 
domestic disturbance, particularly when Bayern und Reich provided all the functions of a 
reserve in those instances.  Moreover, as an official military reserve under army control 
they were subject to orders from Berlin, which Bayern und Reich was not.  “The 
Reichswehr is the instrument of the Reich government in all instance of domestic 
disturbances and that must be reckoned with, that it [Reichswehr] – as was already the 
case, being needed for use in strife filled territories outside Bavaria.”22  With the national 
government in the hands of a coalition (Cuno) they saw as detrimental to the interest of 
patriotic paramilitaries, the Bayern und Reich leadership felt they could only support the 
creation of a military reserve as long as their own domestic program was not undercut.23
Having run into resistance with their idea of a military reserve run by Bund 
Bayern und Reich, the military leaders sought different ways to coordinate the patriotic 
groups.  Conceiving of a Bavaria defended by three forces, the Reichswehr, the 
paramilitaries of the patriotic movement, and a reserve police used in emergencies, the 
government created an emergency police force, or Notpolizei.
 
24
                                                     
22 Gedanken zur Frage der bayerischen Volkswehr, 15. March 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 22. 
  This entity, created in 
the spring of 1923 was designed to help rural areas maintain law and order.  The Ministry 
of the Interior took the lead in organizing the force, but groups like Bund Bayern und 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bayerisches Landeskommandant an den General der Kav. von Stetten, 10. April 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, 
B. 13. 
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Reich were critical to helping fill its ranks.  On the part of the authorities this was 
designed to further improve coordination amongst the patriotic bands.25
Despite their hopes, the creation of the emergency police did create problems 
amongst patriotic groups.  The regulations set out by the Ministry of Interior specified 
that only organizations loyal to the state (staatstreu) were allowed to participate in the 
emergency police.  This had the effect of disqualifying the Nazi Party and the other 
groups because of their extremism and even their distrust of the reigning conservative 
government in Munich.
 
26  This extended to Bund Oberland, whose members believed 
that the emergency police was being set up exclusively through Bayern und Reich. In the 
case of Oberland, however, the government’s reticence partially stemmed from the 
organization’s long feud with Pittinger in 1922 as by their radicalism.27  This led to a new 
round of accusations between the two groups, as Pittinger accused the new Oberland 
leaders of spreading lies about him and his organization to officials in the Interior 
Ministry.28
It also created problems for Bayern und Reich, which had difficult relations with 
several local districts and units in 1923.  Particularly noteworthy in this respect was the 
local region around Freising, which was a part of Pittinger’s paramilitary group, but often 
styled itself as Organisation, or Bund Unterland.  The leadership wrote the local leader 
there in May 1923 inquiring if his group was suitable as a participant in the emergency 
police.  The danger, from Pittinger’s perspective, was that Unterland’s participation in 
some local events with the Nazi Party, including a rally where Hitler was feted as “a great 
 
                                                     
25 Brief an Hauptmann Heiss, 23. May 1923, ibid. 
26 Brief an sehr geehrter Hauptmann Hoffmann, 23. May 1923, ibid. 
27 Leiss an Pittinger, 13. March 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 15. 
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man,” might give the officials pause in working closely with Bayern und Reich or the 
Freising local.29
The close coordination between the army and Bund Bayern und Reich naturally 
raised questions about the organization’s relationship to the Bavarian government itself.  
Most scholars have seen in the group’s interactions with the governing coalition in 
Munich a lukewarm to close relationship, depending on party.  This relationship could 
become strained if the governing coalition strayed too far from patriotic ideas.
 
30
The main efforts of Bund Bayern und Reich in the political sphere had to do with 
constitutional questions.  Naturally this was an outgrowth of the organization’s program, 
which had as its goal a federal form of government and a monarchy.
  Mostly, 
though, Bund Bayern und Reich’s relationship to party politics was guided by its status as 
a paramilitary force.  The majority of its interactions with officials were from the 
military.  When it did interact with party politics it kept its activities confined to 
lobbying, sometimes intensely, for its own point of view. 
31
                                                     
29 Brief an sehr geehrter Hauptmann Hoffmann, 23. May 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 13. 
  While the 
recreation of a kingdom in Bavaria seemed somewhat out of reach, the group was 
particularly keen to preserve the federal nature of the German Reich, something they, like 
the Einwohnerwehr before them, saw as under attack from the centralizing tendencies of 
Berlin.  “In the Weimar constitution the federalist principle has been replaced by the 
30 Harold Gordon Jr., claimed that party preferences in Munich governed reactions to Bayern und Reich and 
the other Verbände.  The Middle Party tended to back off on full hearted endorsement of these 
organizations, while the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP) was much more enthusiastic in its support at first, 
though this waned in 1923, Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, 27-33.  Hans Fenske, on the other 
hand, portrayed a much more combative relationship between the two, one influenced heavily by ideology 
in which the Verbände frequently took up against the government, Hans Fenske, Konservatismus und 
Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern nach 1918, (Bad Homburg: Verlag Gehlen, 1969), 174-84. 
31 Hofberger, Bayern und Reich, 9, IfZ, Sk 337. 
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unitary one.”32  For Pittinger’s men, the Bismarckian constitution, which granted rights 
and privileges to the individual states was more satisfactory, a Reich filled with 
individual, semi-autonomous, states as had prevailed, at least for Bavaria, prior to 1914.33
Preparations for revising the Bavarian state constitution began in the spring of 
1923.
 
34  These changes were a result of a two factors.  One was the dynamics of party 
politics in Bavaria, where the governing coalition, particularly the Bavarian People’s 
Party, hoped to preserve local power.35  Another was the advocacy of the patriotic 
movement, particularly Bayern und Reich.  The ruling coalition parties, the Middle Party 
and the Bavarian People’s Party, promised Pittinger and other vaterländisch groups that 
they would introduce bills in the Diet to do away with parliamentary democracy, a major 
goal of Bayern und Reich.  However, these bills ended up delayed for one reason or 
another such as religious holidays and the opposition of smaller parties.  This created 
suspicion within the Bund as to the true intent of the government on this question, 
something noted quite clearly by the leadership.36
Bayern und Reich’s purpose in doing away with parliamentary democracy was 
first and foremost, to protect the federalist structure of the old Reich.  “The German 
national state is generally only possible in the concentration of the historically developed 
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33 Ibid. 
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German member states and on the basis of their political and cultural existence.”37  They 
believed that the Weimar Constitution was part and parcel of the old struggle of German 
nationalists to create a unitary state in opposition to the individual state.  It went against 
the will of the people as they saw it.  It also violated what they felt was the special 
character of Bavaria within the German Reich.  This compelled them to strive against any 
and all attempts by Berlin to expand its powers.38
Their fears in this area approached hysterical paranoia.  Pittinger and his men 
firmly believed that the national government was planning to take over Bavaria at any 
time.  In October 1923, as the political situation built towards the Beer Hall Putsch, the 
Bayern und Reich leadership reported that the government in Berlin “waits only for the 
opportunity to bring the Bavarian state of emergency, and the inconvenient man, to an 
end.”
 
39  To this end, it was reported, the Reich cabinet was preparing a law to allow them 
to circumvent local statutes in Munich.  Additionally, the army leadership in Berlin 
sought to impose new regulations on the Bavarian Reichswehr, which General von Epp 
(one of the originators of Freikorps in the state) saw as a reduction of the state’s rights.40
Bund Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues of Bavaria 
 
 Pittinger’s organization was certainly the largest of the Bavarian Wehrverbände, 
but not the only one devoted to helping create a patriotic utopia in the Freistaat.  There 
were seventy-three such entities in Bavaria in the early 1920s, some of which, like 
                                                     
37 Die Notwendigkeit der föderalistischen Revision der Weimarer Verfassung, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 29. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Führernachrichten, 12. October 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 24. 
40 Ibid. 
213 
 
Bayern und Reich, were paramilitary formations.41
 The solution was the creation of the Union of Patriotic Leagues of Bavaria, or 
Vereinigte Vaterländische Verbände Bayerns.  This organization itself was part of a 
much larger entity, the United Patriotic Leagues of Germany (Vereinigte Vaterländische 
Verbände Deutschlands), and the Bavarian group was nominally subservient to the 
leaders in Berlin, though it was the largest and most important of the provincial 
organizations.  The United Patriotic Leagues was organized in the summer of 1922 and 
was headed by Dr. Hermann Bauer, a man that Harold Gordon referred to as Theodore 
Roosevelt in reverse.
  Others, like the Pan-German League, 
were patriotic groups devoted to a certain ideological line.  Others, like the Nazi Party, 
were involved primarily in politics.  Patriotic groups grew exponentially in the wake of 
the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, but it also weakened the movement in the pursuit 
of its goals.  This situation would need to be overcome if the patriotic movement hoped 
to play any role in Bavarian, or German, politics and society. 
42  Composed of a wide diversity of patriotic societies, the group 
acted only with the consent of the leaders of the individual associations.  Thus Pittinger, 
as head of the organization’s major paramilitary, held great influence.43  It also 
potentially served the interests of the army leadership, who despaired over the need to 
bring all the paramilitary groups together in one entity.44
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42 Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, 92-3.  Bauer, according to Gordon, was a person with little real 
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 Numerous organizations were involved in the United Patriotic Leagues.  Some 
were political organizations like the Pan-German League.  Others were veteran groups 
like the National League of German Officers (Nationalverband deutscher Offiziere) and 
the Union of Bavarian Regimental Officers (Verband bayerische Offiziers-
Regimentsvereine).  Special interest associations, such as the Central union of German 
War Wounded (Zentralverband deutscher Kriegsbeschädigter), were also included in the 
organization.  The diversity of members led to the creation of nine different groupings to 
allow Bauer the ability to coordinate their activities more effectively.  Bund Bayern und 
Reich held a special place in the United Patriotic Leagues.  Not only was it the largest 
paramilitary organization, but by December 1924 it was the only one.45
 The primary activities of the United Patriotic Leagues were propaganda 
campaigns designed to win adherents to a patriotic point of view.  These were directed at 
the parties of the left during elections, or to argue against certain policies.
 
46  The purpose 
naturally was to get Germans to look at the post-war years as a time of defeat, weakness, 
and division; something that could only be rectified by adopting the posture and positions 
of the United Patriotic Leagues.47
 The German Day rallies had been organized by the German Racial Protection and 
Defiance League (Deutschvölkischer Schutz- und Trutzbund, or DVST) as an essential 
  Another key component of the group’s public relations 
strategy was to hold festivals to stress the nationalist point of view along with the unity of 
all the patriotic associations.  These were the German Day, or Deutscher Tag, 
celebrations. 
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celebration of German national consciousness.48  Initially all of the major associations 
were represented at German Day events, though by November 1923 the celebration came 
to be more identified with the more radical organizations around Hitler and the Nazis.  
The vast majority of German Days in Bavaria were held during 1923 as the situation in 
Germany deteriorated precipitously, and in known Social Democratic strongholds, which 
guaranteed a certain level of violence.49  The most violent altercation took place in 
Nuremberg, after the German Day, where clashes between radical nationalists and 
workers left one worker dead and two severely injured.50
As the leading group in the United Patriotic Leagues, Bayern und Reich played a 
large role in these celebrations.  Their leaders spoke at German Day events, and their men 
marched in the parades and demonstrations that usually accompanied them.  Pittinger’s 
men stressed unity when they appeared at the German Day.  One speaker proclaimed: 
“Yes but for our people today it does not involve the form of government at all, but the 
state itself, whose existence is at stake.  Reason enough, that all who think and feel 
racially close ranks together.  You have done that here in Kulmbach and that give the 
meeting its special meaning.”
 
51
                                                     
48 Kershaw, Hitler, 178. 
  The addresses given by BuR leaders tended to emphasize 
areas of common interest.  These included the struggle against the Treaty of Versailles, 
against the communist menace, but also against the depredations of international 
49 Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, 240.  
50 An die Staatsregierung des Freistaates Bayern, Betreff: Vorgänge anlässlich des Deutschen Tages in 
Nürnberg, 11. September 1923, BHSA, II, MA 100 411. 
51 Deutschvölkischer Tag – Kulmbach, 11. August 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 22. 
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capitalism, which was a common theme for more radical groups like the Nazi Party but 
played up by the Bayern und Reich speaker at Kulmbach.52
The proclamation of unity proclaimed by Bayern und Reich leaders usually 
masked very real differences between Pittinger’s group and other associations affiliated 
with the United Patriotic Societies.  These differences could not always be overcome.  
For instance the German Day in Bamberg in October 1923 was marked by a rather severe 
dispute between the representative of Bayern und Reich, von Xylander, and Hitler over 
ideological issues.  The primary issue was over whether to trust the leadership of future 
actions of the patriotic movement to Gustav von Kahr, who was then General State 
Commissioner and an almost unofficial dictator in Bavaria.  Pittinger’s organization and 
the United Patriotic Leagues supported Kahr unquestioningly, whereas Hitler, in his 
remarks, argued that the former Minister-President lacked the natural instinct of a 
politician and was no revolutionary.  The desire on the part of the more radical groups for 
a national revolution became another flashpoint amongst radical nationalists in the fall of 
1923.
 
53
Such disputes naturally masked other areas of contention.  One of these was 
religion.  At the Nuremberg German Day in September 1923 Kaplan Roth of Bund 
Bayern und Reich spoke at length about how religious faith, particularly Catholicism, 
undergirded the völkisch world view.  “Our savior model is Jesus, who came to the world 
not to bring peace, but to bring the sword.”
 
54
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  In the address Roth claimed that the true 
savior for Bavaria and the Reich was Jesus, who “knew and wanted for his people no 
53 Bamberger Tagung, BHSA, II, G.St.K. 100. 
54 Deutscher Tag Nürnberg 2. September 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 22. 
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neutrals; as he said: whoever is not for me, is against me.  Neutrality in serious things is 
weakness of spirit and character.”55  Though Bayern und Reich’s ideological program 
talked about traditional Christianity, Roth twisted it to serve völkisch purposes.  
“Christianity, also Catholicism, in no way makes Christians defenseless in racial matters.  
The words, the judgments, and destinies of the savior speak for our opinions against the 
Jews.”56
Bund Bayern und Reich, the Nazi Party, and the Widening Chasm of the Vaterländisch 
Movement 
 
The United Patriotic Leagues and the organizers of the German Day Rallys tried 
to paper over the differences between the former, including Bund Bayern und Reich, and 
Hitler and his Nazi Party.  However these were ever present and broke out into the open 
at the beginning of 1923.  The major differences between Hitler’s party and Pittinger’s 
paramilitary were based on the former’s rejection of the monarchical, federalist, and 
religious worldview of the latter.  The Nazi Party program, moreover, was revolutionary 
and modern.  The militancy with which Hitler and his followers pursued their goals 
caused a great deal of unrest within Bund Bayern und Reich, and gained him followers 
willing to help him.  They set up an alternate power center on the right that challenged 
the hegemony of Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues right up to the Beer 
Hall Putsch. 
The year following the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr had been an important 
one for Hitler and his party.  Having gained control of the Nazi Party as its preeminent 
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leader in July 1921, he spent the next year and half turning it into a power in Bavarian 
politics, and in the process began a process of self-transformation that turned the beer hall 
agitator into the Führer of the movement.57  A ceaseless agitator, Hitler was referred to 
as the ‘drummer’ in these years and often sought after as a speaker by other organizations 
on the political right in Bavaria.  Hitler spoke at a large rally in August 1922 organized 
by the United Patriotic Leagues and Bund Bayern und Reich, and quickly became a staple 
of the German Day Rallies that began to be held in Bavaria in late 1922.58  Hitler’s 
success at these events only fed the growing Führer cult, one that made him the last word 
in all party matters and which he believed made him the man of the moment in the 
patriotic movement.59
Hitler’s success in these venues was paralleled by the party’s entrance into 
paramilitary politics itself.  In November 1920 Hitler and other party leaders had set up 
their own paramilitary force.  Originally called the ‘Sport and Gymnastics’ department, it 
gradually evolved into the Sturmabteilung, or S.A. – more popularly referred to as the 
brownshirts or stormtroopers.  This paramilitary force was small, but began to grow after 
November 1921.
 
60
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  One consequence of the creation of the brownshirts was that it 
brought Hitler into contact with Captain Ernst Röhm, the Reichswehr’s weapons liaison 
officer.  Röhm introduced Hitler to several important people in the paramilitary 
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movement who were able to help the Nazi leader build up his force, though it did not 
become a factor in paramilitary scene in Bavaria till late 1922.61
The rapid rise of the Nazi Party, and its militant stance, caused numerous 
problems for Bund Bayern und Reich internally.  Beginning in late 1922 a number of 
local units left the organization.  Most departed for ideological reasons.  They simply no 
longer felt comfortable working towards Pittinger’s goals.  Some left because they found 
that Bayern und Reich was too constricted in its definition of itself and its work.  This 
development could especially be seen in the case of the district of Lower Bavaria 
(Niederbayern).  On February 8, 1923 this local unit resolved to leave Bund Bayern und 
Reich and form its own organization.  The reason for doing so was because the Lower 
Bavarian leadership wanted to share their weaponry with like minded paramilitaries, 
something that the state leadership prohibited.
 
62  Despite efforts to bring the local group 
back into the fold, the leadership and members held firm and on October 20, 1923 were 
recognized as an independent paramilitary unit.63
Another unit with which Bund Bayern und Reich had difficulties was Alfred 
Zeller’s United Leagues of Munich (Vaterländische Verbände Münchens).  This 
organization, which comprised the remnants of the old Einwohnerwehr in the city, was to 
join Pittinger’s group as a corporate body, but chose not to in January 1923 because they 
feared having their independent existence subsumed by Bayern und Reich.  At a meeting 
on January 5, 1923 the United Leagues, the remnants of the old Einwohnerwehr units in 
the capital, declared that their reason for not joining Pittinger’s association concerned 
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issues of organizational cohesion; they feared that some of the cells (Bezirke) in the city 
would no longer follow Zeller’s orders if they entered Bayern und Reich.  They also 
wanted to maintain control of their mobile units.64  The state leadership, despite their 
desire to see the United Leagues join as a body, was perfectly willing to let them keep 
their independence, rejecting the premise that local cells could control mobile units and 
warning of the competition that would result between the two groups for members.65
Hitler’s radicalism and success, coupled with the actions of local leaders like Heiß 
and Zeller, led to a split in the United Patriotic Leagues in January 1923.  The Nazi Party, 
Bund Oberland, Zeller’s VVM, and the Niederbayern group, among others helped to form 
the Working Group of Combat Leagues, or Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Kampfverbände.
 
66
                                                     
64 Schiedsspruch, 16. January 1923, IfZ, NSDAP Hauptarchiv, MA 144/6. 
  
This organization was dedicated to the type of radical revolution envisioned by Hitler and 
his counterparts in other groups like Oberland.  It was also more volatile than the United 
Patriotic Leagues.  There was frequent discord amongst the members, disputes that 
primarily concerned tactics.  This could clearly be seen in the Working Group’s only 
major event, the planned disruption of the May Day celebrations in 1923.  In the days 
leading up to the demonstration, several groups, particularly the VVM, resisted the 
violence planned by the leadership.  As a result, the disruption of worker’s parades did 
65 Abschrift des Vorstandes von Bund Bayern und Reich, ibid.  Harold Gordon believes that Captain Röhm 
and General Ludendorff might have influenced Zeller’s decision.  The VVM would continue to train as a 
paramilitary, but without assistance from the Reichswehr, Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, 92-4. 
66 Originally the Nazi Party had belonged to the United Patriotic Leagues, but left according to Hans 
Fenske, so that Hitler would be able to control his own fortunes, something that was not possible in the 
United Patriotic Leagues, Fenske, Konservatismus und Rechtsradikalismus, 185-7. 
221 
 
not go off as planned.  Several groups left the Working Group due to the bloodlust shown 
by the leadership in this instance.67
Helping to fan the flames of discord amongst patriotic organizations was Captain 
Ernst Röhm, who was the Reichswehr liaison officer to paramilitary groups like Bund 
Bayern und Reich.  In this capacity he provided illegal arms to radical nationalist groups, 
during 1922 to Pittinger almost exclusively.  Röhm had been a fixture in the patriotic 
movement since right after the war.  He helped establish and supply Escherich’s 
Einwohnerwehr, and was later involved with more shadowy organizations like the Black 
Reichswehr.  A combat veteran of the First World War, Röhm believed in decisive 
action.  By early 1923 he felt that the time was ripe for patriotic groups to strike against 
the government.
 
68
Röhm came to believe that paramilitary organizations like Bund Bayern und 
Reich, and its leader Pittinger, were incapable of carrying out a revolution against the 
political order.  For him the year 1922 had been a decisive turning point, one in which the 
patriotic movement failed to take full advantage.  In September of that year Röhm and 
Hitler planned a putsch against the government, the third attempted overthrow of the 
government in Munich since the fall of Kahr.  Like the others before it, this planned 
uprising was scuttled in no small part due to the efforts of Bayern und Reich leaders.  
Röhm accused them of spreading rumors about him and his circle, referring to them often 
as “psychopaths.”  The weapons needed for the putsch were never distributed.  Failure to 
 
                                                     
67 Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, 92-5 & 191-209, and Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 129-30 & 
142-3.  The failure to disrupt the May Day demonstrations in the main helped contribute further to the 
schism that already existed between Bund Bayern und Reich and the VVVB on the one hand, and the Nazi 
Party and their allies in the Kampfbund on the other, see Nußer, Konservative Wehrverbände, 238-9. 
68 Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 125-29.  Diehl argues that Röhm viewed himself as a political soldier, and 
this influenced his thinking in regards to organizations like Bayern und Reich, ibid. 
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move, in the captain’s view, was a failure of will and led to a decisive break between the 
captain and Pittinger in January of 1923.69
Röhm’s attack on the Bayern und Reich leader caused an open rupture in the 
patriotic movement, one that became increasingly bitter.  In his break with Pittinger 
Röhm made a number of charges.  One was that Pittinger divided the radical right by 
attacking its leading members, like General Ludendorff, while supporting less savory 
characters, like the United Patriotic League’s head Hermann Bauer.  Rather than work for 
unity, at a time when it was needed, Röhm claimed that Pittinger undermined figures like 
Hitler who worked tirelessly for the movement.  The Bayern und Reich leader was also 
accused of cowardice in the face of government pressure.  Röhm referred specifically to 
planned disturbances in Munich and the Chiemgau, each of which Pittinger called off due 
his inability to make a decision – in the case of the latter by questioning the patriotism of 
his own subordinates.  Finally, the captain accused the health inspector of hoarding 
weapons for his own purposes, rather than sharing them with other paramilitaries.  These 
facts convinced Röhm that Pittinger was incapable of bringing the paramilitary 
formations together to fight the internal and external enemy.
 
70
The person that Ernst Röhm increasingly saw as vital to reviving the fortunes of 
the patriotic groups was Adolf Hitler.  The Nazi leader had the necessary political skills 
to effectively struggle against the nationalist’s enemies on the left; he also had the will to 
do so.  The captain implied as much in the explanation he put forward in January 
regarding his split from Bayern und Reich.
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  Such a viewpoint was not unknown 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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amongst many right-wing Bavarians.  Pittinger was well aware of Röhm’s opinions.  In 
fact the Bayern und Reich leader argued that the timing of the discord between him and 
the Reichwehr’s liaison officer had as much to do with his attempt to create a power 
center on the right, as it did with his alleged cowardice, or the break between him and 
Escherich.  The increasing difficulties Pittinger and Bayern und Reich had with 
subordinate groups, like Zeller’s in Munich or Hofmann’s Bund Unterland, were heavily 
influenced by the captain and his machinations in regards to Hitler.72
The break between the two men was simply the beginning of the feud.  More 
allegations were made in the first half of 1923.  In these Röhm had an ally, General Erich 
Ludendorff.  The former army commander had taken refuge in Bavaria following the 
Kapp Putsch, and from his new home remained very much involved in radical nationalist 
politics.  At first this was a welcome development to many on the political right in 
Munich.  Ludendorff had numerous connections in Austria and Hungary, both of which 
were important to the patriotic movement.  Pittinger himself had worked closely with the 
general in regards to this, having traveled to Budapest on Ludendorff’s and Colonel 
Bauer’s behest to coordinate activities with right-wing elements there.
 
73  Ludendorff had 
also developed close connections with several key paramilitaries in Bavaria, most 
decisively Bund Oberland.74
Pittinger’s relationship to General Ludendorff was nearly as prickly as his 
relationship with Ernst Röhm.  Ludendorff did not care much for the federalist Germany 
idealized by the Pittinger and his group.  Thus he sought, early on, to undercut Bund 
 
                                                     
72 Stellungnahme des Sanitätsrat Dr. Pittinger zur Hauptmann Röhm’schen Schrift, ibid. 
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Bayern und Reich.  One memo, describing the general’s relationship to other patriotic 
groups, noted the close relationship that existed between Ludendorff and Captain Römer 
of Bund Oberland and made the allegation that the former quartermaster was behind the 
dispute between Pittinger and them.75  He also accused the Bayern und Reich leader of 
pursuing separatist politics in the 1921 trip to Austria and Hungary.  Major von 
Wandesleben, an associate of Ludendorff and Bauer’s claimed that the Sanitätsrat 
negotiated for the creation of a Bavarian-Austrian state that would be separate from the 
Reich itself.76  By February 1923 the relationship between the two men had grown so 
toxic that, at a meeting of nationalist organizations held in Klagenfurt, Austria, 
Ludendorff claimed that any Austrian organization that continued a relationship with 
Bayern und Reich could not in any way be tied to him.77
With Ludendorff in his corner, Röhm proceeded to make a number of claims 
against Pittinger in early 1923 designed to decrease the confidence army and political 
leaders had in the leader of Bayern und Reich.  Several of these had already been given 
voice in the memo of January 1923.  Pittinger was accused simultaneously of cowardice 
in the face of the government, lack of resolve in organizing a putsch, the use of weapons 
provided by the army to make other units bow to his will, and failing to unite, and 
provide leadership, to the other organizations of the patriotic movement.
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  To these 
Röhm added another – financial malfeasance.  The Reichswehr’s liaison officer accused 
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Pittinger of misappropriating funds to the tune of fifty million Reichsmarks in February 
1923.79
During 1922 army leaders, along with politicians like Gustav von Kahr, had been 
trying to find ways to maintain a secret weapons cache in contravention of the Versailles 
Treaty and numerous other agreements of the Allied Control Commission.  Bavarian 
leaders feared using government funds so soon after the dissolution of the 
Einwohnerwehr.  At an October 1922 meeting attended by General von Epp, Kahr, Dr. 
Pittinger, and ministerial counsel Dr. Roth it was decided that money for these weapons 
should come from business and industrial concerns in Bavaria.  Dr. Kuhlo, acting as a 
representative for a consortium of German industrialists, apparently gave the Bayern und 
Reich leader nearly fifty million Reichsmarks to purchase weapons for use by patriotic 
groups.  As the liaison officer responsible for obtaining and maintaining the weapons 
cache, Röhm claimed that the weapons were never purchased, nor that he saw any of the 
money himself.
 
80
Röhm’s accusations were serious enough to warrant a military investigation.  
General Franz Ritter von Epp, a figure intimately involved with many of the paramilitary 
groups of the period, presided over the inquiry.  Epp’s query went far afield.  He 
interviewed, most naturally, Röhm, Ludendorff, Kuhlo, and Dr. Roth.
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  Over the course 
of the investigation several things became clear.  One, despite the representations of Dr. 
Roth and Captain Röhm, the sum of fifty million Reichsmarks was never doled out to 
80 Ibid. 
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Pittinger or any of his men.  The testimonies of both men were undercut by that of Dr. 
Kuhlo, who claimed to have never dispensed money on the part of industrialists to Bund 
Bayern und Reich.  The rumor, as he saw it, came from someone within industrial circles 
who misrepresented a statement from someone close to Pittinger.82  Two, it became clear 
that whatever money had been transferred from industrialists to patriotic organizations 
went to the Working Group set up by Röhm, Hitler, Lenz, and Hofmann in January 1923.  
According to Kuhlo, the address given for Bund Bayern und Reich’s headquarters was the 
same as for the Working Group’s.83  Three, Ministerial Councilor Roth appeared to 
misrepresent his testimony, both about the October meeting and the claim that Pittinger 
received the money.84  Part of the reason for Roth’s mendacity stemmed from reports that 
he was closely tied to Zeller, Hofmann, and the rest of the Working Group.85
Having cleared his name in the financial charges, Pittinger struck back at Röhm, 
asking the Bavarian Reichswehr to remove the captain from his responsibilities as the 
liaison officer for the patriotic paramilitaries.  The Bayern und Reich leader’s request led 
to the convening of a special commission to investigate the entire feud to see if Röhm had 
made an honest break with Pittinger, whether he had slandered the man as a coward, and 
his fitness to serve as weapons officer.  The conclusions drawn by the commission 
exonerated Röhm in many ways, making it difficult for the army to comply with 
Pittinger’s request for his removal.  They did however, manage to extract a retraction of 
the cowardice remarks that the captain had made in reference to the Bayern und Reich 
  Epp’s 
findings brought the charges of financial malfeasance to an end. 
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leader.  The findings of the commission were accepted by Röhm, Pittinger, and the head 
of the Bavarian Reichswehr, General Otto von Lossow.86
The length of the Röhm-Pittinger feud, which lasted for much of 1923, had helped 
bring about and exacerbate the split in the patriotic movement epitomized in the creation 
of the Working Group.  On September 17, 1923 the intransigence of the radical circles 
around Röhm calcified further with the creation of the Fighting League, or Kampfbund.  
This new organization was an umbrella group consisting of Bund Oberland, Captain 
Adolf Heiss’s Reichsflagge, and the SA of the Nazi Party.  The organization had a three 
headed directory of Heiss, Dr. Friedrich Weber of Bund Oberland, and Adolf Hitler, who 
quickly rose to the position of political leader within the group.
 
87  As Harold Gordon 
noted, the creation of the Fighting League reflected the increased power of Hitler in the 
patriotic movement, something that was reinforced by the fact that the SA and not the 
Nazi Party as a whole belonged to the organization.  The Fighting League was radical 
völkisch in its ideology and totally committed to revolutionary violence, making it 
difficult for the United Patriotic Leagues or Bund Bayern und Reich to work with it.88
By May 1923 Bund Bayern und Reich was the preeminent paramilitary 
organization in Bavaria, but found itself increasingly under siege.  Using its contacts with 
the Bavarian Reichswehr, Pittinger’s organization undertook activities designed to 
maintain the conservative order in Bavaria even as they planned to overturn democracy.  
To that end the group became a leading voice in the United Patriotic Leagues, an 
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umbrella association designed to serve as a rallying point for the patriotic movement.  
However, the rapid growth of the Nazi Party in 1922 created challenges for Pittinger and 
his men.  Hitler’s radicalism and increasing popularity carved out space on the 
revolutionary right for himself and his party.  Their success began to cause problems for 
Pittinger and the leadership of Bayern und Reich.  Local units fell away, the 
organization’s leader was involved in a dispute with Ernst Röhm and General Erich 
Ludendorff that encompassed the first half of 1923, and Hitler set up two organizations, 
the Working Group and the Fighting League, designed to foment revolution, and setting 
the stage for the Beer Hall Putsch. 
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Chapter 9 
The Constraints of Independence – Bund Bayern und Reich, the Beer Hall Putsch, and its 
Aftermath 
 The opportunity for patriotic (vaterländisch) organizations like Bund Bayern und 
Reich to overthrow democracy was probably never better than in November 1923.  A 
year of international strife and economic collapse had left the Weimar Republic with few 
defenders.  The belief that the time was at hand galvanized and radicalized the patriotic 
movement, pushing its various parties, associations, and paramilitaries towards action.  
However differences amongst the different groups made a coordinated uprising 
impossible and insured that, when it did happen, it was marked by confusion and delay. 
 Bund Bayern und Reich’s role in the Beer Hall Putsch was marginal at best, and 
this reflected the limits of its brand of paramilitary politics.  Dedicated to the overthrow 
of Weimar democracy and revocation of the Treaty of Versailles, Pittinger’s men found 
themselves hampered in their pursuit of their goals by the close relationship they had with 
the Bavarian Reichswehr.  When that body was for the overthrow of the government, they 
were just as prepared to march on Berlin as the Nazis were.  When the army backed off, 
Bund Bayern und Reich stood down.  The ramifications of that act would affect the 
organization for years to come.  
Bund Bayern und Reich and the Beer Hall Putsch 
 The events of the Beer Hall Putsch of November 8 & 9, 1923 capped off a year of 
strife for the patriotic movement and Bund Bayern und Reich.  Having found its own 
agenda increasingly surpassed by the revolutionary program of Hitler and the 
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organizations of the Fighting League, Pittinger’s group would play a rather interesting 
role in the events of those two days.  Committed to some type of action, Bavaria’s largest 
paramilitary group nevertheless remained loyal to Gustav von Kahr, who had been a 
patron to the patriotic movement, and to the army, from whom their prominence amongst 
the paramilitaries was owed.  They did so despite discontent among local units that felt 
that the time was right to move against the government and many of whose members 
were attracted to the revolutionary ideals of Hitler. 
 The prelude to the abortive coup saw an increase in radicalism by the 
organizations of the Working Group during the spring of 1923.  In particular they 
agitated against the Law for the Protection of the Republic and planned to disrupt the 
traditional May Day celebrations in Munich.  They were very open about their intent and 
goals and one result of their radicalism was that it alerted the Bavarian government to the 
very real danger posed by Hitler and his allies.  Accommodation to their demands was 
out of the question for the Knilling cabinet.1  Additionally, authorities were seriously 
undercut by other paramilitaries, particularly Bund Bayern und Reich, who hoped to push 
their ideological program but were unwilling to go the route that Hitler intended to take.  
Pittinger’s exhortations on the constitutional question was just one example of the 
pressure that reduced the government’s “room to maneuver,” and forced Knilling to walk 
a tight rope between the two camps.2
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 Such a balancing act became more difficult over the course of the summer as the 
government had to deal with numerous protests by the Nazis, who used the economic 
distress of the summer and autumn months as an excuse for demonstrations.  These were 
difficult to put down or keep quiet despite the best efforts of the Bavarian government to 
hush up such activity.3  They also tended to become violent as the Nazi Stormtroopers 
were just as willing to attack police and security forces as they were communists.  One 
such event occurred on July 14, 1923 where a demonstration on Arnulfstrasse by the 
Nazis was violently broken up by police.  One eyewitness to the event swore that the 
police charged the demonstrators with swords and rubber truncheons, though this was 
preceded by the virulence of the protestors who moved to within fifty meters of police, 
who had cordoned off the post office.4
 The government’s response to such provocations was increasingly to crack down 
on civil disturbance from both the left and the right.  Police and prosecutors were 
instructed to undertake any and all measure to preserve security and order.  However, 
even as they ordered such measures the cabinet continued to undercut their efforts against 
Hitler and the Fighting League.  They refused to move against the German Days 
organized by the patriotic movement in communities throughout Bavaria.  These had 
increased throughout the year and became increasingly marked by its strident overtones.  
Nevertheless the Interior Ministry continued to be more concerned with the actions of the 
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communists, who had organized their own paramilitary organization – the Communist 
One Hundreds – to take advantage of the chaos of the Ruhr Crisis.5
 Unwilling to move against the more radical elements of the patriotic movement, 
the government in Munich decided to turn to a man who had an intimate working 
relationship with them, Gustav von Kahr.  After leaving the post of Minister-President in 
1921 Kahr returned to his previous position of provincial governor of Upper Bavaria.  
From there he continued to be heavily involved in right-wing politics and the 
paramilitaries.  Kahr was involved with many of the coups planned in Bavaria in 1921 
and 1922, and he remained close to the leaders, such as Pittinger and General von Möhl, 
who were prepared to carry these out.
 
6  As a result of these connections Kahr was 
recalled to the government on September 26, 1923, but this time in the post of General 
State Commissioner (Generalstaatskommisar).  In this post, the former Minister-
President was given virtual dictatorial powers in Bavaria.7
The reaction of the working class and their Social Democratic allies to Kahr’s 
appointment was to prepare for action to defend the republic, which they were convinced 
was now under attack.  Many workers and socialist organizations in Bavaria formed 
councils in response to protest, according to one pamphlet, the increasing treason of 
patriotic organizations against the republic and its leaders.
 
8
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  Naturally Pittinger’s men 
claimed that it was the worker’s councils that intended revolution and the government 
agreed with them.  The fear and paranoia over a potential communist insurrection had 
6 Von Kahr zu Lerchenfeld: Der zweite bayerische Rechtsputsch mißlungen, (Munich: Verlag des 
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grown so acute amongst official circles that the government felt that the only way they 
could deal with the situation was by increasing their cooperation with organizations like 
Bayern und Reich.9
 The elevation of Kahr, however, was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm by 
Bund Bayern und Reich and the other organizations of the United Patriotic Leagues.
 
10  
They saw in the creation of the position of General State Commissioner the beginning of 
the end of the republic.  All during the summer of 1923 Pittinger and his men had been 
advocating for the creation of a dictatorship as a way to restore the old Bismarckian 
constitution.  They favored a “return to Kahr” as the means by which to achieve their 
goals.11  Both Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues pledged to do their 
utmost to help the new General State Commissioner achieve these objectives and to deal 
with the crises that they saw enveloping both Germany and Bavaria.12
 Upon assuming office Kahr made efforts to unite the vaterländisch movement 
around his person.  One of the means by which he did this was to suspend the Law for the 
Protection of the Republic that was so hated by all the paramilitaries.  He also pardoned 
the leader of the Reichsflagge, Captain Adolf Heiss, who had been under arrest at the 
orders of the Berlin government.
 
13  These measures seemed to have a rejuvenating 
influence amongst many of the patriotic organizations.  Though Kahr was attacked by the 
Fighting League in the pages of the Nazi paper Völkischer Beobachter,14
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organizations that had been a part of the defunct Working Group pledged support to the 
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General State Commissioner.  For instance, the Blücherbund decided to throw its support 
to Kahr because not to do so threatened the “peaceful and vigorous development of the 
patriotic movement,” and was the only way to affect a “German racial revolution.”15
 The coming together of the patriotic groups was facilitated, in no small part, by a 
renewal of the strife between Kahr and Berlin that had begun with the dispute over the 
old Einwohnerwehr.  This new conflict began with a ban on the Völkischer Beobachter 
by the Reich government.  The paper had printed a derogatory article against General von 
Seeckt, the leader of the Reichswehr, and his wife, claiming that she was Jewish.  The 
Berlin cabinet, whose negative reaction to Kahr’s appointment led them appoint a 
“dictator” of their own, used the incident as a means of undercutting the new Bavarian 
leader.  In the crisis they also tried to make use of the army, ordering the head of the 
Bavarian military district, Otto von Lossow, to carry out the ban.  These were to no avail, 
as the Bavarian “dictator” simply ordered Lossow, who reported to both men in the case 
of emergencies – which both states were now officially under – to ignore orders coming 
from Berlin.  This move led to his removal from the post by national authorities, though 
he was ordered to stay in the position by Kahr and the cabinet.  Even though the crisis 
was eventually resolved by late October,
 
16 the conflict poisoned federal relations, and 
further led to calls for a takeover of the Reich government by forces on the right – forces 
that now believed a takeover of Bavaria by Berlin would come any day.17
 Pittinger and the leadership of Bund Bayern und Reich worked hard to rally all 
patriotic organizations to the General State Commissioner because they believed that a 
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takeover, or Reichsexecution, would come via the army and were confident that Lossow 
and Bavarian troops would stand with them thus bringing about a final reckoning with the 
republic.18  Their efforts naturally began within their own group.  Many local units had 
expressed dissension throughout the year 1923 with the direction of the organization.  
With the agitation of Hitler and his circle it was unknown how some of the local units 
would react.  Luckily for Pittinger, most local units stood foursquare behind Kahr.  
Throughout October many units of Bund Bayern und Reich pledged their loyalty to him 
and the Bavarian leadership.19  In one example the local leadership of Schiltberg bei 
Aichbach greeted the creation of a national unity front amongst all paramilitaries and 
promised to work against anyone who tried to disrupt Kahr’s political goals.20  Other 
units followed with similar declarations.21
 The full unity of purpose that Pittinger and Kahr hoped for amongst the 
vaterländisch groups failed to materialize however.  For many of the organizations 
affiliated with Hitler in the Fighting League, as they took stock of the situation in the fall 
of 1923, they came to believe that a dictatorship headed by the Nazi leader was preferable 
to one headed by Kahr.  In an anonymous memo distributed by the leadership of 
Wikingbund, one of the successor groups to the Einwohnerwehr and one of the most 
radical, they spelled out precisely what a dictatorship by the state commissioner would 
look like.  “As mentioned above the dictatorship of Kahr in reality has sprung not from 
strength, but from weakness. … This development involves both for the dictator Kahr 
and for the farther future considerable dangers.  If the present exponent of the 
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dictatorship does not do justice to the hopes of nationally active circles, then he will fall 
just as quickly as he came and the civil war follows after him.”22  However, a dictatorship 
led by Hitler promised to fulfill the goals of national/racial solidarity, antisemitism, and 
national activism that the author found appealing.23
The result was that the Fighting League worked feverishly to undercut Kahr.  
However, this was not without its dangers, as there were pressures exerted upon Hitler to 
stand behind the General State Commissioner.  Harold Gordon described the two camps 
as tomcats that warily eyed one another upon first encounter.  Each made conciliatory 
gestures but did nothing to strike a killing blow.
 
24  An example of the virulence of their 
attacks can be seen in the German Day celebration held in Bamberg in October 1923.  At 
the meeting the representative of Bayern und Reich, von Xylander, made an impassioned 
speech defending the course of action set by Kahr and appealing for unity.  This was 
rejected by Hitler and his associates with laughter, sneers, and speeches where the 
General State Commissioner was attacked as a man of the past.  “But apart from that in 
the history of all the revolutions, that never could a man from the old system master it, 
only a revolutionary.”25
In the eyes of the Fighting League Kahr was the worst possible person to lead 
Bavarian resistance against Berlin.  They believed that the national government would 
come at Munich with the strongest possible measures, and that the “dictator of Bavaria” 
would wilt under the pressure.  In their view ample evidence existed that Kahr lacked the 
necessary resolve.  At the Bamberg meeting, Hitler and Weber complained that the 
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General State Commissioner seemed more concerned with disrupting the activities of the 
Fighting League than preparing for a showdown with the “socialist” government.  Kahr 
used police powers to disrupt the meetings of the Fighting League, fourteen of which 
were planned for October 1923 alone.26  In the eyes of leaders like Ludendorff and 
Röhm, this was only the continuation of what they saw as harassment by the Knilling 
Cabinet, who had been banning people from attending Nazi meetings since the summer.27  
With the workers of Bavaria stirred up by their leaders into calling workers councils upon 
news of Kahr’s appointment,28 Hitler and his associates argued that it was no time for 
weakness on the part of patriotic organizations or their allies.29
Kahr, and his allies in Bund Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues, 
were just as interested in undercutting Hitler and his allies.  The banned meetings of the 
Fighting Leagues were just the beginning of this process.  Pittinger and his associates 
prepared a propaganda campaign in October 1923 about the current political climate that 
was to be sent to other German Länder, but made sure that the message remained in the 
hands of the United Patriotic Leagues and Pittinger.  A letter sent to the Bayern und 
Reich leadership on October 23, 1923 showed the importance of controlling the message.  
Local leaders in the town of Ehingen in Württemberg requested that propaganda material 
be sent there with the hope that this would move the local populace into the patriotic (as 
defined by Kahr and Bayern und Reich) camp.  The request had been induced by a Hitler 
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speech, and the materials would help not only in reinforcing the message, but ensuring 
that the enthusiasm of the people in the town was channeled correctly.30
The back and forth between Kahr and his allies and the Fighting League took 
place in the context of the rapidly deteriorating situation, both economic and political, in 
Germany during the fall of 1923.  The collapse of the German Reichsmark, following the 
Berlin government’s disastrous response to the French occupation of the Ruhr Valley, 
had destroyed the life savings of many in the middle class.  The economic desperation, 
and the feelings of political impotence it engendered, led many Germans to call for the 
abandonment of parliamentary democracy.  Kahr, already an unwelcome figure to the 
republic’s democratic leaders, was deep in negotiation with General von Seeckt of the 
Reichswehr and the leaders of northern associations like the Stahlhelm to put pressure on 
the Reich government to step aside in favor of a directorate or military dictatorship.  This 
was the expected coup that many on the right had favored, including the leaders of Bund 
Bayern und Reich and with the backing of the army seemed to be within reach.  All that 
was needed was a broad based-backing for such a move in the north and in Bavaria.
 
31
Such support unfortunately did not come.  In the north of Germany the crowd 
around Seeckt did not have the prestige necessary to carry out a putsch, and the general 
himself seemed unwilling to go along with anything illegal.  The dissolution of the 
republic, were it to take place, had to be done legally, according to him.  The patriotic 
 
                                                     
30 Abschnitt Jung an die Leitung des Bundes Bayern und Reich, 28. October 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 29.  
One of the questions put forward in the letter was who would run the campaign.  The anonymous author 
seemed interested in having propaganda distributed by the Nuremberg Reichsflagge, an organization that 
had been a part of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft and the Kampfbund, but had fallen out with Hitler over the 
appointment of Kahr as Generalstaatskommissar, ibid.  See also, Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, 
221-2. 
31 Ibid, 238-69.  See also, Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 148-50. 
239 
 
groups were just as wary of the situation, though it seemed to give them the opportunity 
to achieve the major goals.  The hang up for Bayern und Reich was Seeckt himself.  In 
the eyes of the leadership a coup and new government led by the general would do 
nothing to resolve the “national-völkisch” question that was the organization’s major 
goal.  Moreover, Seeckt was the one responsible for the Lossow affair and had prepared 
the Reichswehr outside of Bavaria to march against the state if necessary.  Thus they had 
grave misgivings about the general, even as they continued to support Kahr and his 
negotiations with the army leader’s circle.32
Despite their misgivings, Bund Bayern und Reich continued to prepare for action 
right up until a few days before the Beer Hall Putsch.  During October plans were put in 
place to secure Bavaria in the case of a move against either the government in Munich or 
a national coup in Berlin.  Of particular concern for Kahr and Pittinger was the danger 
posed by Bavarian communists.  These needed to be neutralized to secure the state and 
many of their plans dealt with this issue.  The local leader in Füssen reported to the chief 
of the Bavarian state police (Landespolizei), Colonel Hans von Seisser, on the 
deteriorating situation in the Allgäu region and the need to move against both 
communists and social democrats there.  In this instance, a reported influx of communists 
and a lack of resolve by local authorities led to a request by the community leader to 
request for one hundred men of the state police to supplement the two companies of 
Bayern und Reich already there.
 
33
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 Pittinger’s organization, however, did not take part in the Beer Hall Putsch.  This 
was a result of the relationship of his organization to the Reichswehr.  Despite being an 
independent group in terms of funding and its political activities, Bund Bayern und Reich 
depended to a much greater degree on the army to carry out its mission both politically 
and militarily.  The army provided arms, training, and perhaps most importantly prestige.  
Bayern und Reich was the largest of the paramilitaries and one that the army leadership 
dealt with almost exclusively.  Despite Röhm’s challenge to this state of affairs, the 
relationship between the two organizations remained close up to, and beyond, November 
1923.  This arrangement stood in contradistinction to the relationship the Einwohnerwehr 
had to both the army and the state.  In that case, Escherich’s association, though 
essentially semi-official in nature due to having been formed and funded by government 
and military officials, was practically independent in how it operated.  This freedom 
made the Einwohnerwehr a force in Bavarian politics, something that Bund Bayern und 
Reich never fully was. 
 The dependency of Pittinger’s group on the military and political elite for 
guidance effectively constrained Bayern und Reich in the events that followed in a way 
that it did not with Hitler and the Fighting League.  Whereas the latter went ahead with its 
own plans for a putsch upon the foundering of Kahr’s negotiations with rightist circles in 
Berlin, the former saluted smartly and continued to support the General State 
Commissioner.  Just two days before the Putsch the triumvirate of Kahr, Lossow, and 
Seisser met with all of the patriotic paramilitary groups, including both Bayern und Reich 
and the Fighting League.  In that meeting the political and military leaders made it clear 
that any plans for a coup, whether planned in support of events in Berlin, or undertaken in 
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Munich, would be opposed by the Bavarian military and the state police.34  A report by 
the leader of the Chiemgau leader of Bayern und Reich summed up the disappointment of 
the membership and their determination to carry on.  “With heavy hearts we withdraw all 
of our orders.  It succeeded in defiance of initially difficult dysphoria.”35
 The putsch itself provides the clearest indication of Bayern und Reich’s 
dependency upon political and military elites.  Upon hearing of Hitler’s actions at the 
Bürgerbräukeller, Dr. Pittinger phoned Kahr’s office to confirm what he had been told.  
At first officials there did not have any real information about the events surrounding the 
meeting, as the hall was not accessible.  Later, Kahr was told that it looked very much 
like a putsch.  Pittinger insisted that the units in the Chiemgau be put on alert.  However 
officials at Kahr’s office informed the Bayern und Reich leader that the phones were 
down there.  Upon hearing the news Pittinger personally took an army car down to 
Rosenheim to organize the units in support of the government, reporting back to Kahr’s 
office in Munich on his progress.
 
36
 The trip to the Chiemgau has remained somewhat shrouded in mystery, 
particularly as it relates to Pittinger’s motives.
 
37
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  It is clear though, that Pittinger 
continued to throw his lot in with Kahr.  At Aibling Pittinger instructed the local unit to 
follow only those orders that came from the General State Commissioner.  He issued 
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Kahr’s position vis-à-vis the putsch.38  This becomes even clearer when one reads the 
directive from Pittinger to Merz, the state’s councilor in Aibling.  In it he ordered 
roadblocks designed to stop the putschists from reinforcing their compatriots in Munich.  
Despite this, however, it was clear that Pittinger and his men approved of the dissolution 
of the government, regardless of the circumstances in which it occurred.  The placards 
proclaiming the new national government of Kahr, Hitler, and Ludendorff were 
distributed by the Pittinger’s men in Aibling, and these gave the impression that Bayern 
und Reich approved of the dissolution of the Diet and cabinet.39
 Mixed messages seemed to be the order of the day for Pittinger, for not every unit 
in Bund Bayern und Reich was informed of events or put on alert, and those that were 
sometimes found themselves with conflicting orders.  The Chiemgau regiment that 
Pittinger had mobilized was distressed by the lack of information given to them by the 
Bayern und Reich leader, and unsure of their vague orders.  These included massing in 
Rosenheim to be prepared to march, but no word was given as to the goal.  By the end of 
the day of November 9 the numbers mobilized reached three thousand men, leading to 
problems of housing and feeding such a force, and this led to disillusionment.
  
40
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Additionally the local unit in Pfaffenhofen was not informed by the leadership of the 
happenings in the Bürgerbräukeller until the next day.  According to local officials, they 
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had no real information, beyond rumors, of the events in Munich until news reached them 
that the putsch had been put down.41
 Their distress led to outright resentment at the leadership of Bayern und Reich, 
and indeed the political elite in Bavaria, in the days after the putsch.  Regional leaders in 
the Chiemgau reported that, two weeks later, much of the rank and file had expressed 
unhappiness with the way they had been led during the Putsch.  For the most part this 
anger was directed at the members of the Bavarian People’s Party in the region.
  
42  
However, a fair amount was directed at the General State Commissioner.  Kahr, in the 
minds of many local units, had missed a golden opportunity to overturn parliamentary 
democracy in Bavaria, if nowhere else.43  “One expected a dictator and not a General 
State Commissioner, i.e. one is ill-humored, that the government is still visible as such.  
One encounters on that score so many harsh judgements, to a certain degree exasperation 
against the government that one is affected by.”44  For many members on the local level 
Kahr had simply not kept his word.  For this he was called a “traitor” and a “knave.”45
 The lack of action on the part of the General State Commissioner during the 
Putsch itself only explains part of the anger amongst the membership.  Another was the 
demand for loyalty amongst the remainder of the patriotic organizations, including those 
that had not participated in the coup at all.  On November 10 Kahr’s office in Munich 
sent out a memo where it demanded that, to regain public confidence, the organizations 
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of the United Patriotic Leagues provide explanations of their opinions on the Putsch, their 
political views, and pledge their support for the current government.46  On this score the 
Bayern und Reich leadership was very prompt in their response.  They claimed that the 
group stood behind Kahr one hundred percent, and blamed Hitler for the events of 
November 8 and 9, saying that he had broken his promise not to move against the 
General State Commissioner.47  Pittinger’s rapid response was seconded by the military 
leadership of Bayern und Reich which, while supporting Kahr and laying the blame at the 
feet of the Nazi leader, pointed out that the former Minister-president had the backing of 
both the Bavarian Reichswehr and the state police, making it necessary to back the stance 
adopted by Pittinger and Kahr.48
 Such reinforcement from the paramilitary’s leadership had some effect on local 
units, though there continued to be some discordant notes.  Some units registered their 
support for Kahr straight away.  The leaders of Jura-Maingau stated that standing behind 
the General State Comissioner presented Bayern und Reich the opportunity to prove that 
they were the proper instrument in his quest to overturn parliamentary democracy.
 
49  
Other units pledged support, but hoped for amnesty for lower level putschists, or leniency 
for their organizations.  The local unit in Bad Kissingen insisted on saying that they only 
did what they thought would best serve the fatherland.50
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  The district leader of 
Staffelstein stressed this too, writing, “Therefore we sincerely request (Kahr), to lift the 
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ban on the national leagues ‘National Socialists, Oberland, Reichskriegsflagge,’ in order 
to allow the collaboration of these organizations with us again, to let judicial proceedings 
against persons connected to the Hitler Putsch be suspended and at best to grant the 
convicted amnesty.”51
 Other units took the opportunity to use Pittinger’s lack of leadership, and the 
leadership’s stance after the putsch to make a case for more thorough reforms of Bund 
Bayern und Reich.  The leader in Oberfranken wrote to Pittinger two days after the failed 
coup and argued that much of the success of the Kampfbund was due to failure on the 
part of local leadership in Bayern und Reich.  He noted that many men in positions of 
authority were not well versed in the ideological underpinnings of the paramilitary.  
These had been sacrificed, he believed, to the needs of military efficiency and political 
expediency.  The regional leader also argued that the Bayern und Reich leadership had 
sacrificed traditional ideas of military organization and justice, for a top down system 
weighted too heavily in favor of the leadership.  To prevent a revival of either the Nazis 
or the Fighting League, which he believed was a malevolent force in Bavarian politics, 
the local leader suggested more rigid discipline and adherence to the program and the 
traditional military code.
 
52
The actions of Bund Bayern und Reich during the Beer Hall Putsch, while 
controversial amongst the membership, did bring benefits to the organization.  One of 
these was a renewal of its preeminent position within the patriotic movement.  In a 
statement released after the coup ended, Kahr made special note of the loyalty of 
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Pittinger’s association.  In the same proclamation the General State Comissioner banned 
those organizations that had participated in the coup.  Naturally this included the Nazi 
Party, but also Bund Oberland and Ernst Röhm’s Reichskriegsflagge.53  The prohibition 
on these groups meant that many of their former members could now join other 
paramilitaries, including Bayern und Reich, which were not under the ban.  This process 
began in earnest in the weeks following the abortive coup.  In the Chiemgau, for 
example, many Nazi Party members joined Bund Bayern und Reich following the failure 
of the Putsch.  There they joined the organization’s third battalion led by a man named 
Jäger, who already had shown his displeasure with the health inspector’s leadership, a 
sentiment shared by his men.  Their main reason in switching allegiances, as an Interior 
Ministry memo stated, was to continue to agitate until such time as the prohibition was 
lifted.54
 The renewed prominence of Bayern und Reich was matched by the growing list of 
paramilitaries that fell into disfavor with the Bavarian government, or with Kahr himself.  
In late 1923 and early 1924 many sister organizations within the United Patriotic Leagues 
also came under the government ban.  One reason for this was the stance taken by these 
groups following the Beer Hall Putsch.  On November 10 a number of paramilitaries, 
Blücherbund, Reichsflagge, and Bund Wiking among others, penned an open letter to the 
General State Commissioner which, while supportive, cast aspersions on his willingness 
to fight for the goals of the patriotic movement.  In particular they questioned if he would 
ban socialist organizations as he had the Nazi Party, or declare the Weimar constitution 
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null and void.55  Such opinions led to increasingly difficult relations, if not outright 
prohibition for several groups.  Bund Wiking, which had belonged to the Working Group 
at the beginning of 1923, found itself under investigation by the Bavarian government at 
the insistence of the cabinet in Berlin,56 while the government considered banning other 
groups, like Jungdeutscher Orden, in localities where they had caused particular 
problems.57
 The decision to stand by Kahr in the aftermath of the putsch became increasingly 
more tenuous for the leadership of Bayern und Reich.  Rumors swirled about the General 
State Commissioner’s relationship to the Putschists and his real intentions.  Many of 
these rumors came from patriotic organizations themselves.  A police report from 
Ingolstadt noted that placards began appearing on city streets after November 14 that 
detailed Kahr’s infamy.
 
58  Titled, “Who has broken his word?  Kahr!,” the posters 
claimed that, rather than objecting to the putsch and working hard to defeat it after being 
freed, the General State Commissioner, along with Lossow and Seisser, continued to 
entertain the idea of a coup.  As late as 11 p.m. one of the major conspirators, Ernst 
Pöhner, was with Kahr.  The anonymous authors claimed that it was only after a 3 a.m. 
meeting with Cardinal Faulhaber, the archbishop of Munich-Freising, that Pöhner was 
arrested and energetic action against the putsch began.  This made Kahr a traitor in their 
eyes.  “Remember these four dates of the second November betrayal!”59
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February 1924,60 a move that the Bayern und Reich leadership believed was only done to 
appease the “members of the völkisch parties.”61
The Long Term Consequences of the Putsch for Bund Bayern und Reich, 1924-1928 
 
 The four years that followed the Beer Hall Putsch were ones that saw further 
changes to the structure of Bund Bayern und Reich, but also decline.  Pittinger’s 
organization found it increasingly difficult to operate as a paramilitary association after 
1924, and slowly began to evolve into a more traditional political organization.  At the 
same time the process by which the group saw its position on the right further eroded to 
the more revolutionary voices on the right associated with Hitler and his Nazi Party 
continued unabated. 
 One thing that became increasingly clear to the government in Munich in the 
aftermath of the putsch was that its reliance on private patriotic associations for security 
had become burdensome.  Public safety had not been served in November 1923 and this 
needed to depend on more stable foundations.  In early 1924 members of the Bavarian 
People’s Party managed to persuade the government to create an emergency force called 
Notbann.  This organization was conceived as public paramilitary dependent upon the 
state for its support, and which would direct itself against both the right and the left.  For 
the Knilling cabinet this was the group’s greatest virtue.  “A paramilitary free from 
politics.  At last ‘duty’ includes the duty, to make themselves available unconditionally at 
each call up of the state government against a domestic threat.”62
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von Epp, a major figure in the creation of many patriotic paramilitaries became the 
formation’s first leader.63
 Bund Bayern und Reich welcomed the creation of the Notbann, though they were 
concerned with certain aspects of the new formation.  They were pleased with the fact 
that they had a working relationship with the appointed leader of the group.  They were 
also delighted that members of their organization could join.  However, Pittinger and the 
leadership had several nagging questions.  One concerned the relationship of Bayern und 
Reich to the Reichswehr.  The creation of a new paramilitary force implied that the 
special relationship between the two organizations was null and void.  A second concern 
was over the stipulation that members of the Notbann be completely free from politics.  
Members of Pittinger’s group could join the new formation, but had to leave their politics 
at the door.  The leadership believed that the work of its members in the new association 
should not preclude their work for Bayern und Reich.  Finally, they expressed concern 
that Epp’s new entity seemed to preclude the purely paramilitary functions of Pittinger’s 
units, and they hoped that these could continue as much as possible.
 
64  Despite such 
misgivings they pledged their full support, even defending the new organization as vital 
to skeptics like General von Lossow.65
 The Notbann became a prime example of how bitterly the patriotic movement had 
been divided by the events of 1923 culminating in the Beer Hall Putsch.  For those on the 
radical right, epitomized by the remaining groups of the Patriotic Working Group, the 
new organization was nothing more that the “dictatorship of the middle,” the triumph of 
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Bavarian particularism in the face of the events of November 8 and 9.  They doubted 
whether the working relationship between the new Notbann and Bund Bayern und Reich 
could even work.  In their view, the patriotic and explicitly political program of 
Pittinger’s organization had to be sacrificed to the needs of the Notbann.66  Such a view 
was rejected by Epp himself, who said in an essay that his formation only followed the 
self-defense concepts pioneered by the Einwohnerwehr.67
The creation of the Notbann led to further soul searching within Bayern und 
Reich, and with it to a second major reorganization.  Many local leaders began in early 
1924 to express doubts related to the group’s paramilitary activities, the departure of local 
units, the upcoming parliamentary elections in Bavaria,
 
68 and their own difficult financial 
situation.69
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  These problems were taken up by the state representative beginning in April 
1924 and led to a reorganization of the state leadership.  A new department was added: a 
chancellery, or Zentral-Abteilung, which coordinated all of the administrative work of the 
leadership, was responsible for enforcing regulations, and supervised most non-
paramilitary activities.  The Propaganda and Press department was split into separate 
offices, with the former coordinating its activities with the defense and organization 
department, while the press office ran the organization’s newspaper, Bayern und Reich.  
The defense office’s responsibilities remained unchanged from before.  They coordinated 
all the personnel in the local offices, and coordinated their activities with the army.  The 
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only additional activity assigned to this office was their coordination with the German 
Emergency Force (Deutscher Notbann), which had been created in the aftermath of the 
Beer Hall Putsch.70
Pittinger’s organization continued to be beset by the defection of local units in the 
aftermath of the Beer Hall Putsch.  One local unit, in the months following the Beer Hall 
Putsch, dissolved its relationship with Bund Bayern und Reich because the leadership had 
become enamored with the political ideas of Hitler.  This unit, from the region of Upper 
Franconia (Oberfranken), split off during the summer of 1924.  The new group they 
created, Wehrverband Oberfranken, adhered specifically to a party-völkisch 
(parteivölkisch) line as enunciated by Hitler and the Fighting League (Kampfbund).  
Specifically, according to the report of a local diet held in the city of Kulmbach, the new 
group adhered to ideas of a unitary Reich, which was vehemently opposed by Bayern und 
Reich.
 
71  They also hoped to revive the spirit of solidarity amongst that existed amongst 
radical nationalist organizations just prior to the putsch.  “If we fail to liquidate 
completely the eighth and ninth of November completely in us, then we deserve our fate.  
Ludendorff, Hitler, Kahr, & Lossow must stand together.  If the leaders are not ready to 
effect that, then they are not. …otherwise we will not acquire freedom.”72
Another problem that continued into the post-1924 period was the bleeding away 
of members to more radical völkisch parties and units.  This development was partially 
attributed to the feeling amongst many members that, with the creation of the Notbann, 
there was really no need to continue as a paramilitary unit.  Those young people who 
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71 Tagung in Kulmbach am 5. Juli 1924, Der Standpunkt des Bundes Bayern und Reich, BHSA, IV, BuR, 
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were in Bayern und Reich in particular saw things this way.  Many joined other 
organizations, a trend that was worrisome to the leadership.  However they continued to 
hope for the best.  As Pittinger put it, “many members of our league belong to other 
associations, whose patriotic disposition cannot be doubted.”73
The transformation of the group from a paramilitary unit to a state political 
(staatpolitisch) entity was the point of the reorganization.  What this meant for Bayern 
und Reich was that military training that had been partially undertaken to prepare its 
members for a foreign war, would be scrapped for a program that prepared the minds of 
the people of the state for defense thinking.  However, this did not mean that all 
paramilitary activtity was given up.  Pittinger made clear that internal enemies still 
existed in Bavaria, and these still needed to be fought, particularly socialist and 
communist groups.  The political program, however, would now take precedence over the 
other.
  He believed that once the 
transformation of Bayern und Reich was complete these members would return. 
74
One way to do this was to continue to advocate for the abandonment of 
representative government, and they did this in a clever way.  Beginning in 1924 
Pittinger’s group began to agitate for the use of the people’s referendum 
(Volksreferendum) as a tool of democracy.  On the surface this seemed very innocuous.  
Legislative power would be put in the hands of the people, not the representatives in 
Munich.  The bill did not pass.  The major roadblocks were provided by the democratic 
parties in the Diet and the Farmer’s League, both of which objected on the grounds that 
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74 Diehl, Paramilitary Politics, 163-7.  The adoption of a state political program did cause a rift between 
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the bill would strengthen executive authority at the expense of parliament.  Their 
obstinacy, anticipated by the governing coalition, prevented easy passage, and this fact 
enraged the Bayern und Reich leadership.75  Their response was to mobilize all of the 
local units to campaign on behalf of the bill’s passage.76  Despite the efforts the bill on 
the people’s referendum went nowhere.  Naturally the leadership blamed their erstwhile 
political allies for its failure.77
They also continued to put pressure on the government in Munich to stand up for 
Bavaria’s rights vis-à-vis Berlin.  In August 1924, at the insistence of the allied powers, 
Berlin centralized the Reichsbahn, the national railroad.  This move removed the 
Bavarian rail system from Munich’s control and naturally outraged Pittinger and his men.  
The Bundesleitung sent a strongly worded letter the Minister-President of Bavaria, Dr. 
Heinrich Held, urging the Bavarian government to resist such measures as it would 
undercut Bavarian sovereignty.
 
78  Pittinger believed that the centralization of the 
Reichsbahn violated the state treaty of 1871, from which Bavaria received most of its 
privileges.  Moreover it would deprive the state of control over much of its economy.  For 
Bayern und Reich the actions of the Reich government proved that they were more than 
prepared to sever the bonds that bound Bavaria to the rest of Germany.79
Perhaps the best example of the political work done by Bund Bayern und Reich 
was its propaganda activities on behalf the United Patriotic Leagues, of which it 
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continued to be the leading member.  The organization continued to put out propaganda 
at election time attacking the Social Democrats and the Weimar Republic.  During the 
1924 Reichstag elections they distributed a series of pamphlets to dissuade their fellows 
from supporting the Social Democrats or the Communists.  Each essay had a theme, from 
fears of a revival of a European war to those of a civil war.80  In spite of the changing 
topics, the message always remained the same; the Socialist leaders of the new Germany 
were responsible for the country’s miserable state of affairs, and only by adopting a 
patriotic and völkisch view of homeland (Heimat) and Fatherland would Germany be 
revived.  “The republic may go to hell, if only Germany, the fatherland, is being saved!  
Constitutions come and go.  But the name ‘fatherland’ will outlast all storm periods, it is 
eternal.”81
Bayern und Reich and the United Patriotic Leagues also undertook a similar 
propaganda campaign in support of Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg’s candidacy in 
the 1925 presidential elections.  While, in this instance, their support went to one specific 
candidate, Hindenburg filled the role of stand in for the type of politician Pittinger and his 
men felt should rule in Germany – a person who put country above party.  “We are not 
allowed to ask, if the candidate belongs to this or that party, if he is Catholic or 
Protestant, if he promises to us all and everything.  We are only allowed to ask: is he a 
veritable German man?”
 
82
                                                     
80 Wer stützt uns in einen neuen Krieg?, and Wer rüstet zum Bürgerkriege?, Severings Kieler Rede, BHSA, 
IV, BuR, B. 1/2. 
  The former World War I military commander stood in sharp 
contrast to the party politicians who, in their view, conspired with each other to maintain 
the republican governing coalition.  In particular Pittinger’s organization, and their allies, 
81 Schwarz-rot-gold gegen Schwarz-weiß-rot, ibid. 
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targeted the Catholic Center Party, which they accused of not only betraying their 
country, but their faith as well.83
Propaganda was not only put out during election time, but at any point that there 
was an issue of public policy of which Bayern und Reich, or the United Patriotic 
Leagues, did not approve.  When the Treaty of Locarno was signed in 1925 the patriotic 
movement, and Pittinger’s group in particular, reacted negatively to the news.  Despite 
the agreement’s positive effect on Germany’s relations with the western allies, France in 
particular, Bayern und Reich and its allies attacked the treaty in no uncertain terms.  For 
them, Locarno only underlined the status quo in Europe as epitomized by the Treaty of 
Versailles.  The guarantees made concerning the country’s frontiers in the west did not 
extend to the east, the area that most concerned Pittinger and his men.  Moreover, by 
signing the treaty, Stresemann had only given official imprimatur to the “war guilt lie” 
that lay at the center of the post-war arrangements.  Bayern und Reich, indeed the entire 
patriotic movement, pledged to continue to work to overturn the peace settlements by any 
means necessary.
 
84
What this meant in practice was to continue to use propaganda against the Paris 
settlements.  The Treaty of Versailles in particular was always a major topic in the 
organization’s efforts.  Most materials put out by the group attacked the treaty, and its 
role in creating the conditions in which Germany and Bavaria found itself.  For instance 
the German calendar for the year 1925 produced drawings and cartoons, fifty-three in all, 
attacking the agreement.  Additionally, the written material was similarly vehement.  
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“Think of Versailles!  Think of it daily, what a humiliating disgrace has been done to us 
there, how we have been robbed and plundered, how it made us defenseless and 
dishonorable!  The Versailles peace is no peace, but war, no treaty, but a breach of 
human rights.”85
 The Beer Hall Putsch showed the limits of paramilitary politics as practiced by 
Bund Bayern und Reich.  Closely aligned with the government, and with an ideological 
program that aimed somewhere between the old imperial system and the racial fantasies 
of völkisch thinkers, Bayern und Reich was never in a position to act on the obvious 
wishes of their membership.  The group’s lack of action, backed up by the army, 
delegitimized it in the eyes of some.  In the Putsch’s aftermath, the organization charted a 
different course, one that forced it to eschew many of the trappings of its original 
mission.  By the time that happened of course, the situation in Germany had changed, and 
even in the patriotic movement the momentum had shifted to Hitler and the Nazi Party. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 When Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933 it 
marked the culmination of over a decade of agitation on the part of patriotic 
(vaterländisch) organizations in Bavaria, who had hoped to see German democracy 
overturned since the very first stirrings of revolution in November 1918.  The hatred they 
felt towards the Weimar Republic, which they always identified with the political left and 
Marxism drove the proliferation of Freikorps, paramilitaries, and political parties in the 
republic’s early years.  The Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich were an integral 
part of this development, at different times, and their existence provided an institutional 
framework by which völkisch ideas gained widespread acceptance.  That many members 
of the Civil Guards and Bayern und Reich found their way into the Nazi Party or, at the 
very least, voted and joined affiliated organizations stands a testament to the role such 
groups played in the formative years after 1918. 
 Many of the men who played such a large role in the history of these two 
organizations continued to participate in the politics of the patriotic movement, but often 
with less prominence than before.  Georg Escherich, the former leader of the 
Einwohnerwehr, spent much of 1922 and 1923 in semi-retirement from politics.  His 
opinions on the issues of the day were still sought after by prominent people, but kept his 
distance from the patriotic groups in the months preceding the Beer Hall Putsch.1
                                                     
1 Escherich an Hugo Stinnes, BHSA, V, NL Escherich, B. 32. 
  In the 
late 1920s he returned to patriotic politics with the creation of a new group, Bavarian 
258 
 
Homeland Protection, but this outfit did not last long.2  Escherich then went into 
permanent retirement, dying of natural causes in 1941.3
 His second in command, Rudolf Kanzler, continued to be involved in the patriotic 
movement after the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr, though not in a prominent way.  
He became involved for a while with the paramilitary group “Treu-Oberland,” though it 
appears he never held a large position within it.
 
4  Retiring from public life, Kanzler 
returned to prominence in 1931 with his memoirs over his years in the Einwohnerwehr, 
Bavaria’s Struggle against Bolshevism.  In the 1936 he was tried in a Munich political 
court accused of swindling a former associate.5
 Dr. Otto Pittinger, the Regensburg health inspector who was the head of Bund 
Bayern und Reich, continued to be a controversial figure in the patriotic movement.  In 
1924, in addition to his duties as head of Bayern und Reich, Pittinger served as a star 
witness in the Hitler-Ludendorff trial.  There he testified to Hitler and Ludendorff’s 
knowledge of government warnings not to undertake a putsch against the state.
  Like Escherich he died of natural causes 
in 1956. 
6
                                                     
2 Landauer Volksblatt, “Politisches aus aller Welt,” 21. March 1929, Nr. 67, BHSA, V, Sammlung 
Personen 3672. 
  His 
testimony did not make him popular with many in the patriotic movement, nor were his 
innovations accepted within Bund Bayern und Reich.  The drop off in membership and in 
3 Völkischer Beobachter, “Oberforstrat Escherich Gestorben,” 29. August 1941, Nr. 242, ibid. 
4 Aufruf, BHSA, IV, EWB, NL Kanzler, B. 17. 
5 Völkischer Beobachter, “Politischer Prozeß,” 14. February 1936, Nr. 45, BHSA, V, Sammlung Personen 
4017. 
6 Pittinger Affadavit, 27. November 1923, BHSA, IV, BuR, B. 16/1. 
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financial support permanently weakened the group, and in 1928 it was folded into the 
Stahlhelm.7  Pittinger however did not live to see it.  He died in 1926 of natural causes.8
 Gustav von Kahr, who did so much to foster the development of the 
Einwohnerwehr, and whose actions on November 8 and 9, 1923 thwarted Hitler and his 
plans, was essentially retired from politics after 1924.  Pensioned off as a civil servant, 
Kahr lived in Munich comfortably until June 30, 1934, when he was arrested by the 
Gestapo and SS.  Taken to Dachau as part of the round up surrounding the event known 
as the “Röhm Putsch,” Kahr was tortured and killed for his role in putting down the Beer 
Hall Putsch.  His badly mutilated body was discovered a couple of days later near the 
camp.
 
9
 Ernst Röhm, who had been such a help to both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund 
Bayern und Reich in his role as weapon’s liaison officer, continued to play an important 
role in the patriotic movement and Nazi Party right up until his death.  Not tried like the 
other conspirators of the Beer Hall Putsch, Röhm spent the next year trying to set up a 
new paramilitary organization, the Frontbann, and later was elected to the German 
Reichstag on the ticket of the Deutschvölkischer Block.  Later Röhm left Germany to 
serve as a soldier of fortune in South America, before returning in 1931 to take command 
of the S.A.  Under his leadership the organization grew rapidly until by 1934 it had nearly 
a million members.  Always controversial and difficult to handle, Röhm hoped to see his 
men supplant the regular German army once Hitler came to power.  In 1934, hoping to 
secure army support for his succession to the presidency once Hindenburg died, Hitler 
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made an arrangement with army leaders and had Röhm murdered as part of a general 
purge of the S.A.10
 The murder of Röhm and Kahr at the hands of the Nazis, and with Hitler’s 
approval, marked the final postscript to the patriotic movement.  Killed by an erstwhile 
ally from the faction’s early years, both men found themselves as captive to events as 
Escherich, Kanzler, and Pittinger had been before them.
 
11
 This study of the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich has looked at the 
development of each group in terms of its ideology, its membership, and activities.  Each 
in its own way had a distinctive history, but contained characteristics that made it similar 
to other patriotic entities.  The primary similarities between these two paramilitary 
formations and the others can be seen in its loathing of Marxist Socialism in all its forms, 
an aggressive German nationalism, distrust, if not outright hatred, of parliamentary 
democracy, and a belief that there needed to be a return to an earlier vision of the German 
  Instead of leading to a renewal 
of Germany under völkisch precepts, the patriotic movement had been co-opted and 
superseded by a political organization that shared much of their worldview, but differed 
in ways so profound that it often led to division as much as unity.  In the end, the 
ideological program of group’s like the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich 
could not compete with the dynamism of the Nazis and this helped lead to the withering 
of the Bavarian paramilitaries. 
                                                     
10 Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1998), 231, 265, 499-506, & 
511-4. 
11 In the case of Ernst Röhm he was not only outmaneuvered by Hitler vis-à-vis the army, but within the 
Nazi leadership by more ambitious lieutenants like Hermann Goering and Heinrich Himmler, Kershaw, 
ibid, . 
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state, or German culture, or to the ideals of 1914.  These major ideas, for a long time, 
united the patriotic movement and gave it coherence. 
 Patriotic paramilitaries had other traits in common as well.  Most were begun by 
men who were part of the lower to middle reaches of the Bavarian state bureaucracy.  
These were people who, had the old regime continued past 1918, might have one day 
advanced to the highest reaches of the state and its bureaucracy.  The revolution seemed 
to close the door on further advancement, and this partly motivated people like Gustav 
von Kahr, Rudolf Kanzler, and Otto Pittinger in creating, or helping set up various 
Freikorps and paramilitary units.  A cozy relationship with the Bavarian army was 
another major commonality amongst patriotic formations, though this relationship was 
often one sided. 
 However it would be the differences in how the two organizations developed and 
operated that provide the key to their importance in the history of the radical right in 
Bavaria.  This is a crucial point, for each group evolved in a particular historical setting 
that influenced not only how it reacted to the state, but also to the events of importance in 
the early republic.  The Einwohnerwehr, organized in Bavaria following the events of 
May 1919, served the function of an umbrella organization.  Not only did it come to 
supersede the various Freikorps units that had been created to deal with the Räterepublik, 
but it took in whole organizations like the Freikorps Oberland, which found itself 
fighting on the Reich’s eastern borderlands.  Bund Bayern und Reich, on the other hand, 
had been created out of a need to provide stability to a fluid situation following the 
dissolution of the Civil Guards.  Its existence was tied to the need to keep as much of the 
old paramilitary structure intact as possible.  That it was eventually unable to do so, 
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spoke to changed circumstances within the Bavaria amongst those predisposed to 
patriotic and völkisch ideas. 
 Four major conclusions can be asserted in relation to Georg Escherich’s 
Einwohnerwehr.  The first of these was that the Civil Guards were functionally völkisch 
in terms of their world view.  Despite the regulation’s insistence that the organizations 
only function was to protect the state, and all state-supporting elements within it, in 
reality the leadership carefully crafted its ideology and activities to support traditional 
social and political arrangements.  For them the uprising of November 1918 was just as 
troublesome as that of April and May of 1919.  That the new political order came from 
Social Democrats, first in an alliance between the SPD and USPD, later a revolt by more 
radical elements of the USPD in the Räterepublik, struck them as a misfortune to both 
Bavaria and Germany.  The country’s new masters were seen alternately as robbers, 
swindlers, and murderers who were prepared to give the Fatherland over to its enemies 
rather than work for its welfare.  USPD and KPD members were routinely denied entry 
into the guards, and many SPD members also had problems reconciling the worldview of 
the EW’s units with their own political beliefs.  For the leadership, the political left was 
outside the ‘people’s community,’ and the only reason Escherich and Kanzler tolerated 
the SPD during the Einwohnerwehr’s existence was due to the fact that majority Socialist 
governments were in power both in Munich and Berlin.  When the moment of truth came 
in March 1920, Escherich and his allies were just as willing to threaten Social 
Democratic leaders with violence just as they had with the Independent Socialists. 
 Another aspect of its völkisch stance could be seen in the thinly veiled 
antisemitism that prevailed in many local units.  Officially non-sectarian, as well as non-
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political, Civil Guard members and their leaders frequently ignored regulations to take in 
members regardless of religion.  Jews were harassed in many rural units, most 
significantly in the Chiemgau, which was a stronghold for the Einwohnerwehr.  Such 
incidents show that strong antisemitic tendencies were prevalent in Escherich’s 
organization.  Several members of the top leadership were broadly sympathetic to 
völkisch ideas and many, if not all, subscribed to the ultra-nationalist views of the Pan-
German League, whose own leader, Heinrich Claß, often spoke out against Jews using 
the most abusive language. 
 As was the case with many of the men who joined more radical organizations like 
the Freikorps later-Bund Oberland and the Nazi Party, Einwohnerwehr members were 
deeply impacted by the First World War and its aftermath.  Like many Germans who held 
to völkisch beliefs during the old Reich, the onset of the Burgfrieden in 1914 came to 
symbolize for them the true unification of Germany, when citizens of all stripes put aside 
political differences to fight a common enemy – a true people’s community.  Defeat and 
revolution tore apart their imagined vision of the Reich.  For people like Rudolf Kanzler, 
the most important work of the guards was in reviving this spirit.  Their propaganda 
frequently depicted the political environment of the new republic, particularly that 
emanating from the left, as essentially un-German.  It was vituperative, contentious, and 
totally free of the unity that Escherich and his men believed necessary to return Germany 
to a state of order and power.  They believed only by putting aside party politics, i.e. 
adopting their ideological world view, could the Fatherland be revived. 
 Often this worldview was wedded to older concepts of homeland and white-blue 
Bavaria, something that was not prevalent in more radical organizations.  This was 
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illustrated most clearly in the articles of the Einwohnerwehr paper Heimatland as it 
related to the first state shooting festival.  The articles written about that event tied 
current events, the dispute over weapons, the fears of a more centralized Reich, and the 
need to return to the ideals of 1914 with an older tradition of solid Bavarian patriotism 
that described traditional Bavarian citizens upholding their rights and weapons in much 
the same way as citizens had done for decades and centuries.  It also manifested itself in 
the group’s obsession with the rights of the state within the new constitution written at 
Weimar, a document that they found to be overly centralized and detrimental to Munich’s 
position in a federal German state. 
 The second major conclusion is that, over the course of its history, the 
Einwohnerwehr became a significant power player in the Bavarian state.  Originally, this 
had not been the intention of the Social Democratic leaders who helped bring the Civil 
Guards into existence.  They wanted a reliable force that could be called upon to 
supplement the army and defend the state.  In Bavaria, however, factors came together 
that allowed Escherich and Kanzler to create a de facto independent entity there.  The 
most decisive of these developments was removing the guards from the outright 
supervision of the army.  By removing government oversight, while taking its money and 
arms, the Einwohnerwehr could develop its own practices and procedures.  One can see 
the effect of this in terms of ideology where, as mentioned above, many local units 
discriminated against workers and Jews, even though the regulations allowed 
membership from those groups. 
 The extraordinary leeway given to the Civil Guards helped foster a sense of 
arrogance and entitlement amongst many of the men.  Members of local units were often 
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involved in trouble with the law owing to the zeal with which they carried out their 
activities.  Workers and working class districts tended to be targeted no matter the 
circumstance, economic or political, and this created tensions between the organization 
and the SPD Hofmann government, as both clashed bitterly over a number of issues.  
Eventually the acquiescence shown to Escherich’s group came back to haunt the 
government as the guards played a decisive role in the events of the Kapp Putsch in 
Munich. 
 During the tumultuous days of March 1920, Escherich is said to have boasted that 
he had a hundred thousand men behind him.  The implicit threat in that statement 
illustrates, perhaps better than any other, how powerful the Einwohnerwehr had become.  
Its power and influence only grew from there.  Under the new government of Gustav von 
Kahr, the regional governor of Upper Bavaria at the time, Escherich’s association was 
able to expand its influence.  It moved into Austria with the Organisation Kanzler and 
into Silesia and northern Germany with the Organisation Escherich.  Despite the political 
opposition from Berlin and the northern states, and the illegality of such activities, no 
sanctions were placed on the group.  In fact the Kahr government went out of its way to 
defend the Einwohnerwehr against both the Reich government and the allied powers who 
had come to take a dim view of the paramilitary’s activities. 
 Escherich’s organization was not only a power player in Bavarian politics, but 
increasingly became bolder in its political program.  This development, which went 
against the group’s regulations, was a consequence of its expansion.  Following the Kapp 
Putsch, Escherich and the Bavarian leadership came to believe that there needed to be a 
continued ‘patriotic’ presence in northern Germany.  The need, as they saw it, helped 
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lead to the founding of the Orgesch, which was to keep alive a nation-wide patriotic 
movement.  The criticisms leveled against the Reich government, coming under the 
auspices of this new entity actually had been present in the months prior to the Kapp 
Putsch, when propaganda materials out of Munich criticized the actions of democratic 
leaders in Berlin, and in Munich.  Thus the Civil Guards, despite their protestations, 
became one of the focal points of resistance to the Weimar government, and its 
constitution. 
 Finally, the Einwohnerwehr became the means by which patriotic ideas were 
spread beyond the borders of Bavaria.  The existence of a strong ultra-nationalist 
organization in Bavaria became crucial after March 1920 when energetic action by 
workers, and then the Reich government, had broken the power of far-right groups north 
of the Main.  The activities of the Orgesch, founded in conjunction with the Stahlhelm, 
and the Orka (a sub group of the Organisation Escherich), helped to maintain the 
patriotic movement.  In many ways they were crucial in helping spread it.  Under the 
guidance of the Orka, the Heimwehr movement was established in Austria and would 
become a crucial player in politics there over the next decade.  The Orgesch also helped 
to organize resistance to Polish ‘encroachments’ in Silesia, setting up numerous umbrella 
groups to coordinate fighting units, and sending Freikorps units from Bavaria, most 
notably Freikorps Oberland, to assist the Silesians. 
 The dissolution of the Einwohnerwehr in the summer of 1921 opened up a 
vacuum in the patriotic movement, one that was not easily filled.  Due to pressure from 
the allied powers, the Bavarian government could not set up a semi-official organization 
tied to the state, as the Civil Guards had been.  In its place would come a plethora of 
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paramilitaries, each only a fraction of the size of the former Einwohnerwehr and without 
its influence.  The fracturing of the nationalist right that resulted would characterize the 
far-right, now far more contentious amongst itself, right up until the Beer Hall Putsch and 
beyond. 
 Bund Bayern und Reich, which came into existence in this milieu, quickly became 
the most prominent of these organizations, but was different in its character and actitivies 
than the old Einwohnerwehr.  The most significant difference between the two groups 
was that Pittinger’s association was much more radical in an overt way.  The 
Einwohnerwehr had been functionally völkisch, but Bayern und Reich was explicit in 
proclaiming this orientation.  Its program spoke of creating a racist Bavaria and 
Germany, excluded Jews from its membership and spoke of eliminating their influence in 
the Reich, and sought to overthrow the Weimar Constitution and Republic.  Anti-
Marxism continued to be a major point in the program, just like it had been with the Civil 
Guards, but now consciously included the SPD in its list of enemies.  They also wanted to 
see the expansion of the Reich into a greater German state. 
 In addition to being a more ideological organization than the old Einwohnerwehr, 
Bund Bayern und Reich also was much more dependent upon its state sponsors in a direct 
way.  In fact without support from the army, which became, after the dissolution of the 
guards, the primary – and secret – means of support for the patriotic movement, it is 
doubtful that Otto Pittinger’s group would have made a major impact.  Military support 
allowed money to flow into the health inspector’s coffers.  Their decision to deal with his 
organization, both the Organisation Pittinger and Bund Bayern und Reich, as the 
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exclusive paramilitary in the state helped to swell membership following its creation in 
1922. 
 The backing of the army however, could not stop ideological infighting within the 
patriotic movement, or within Pittinger’s group, and this fact made Bayern und Reich 
more dependent upon the army than ever before.  The struggles between Pittinger and 
Bund Oberland, the dispute with Ernst Röhm over weapons and funds, and the strife 
between the United Patriotic Leagues and the Patriotic Working Group/Fighting League 
ordinarily might have spelled the death knell of any organization, and Bayern und Reich 
suffered many defections from within its own ranks, both members and whole units, 
during the year.  During all of this the Reichswehr maintained its strong connection to 
Pittinger and his men, siding with him in nearly all of these disputes.  They also took over 
control of the military arm of the organization, a discordant note that denoted lack of faith 
in Pittinger and also only served to bind Bayern und Reich even more closely to the army. 
 The fruits of such a relationship could be seen in the group’s reaction to the Beer 
Hall Putsch.  Actively supporting a ‘March on Berlin,’ when that seemed a possibility, 
Bayern und Reich backed off the moment the negotiations between Kahr and far-right 
activists in northern Germany broke down.  Like the other associations, Bayern und 
Reich was warned not to undertake any operations that would force the army’s hand, a 
promise they kept.  Of the major paramilitaries in Bavaria in 1923, Pittinger’s 
organization was the only one that did not participate in the putsch and actively worked 
to squelch it outside Munich by preventing outside reinforcements from reaching the 
capital. 
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 Another striking characteristic of Bund Bayern und Reich was its seeming 
provincialism, a tendency which caused a great deal of strife for the organization.  
Pittinger’s strong inclinations towards a federal constitution, in which Bavaria maintained 
the rights it had under the old Bismarckian constitution, was a hallmark of the group, 
indeed all the associations united under the United Patriotic League banner.  They sharply 
opposed further centralization of the German state, which was one of their major 
complaints about the Weimar constitution.  It also fed their paranoia about a possible 
strike against Bavaria from the national government, and helped make the case for their 
continued existence as a prop of the Bavarian state. 
However, their adherence to federalism and states’ rights came under sharp attack 
from other entities on the far right.  The organizations around Hitler and the Fighting 
League often accused them, wrongly, of pursuing separatist politics at the expense of the 
Reich.  This became the subject of numerous investigations, both in the Bund Oberland 
controversy and the Röhm-Pittinger dispute.  In each case Pittinger was accused of 
dealing with foreign emissaries to divide Bavaria from Germany, whether to create a 
Danubian state or a sovereign state on its own.  The investigations into these allegations 
exonerated Pittinger in each case, but the rumors would persist right through the Beer 
Hall Putsch. 
Finally, Bund Bayern und Reich found itself increasingly outflanked by the Nazi 
Party and groups affiliated with the Fighting League.  This became a huge problem for 
Pittinger and the leadership in late 1922 and throughout 1923 as the situation in Germany 
deteriorated precipitously.  In the Ruhr Crisis of 1923 Bayern und Reich found itself 
agreeing with the strategy outlined by the government, one that seemed ineffectual and 
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doomed to failure by Hitler and his allies.  Their attacks and simple slogans, coupled with 
the crippling hyperinflation brought about a shift to the more radical paramilitaries and 
their spokesman. 
One consequence of this was that Bayern und Reich began to lose members.  As 
an association that had the restoration of monarchical government as one of its goals, 
there was already a perception of Pittinger’s organization as solidly establishmentarian, 
despite the radical nature of their program and their willingness to advocate for and plan 
the overthrow of democracy.  Despite the leadership’s best efforts, many of the younger 
members found their way into Fighting League-affiliated groups, and many local units 
disassociated themselves with Bayern und Reich for what they perceived was its lack of 
radicalism.  Many of the leaders of these outfits became enamored with the revolutionary 
ardor of the Nazi Party, and its leader, something that Pittinger and his men could not 
replicate due to their beliefs, the lack of anyone to match Hitler’s charisma, and the ties 
that bound Bayern und Reich to the army and state. 
In the end, both the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich helped prepare 
the groundwork that later bore fruit for Hitler.  By adopting the world view of völkisch 
ideologues, consciously or not, they helped acculturate many Germans of varied 
backgrounds to the idea that the Weimar Republic, and the society it was trying to create, 
was essentially un-German and thus worthy of destruction.  The paramilitaries of the 
early republic in Bavaria essentially helped this process along by engaging in violence 
against organizations on the left, and against workers, by propaganda activities, and by 
plotting to violently overthrow the government.  Even though they did not succeed in 
many of their endeavors, they did succeed in de-legitimizing democracy for many 
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Bavarians who might have, under better circumstances, given the new government a 
chance.  This was the true legacy of the Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern und Reich. 
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Appendix A 
Chronology of Major Events 
1918 
January 1918 – Demonstrations in Munich led by SPD and USPD leaders.  Kurt Eisner 
jailed after protest. 
October 1918 – Kurt Eisner released from jail in Bavaria. 
November 7, 1918 – Joint rally of SPD and USPD in Munich leads to revolution forcing 
the last Wittelsbach king to flee.  Bavaria becomes a Free State, Kurt Eisner becomes 
head of the government, and the first Worker, Soldier, and Farmer councils set up. 
December 1918 – Rudolf Kanzler forms first paramilitary militia in Rosenheim. 
1919 
January 12, 1919 – Parliamentary elections lead to defeat for Eisner’s USPD. 
February 21, 1919 – Kurt Eisner assassinated while entering Bavarian Diet. 
March 1919 – the establishment of the Hofmann government and the radicalization of the 
councils. 
April 5, 1919 – Räterepublik (council republic) set up in Munich, Hofmann government 
flees to Bamberg. 
April 8, 1919 – First attempted assault on Munich is defeated by council forces 
April 14, 1919 – Hofmann government calls for creation of militias to deal with 
Räterepublik. 
May 1, 1919 – Government forces retake Munich and suppress the Räterepublik. 
May 17, 1919 – Hofmann government calls for creation of Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria. 
May-August 1919 – Organization of the Einwohnerwehr in Bavaria under Georg 
Escherich with help of the Bavarian Reichswehr and Governor of Upper Bavaria, Gustav 
von Kahr. 
August-December 1919 – Spread of Einwohnerwehr throughout Bavaria, difficulties with 
workers entering the organization, and problems with SPD Hofmann government. 
1920 
February 21, 1920 – Meeting in Munich to discuss the creation of self-defense 
organizations in Austria.  Followed by meeting in Salzburg on February 28. 
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March 12-22, 1920 – Kapp Putsch in Bavaria resulting in the resignation of the Hofmann 
government, the creation of a conservative government under Gustav von Kahr, general 
strikes in Bavaria, and the suppression of industrial workers in northern Bavaria, 
particularly in Hof. 
April-June 1920 – Founding and organization of the Organisation Escherich (Orgesch). 
April-August 1920 – Creation of Heimwehr in Austria under auspices of Organisation 
Kanzler (Orka). 
July 9, 1920 – Interallied Military Commission demands the dissolution of the 
Einwohnerwehr and the Orgesch. 
August 7, 1920 – Law for the Disarmament of the Population passed by the Reichstag. 
August-September 1920 – Antisemitic incidents in Rosenheim Einwohnerwehr. 
September 25-30, 1920 – The first Einwohnerwehr state shooting festival 
(Landesschießen) held in Munich, including a large rally at the Königsplatz on September 
26. 
1921 
May 5, 1921 – Allied powers issue ultimatum to the Bavarian government calling for the 
disbandment of the Einwohnerwehr. 
June 1921 – Einwohnerwehr disbanded, Organisation Pittinger (OrgPi), as successor to 
Einwohnerwehr, created on June 12. 
June-November 1921 – Feud between Georg Escherich and Otto Pittinger over control of 
the OrgPi. 
1922 
January-July 1922 – Feud between Pittinger and Josef Römer of the Bund Oberland. 
April 1922 – Creation of Bund Bayern und Reich. 
Summer 1922 – Creation of the United Patriotic Leagues to coordinate all patriotic 
organizations 
1923 
January-December 1923 – French occupation of the Ruhr due to German unwillingness 
to pay war reparations.  German government adopts passive resistance in Ruhr, then 
decides to print money, destroying German currency.  Country slides into economic 
chaos. 
January 28, 1923 – Nazi Party and other organizations leave United Patriotic Leagues to 
form Working Group of Patriotic Fighting Leagues. 
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January-March 1923 – Several local units leave Bund Bayern und Reich to form 
alliances with Hitler and Working Group. 
January-June 1923 – Röhm-Pittinger dispute over questions of competence and the 
misallocation of funds further divides patriotic organizations in Bavaria. 
Spring 1923 – Bund Bayern und Reich encourages changes to Bavarian constitution that 
would have overthrown republic in the state. 
May 1, 1923 – Planned disruption of May Day celebrations failed, causes dissent within 
the Working Group. 
Summer 1923 – Bavarian government having greater difficulties with all patriotic groups, 
especially the Nazi Party. 
September 26, 1923 – Gustav von Kahr named General State Commissioner in Bavaria 
with dictatorial powers. 
October 1923 – Efforts to unite all patriotic organizations around Kahr begins and fails.  
Kahr resumes his feud with Berlin and plots with patriotic circles in northern Germany 
for a putsch against the Reich government. 
November 7, 1923 – Having failed in negotiations with ultra-nationalist circles in Berlin, 
Kahr, Otto von Lossow, and Hans von Seisser obtain a pledge from all patriotic 
organizations, including Bund Bayern und Reich and the Nazi Party, to abstain from any 
coup attempt. 
November 8 & 9, 1923 – Hitler, Ludendorff, and the Fighting League attempt to seize 
power in the Beer Hall Putsch.  Bund Bayern und Reich remains loyal to Kahr and works 
to subvert the coup attempt after a period of confusion. 
November-December 1923 – Aftermath of the Beer Hall Putsch.  Kahr bans Nazi Party 
and Fighting League groups and obtains loyalty from Bund Bayern und Reich and other 
patriotic organizations.  Discontent within Bayern und Reich with Kahr and the 
leadership of Pittinger begins to surface. 
1924 
January-March 1924 – Bavarian government begins to organize the Deutscher Notbann 
to serve as a reliable self-defense force.  Bund Bayern und Reich members allowed to 
join, but not do political work while members of the force. 
February 1924 – Bund Bayern und Reich continues to urge constitutional reforms that 
will undercut democracy in Bavaria. 
February 26, 1924 – Hitler-Ludendorff Trial begins in Munich.  Bund Bayern und Reich 
head Otto Pittinger is a witness in the trial. 
March-July 1924 – Continuing organizational issues for Bund Bayern und Reich as local 
units defect and a reorganization of the leadership is carried out. 
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1925-1928 
1926 – The head of Bund Bayern und Reich, Dr. Otto Pittinger, dies of natural causes. 
1928 – Losing members, Bund Bayern und Reich is folded into the Stahlhelm. 
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Appendix B 
Glossary of Important Terms 
Anschluß    -  Term refers to the desire for union  
       between Austria and Germany  
       amongst many people from both  
       countries in the years after World  
       War I. 
Auflösung    -  A term meaning dissolution, this  
       referred to the struggle to disband the 
       Einwohnerwehr in 1920-1921. 
Bund Bayern und Reich  -  League of Bavaria and the Reich,  
       founded by Otto Pittinger in April  
       1922 and was the most significant  
       paramilitary force in Bavaria after  
       the dissolution of the    
       Einwohnerwehr. 
Bund Oberland   -  Formed out of the Freikorps   
       Oberland, which had helped in the  
       “liberation” of Munich, Bund  
       Oberland’s leadership became  
       embroiled in a feud with Bayern und  
       Reich head Pittinger and later allied  
       with Hitler in the Beer Hall Putsch. 
Burgfrieden    -  A term that means civil peace, this  
       was used to connote the intense  
       national feeling in Germany brought  
       about by the outbreak of the First  
       World War. 
Deutscher Notbann   -  Paramilitary unit created by the  
       Bavarian government in the wake of  
       the Beer Hall Putsch to ensure a  
       more reliable emergency force. 
Einwohnerwehr   -  Civilian Defense Guards, or force,  
       set up in the months after the   
       suppression of the Räterepublik in  
       Munich. 
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Entwaffnung    -  Term meaning disarmament, this  
       term was used in the dispute over the 
       Einwohnerwehr. 
Freikorps    -  Translated literally as Free Corps,  
       these units were made up of ex- 
       soldiers who followed charismatic  
       officers.  They helped suppress the  
       Spartacist Revolt, the Räterepublik,  
       and fought the new Polish state in  
       the east. 
Gauleiter    -  District leader in the Einwohnerwehr 
       and Bund Bayern und Reich and was  
       later used to denote a district leader  
       in the Nazi Party. 
Germanen Orden   -  Pre-World War I völkisch group that  
       was a predecessor of the Thule  
       Society. 
Heimat    -  Homeland, often used   
       interchangeably with fatherland. 
Heimatland    -  This was the official news organ of  
       the Einwohnerwehr. 
Heimwehr    -  Name given to the Austrian   
       paramilitary organization created by  
       the Orka in 1920. 
Kampfbund    -  This was the name of fighting league 
       created by Hitler and Ludendorff in  
       September 1923, would participate  
       in the Beer Hall Putsch. 
KPD     -  An acronym for the Communist  
       Party of Germany, this party formed  
       after the war and was opposed to the  
       Nazi Party and the SPD alike. 
Kreisleiter    -  This was a Regional leader in the  
       Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern  
       und Reich. 
Landespolizei    -  A militarized police force created in  
       the early 1920s in Bavaria, its leader, 
       Hans von Seisser, was taken hostage  
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       by Hitler at the beginning of the Beer 
       Hall Putsch. 
Landesschießen   -  This was a state shooting festival  
       held in Munich by the   
       Einwohnerwehr in September 1920. 
Notpolizei    -  An emergency police force created  
       by the Bavarian government in  
       spring 1923. 
Organisation Escherich  -  Group created by Georg Escherich  
       and Franz Seldte in the Spring of  
       1920, which was designed to   
       coordinate all patriotic groups.   
       Known by the acronym Orgesch. 
Organisation Kanzler   -  A subset of the Orgesch, this group  
       helped to organize paramilitary units  
       in Austria in 1920.  Known by the  
       acronym Orka. 
Organisation Pittinger   -  Group created upon the dissolution  
       of the Einwohnerwehr, was intended  
       as a coordinating agency for other  
       paramilitaries.  Known by its   
       acronym OrgPi. 
Ortsgruppe    -  This was a local cell of both the  
       Einwohnerwehr and Bund Bayern  
       und Reich. 
Räterepublik    -  The council republic that developed  
       in the aftermath of the Eisner  
       assassination and which is known  
       more popularly as the Munich  
       Soviet. 
Reichswehr    -  Name given to the German army  
       during the Weimar Republic. 
Reichsbahn    -  The name of the national German  
       railway during the Weimar Republic. 
Ruhe und Ordnung   -  Term that was often used by the  
       Einwohnerwehr to justify their  
       actions. 
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SPD     -  An acronym for the Social   
       Democratic Party, which was the  
       political party representing   
       Germany’s working class and who  
       took power in Germany following  
       World War I. 
Stahlhelm    -  Translated as Steel Helmet, this  
       organization began as a paramilitary, 
       but also served as an advocate for  
       veterans.  Akin to the American  
       Legion. 
USPD     -  An acronym for the Independent  
       Social Democratic Party, which was  
       formed during World War I as a  
       result of the schism within the SPD.   
       They took power in a coalition  
       government in Bavaria following  
       World War I. 
Vaterländisch Movement  -  Patriotic movement that included a  
       number of paramilitary organizations 
       and political parties in post-1918  
       Bavaria 
 
Völkisch Nationalism   -  A racially-based form of nationalism 
       developed in post-unification  
       Germany.  Völkisch thinkers   
       emphasized German superiority and  
       preeminence while denigrating all  
       those who did not belong the racial  
       community, or whose political  
       viewpoints were at variance with  
       their own. 
Volksgemeinschaft   -  A term referring to the concept of the 
       community of  the people, where it  
       was believed that all Germans would 
       live in harmony despite differences  
       of class or religion. 
Wandervögel    -  A pre-World War I German youth  
       movement that emphasized getting in 
       touch with nature, and was suffused  
       with völkisch ideology. 
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Appendix C 
Map of Bavaria 
 
Source: Travels Through Germany website: www.travelsthroughgermany.com/bayern-
map.htm 
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